1999 PLP 489 (PLC)

(6) Attendance Card 6‑2‑1992 to 29‑2‑1992. 24 days (7) Attendance card 1‑3‑1992 to 31‑3‑1992 31 days (8) Appointment order 14‑3‑1992 to 12‑5‑1992 60 days (9) Attendance card 1‑4‑1992 to 30‑4‑1992 30 days (10) Attendance card ‑5‑1992 to 31‑5‑1992 31 days (11) Appointment order, 15‑5‑1992 to 13‑7‑1992 60 days (12) Attendance card 1‑6‑1992 to 30‑6‑1992. 30 days (13) Appointment order 6‑2‑1992 to 6‑4‑1992 60 days (14) Appointment order, 1‑8‑1992 to 29‑9‑1992. 60 days Annexure A/19 showing particulars of duty from September, 1992 to September, 1995. (Sd.) Representative of respondent. 21‑4‑1999 (Sd.) 21‑4‑1999

3. As will be apparent from the above joint statement, the respondent was first appointed on 13‑12‑1989 as Driver for 60 days. After a gap of about. one month and six days, he was again appointed, second time, for 60 days w.e.f. 5‑3‑1990 to 3‑5‑1990. Again with a gap of six days, he was appointed, third time, for 6 days w.e.f. 10‑5‑1990 to 11‑7‑1990. Again with a gap of five days, he was appointed, fourth time, for another 60 days w.e.f. IS‑7‑1990 to '12‑9‑1990. Likewise with a gap of five days, he was again appointed, fifth time, for 60 days w.e.f. 18‑9‑1990 to 16‑11‑1990. The respondent has, however, produced his attendance card showing his appointment w.e.f. 6‑2‑1992 to 29‑2‑1992 for 24 days only (without producing any appointment order) after a gap of two months and twenty days. Another attendance card w.e.f. 1‑3‑1992 to 31‑3‑1992 for one full month (i.e. 31 days) has been produced, again without an appointment order. However, with a gap of 13 days, he has been able to produce another appointment order, for 60 days w.e.f. 14‑3‑1992 to 12‑5‑1992 with an attendance card‑w.e.f. 1‑4‑1992 to 30‑4‑1992 for 30 days and again another attendance card from 1‑5‑1992 to 31‑5‑1992 without an appointment order. Another appointment order for 60 days w.e.f. 15‑5‑1992 to 31‑7‑1992 with an attendance card for the month of June was produced. Lastly, he has produced an appointment order for 60 days w.e.f. 6‑2‑1992 and then with a gap of about 20 days appointment order for another 60 days w.e.f. 1‑8‑1992 to 29‑9‑1992. All these appointments bear out that the respondent was appointed as Driver in the applicant Corporation from time to time used as many as nine appointment orders were issued for specified period but all with gaps. There seems to be no continuity of service up to 29‑9‑1992. The respondent, however, without producing any appointment letter, has been able to produce Annexure A‑19, showing particulars of duty performed by him from September, 1992 to September, 1995 with a summary of attendance register produced by a witness, summoned by the respondent from the applicant Corporation namely M. Ayub, Yard Master, S.R.T.C., Hyderabad, as ordered by the learned Labour Court. By this piece of evidence, it stands proved that the respondent has been working continuously since 1‑8‑1992 up to September, 1995, as such, he has been rightly held to be a permanent workman by the learned Labour Court. He was, thus, entitled to a notice of termination of his employment as provided under Standing Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance; 1968.

4. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 will not be attracted to this case as every appointment was temporary in nature indicating the time as and when the said temporary appointment was to expire. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the contention is not tenable. Had there been initial appointment only for 60 days or even for 89 days, not to attain the limit of 90 days, the arguments would have some force, but merely appointing the respondent initially for 60 days, and, thereafter, extending the said period by issuance of separate office orders, will not take away the right of a workman to attain the status of a permanent workman. The moment, the respondent attained the status of permanent workman, he became entitled to a notice of termination in accordance with Standing Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Admittedly, no termination letter had been issued. The law provides that the services of a permanent workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken.

5. Mr. Devdas, in support of his submission, however, placed his reliance on a case reported as Qareebur Rehman v. Mehran Bottlers (1993 PLC 154) wherein it was held by a learned Chairman of this Tribunal that, "where appointment of an employee was for a specified period, service of a separate letter of termination was not at all necessary on such employee" The case, cited by the counsel, is distinguishable inasmuch as there was only one letter of appointment for a specified period of 89 days and, thereafter his employment stood terminated and, as such, he being a temporary workman, could not claim notice of termination of his service under Standing Order 12(3), whereas in the instant case there are four appointment letters, attendance cards, extending to several years with register of attendance for September, 1992 to September, 1995.

6. He also placed his reliance on a case reported as Munir Khan v. Presiding Officer, Vth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi (1993 PLC 192). This case is also distinguishable inasmuch as in the said case, there was also a temporary appointment for 89 days only, and no further.

7. For the above discussion. I find no illegality, incorrectness or even impropriety in the decision, given by the learned Presiding Officer, impugned in the above revision.

8. In result, the revision application is dismissed. Announced in open Court, this the 30th days of April, 1999. H. B. T./256/K/Lab. (Trib.) Revision dismissed.