1994 PLP 487 (SCMR)
MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others‑‑‑Appellants Versus ABDUL GHANI and others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1994 PLP 487 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Zaffar Hussain Mirza and Ajmal Mian, JJ |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others‑‑‑Appellants Versus ABDUL GHANI and others‑‑‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 487 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 487 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Zaffar Hussain Mirza and Ajmal Mian, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 487 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others‑‑‑Appellants Versus ABDUL GHANI and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Ali Akbar, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellant (in Civil Appeal No. 108‑K of 1979).
- Yousaf Rafi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents Nos.l and 2 (in Civil Appeal No. 108‑K of 1979).
- KA. Ghani Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No.3 (in Civil Appeal No. 108‑K of 1979).
- KA. Ghani, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellant (in Civil Appeal No. 109‑K of 1979).
- Yousaf Rafi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents (in Civil Appeal No. 109‑K of 1979).
- Date of hearing: 20th November, 1990.
- "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perusing the plan placed on the file we have come to the conclusion that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for respondents Nos.4 and 5 the heirs of Eida that the whole of the roof over portion `D' has been transferred to them. It is evident from the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated the 27th of June 1964 that the open roof in the property has been transferred to the transferees of the corresponding portions on the ground floor and that was reasonable too because the transferees of the only room on the first floor could not have been given the open roof of the whole building. There is also no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that respondents Nos.4 and 5 should have no right of access to the room on the first floor over any portion of the roof of portion `D' transferred to them, for in that case it would not at all be possible for respondents Nos.4 and 5 to approach the room on the first floor transferred to them. The order of the Settlement Commissioner that respondents Nos.4 and 5 the heirs of Eida would have the right to pass over the open roof for approaching the room on the first floor was. therefore reasonable and justified. However, to obviate the recurrence of any dispute between the parties in future we amend the order of the Settlement Commissioner to the extent that the Settlement Authorities concerned should demarcate the passage over the roof of portion `D' transferred to the appellants which respondents Nos.4 and 5 the heirs of Eida transferees of portion `B' on the first floor could find access to it. The passage should be demarcated in such a way as to cause least inconvenience to the appellate is."
Headnotes / Summary
(From the judgment dated 18‑4‑1979 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, passed in Constitutional Petitions Nos. 409 and 468 of 1969). (a) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 10 & Sched.‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185 (3)‑‑‑Leave to appeal was granted to consider, whether on the facts of the case, respondents who were transferees of single room on one of the shops in question, could be entitled to the transfer of roofs of all the adjoining shops; and whether in the circumstances of case P.T.D. could have been amended. (b) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 10 & Sched.‑‑‑Transfer of roof of entire building to transferee of one room‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Roof of entire building was transferred to respondent on the ground that he must have been using roof of all the ground floor though unauthorisedly since 1951‑‑‑Such reasoning for the allotment of entire roof of the building was not a sufficient reason warranting transfer of same‑‑ ; Settlement Authority, without having recorded a< fndi4g of fact that one room (allotted to respondent) and the roof of the entire building constituted one unit r under evacuee laws, could not transfer roof of entire building to, respondents I on the basis of the unauthorised use thereof by them‑‑‑Original P.T.D. did not include roof of the building or the fact that respondents had paid price a thereof‑‑‑Subsequent amendment of P.T.D. the effect of which was to transfer roof, even without charging price was not warranted by law‑‑ Respondents were thus, not entitled to transfer roof of entire building. Abdul Majid and another v. Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Lyallpur and 4 others 1977 SCMR 353 and Nazir and others v. Syed Israr Ahmad and others 1981 SCMR 829 rel.
Judgment & Decree
4. From the record it is evident that the room on the first floor, which was assigned property No.B‑436, was not in existence at the time of partition of India. It was constructed as per finding of the Settlement Commissioner prior to 21‑1‑1951 on a portion of the roof. It is also an admitted position that when the above room was transferred to respondents Nos.l and 2, the P.T.D. did not include the roofs of the shops which were lying vacant, nor any price for the same was charged by the Settlement Department as is evident from the above quoted portion of the order of the Settlement Commissioner. The question which requires consideration is, as to whether the Accounts Officer could have allowed the addition in the P.T.D. as to include the roofs of the shops which were transferred to different persons including the appellants and their predecessor‑in‑interest. The Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, or the Schemes framed there under, do not confer any such power on the administrative side upon an Accounts Officer. Be that as it may, the above action of the Accounts Officer was upheld by the Settlement Commissioner. Further question which needs examination is, whether the order of the Settlement Commissioner which has been upheld by the High Court can be sustained. The reasoning found favour with the Settlement Commissioner, namely, that the respondent No.l must have been using the roofs of all the shops though unauthorisedly since before 1951, in our view, is not a sufficient reason warranting transfer of the roofs of the shops to respondent No.l, though the shops were already transferred inter alia to the appellants and thereby depriving the transferees of the shops the roofs of their shops. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Majid and another v. Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Lyallpur, and 4 others (1977 SCMR 353), in which the facts were that a double‑storeyed building bearing No.129/1 situated in Ward No.7 of Montogomery Bazar, Lyallpur, was an evacuee property, of which various portions were in possession of various persons. Upon the application of the occupants, the various portions of the building were transferred as follows:‑‑ "(A) One room on ground to Muhammad Yaqub floor (B) One room on the first to Muhammad Hanif and floor with kitchen on Muhammad Latif the ground floor (C) A garage on ground to Muhammad Sharif floor (D) One room with a to Abdul Majid and bath room, a store Abdul Hamid room and passage on the ground floor (E) Shop one room on to Master ground floor Muhammad Hanif (F) Shop one room to Eida son of adjacent to stair‑ Natha." case on ground floor It was ordered that the easement rights and the use of the stair‑case would be common for all the occupants concerned. It seems that on 24‑7‑1963, Muhammad Latif and Muhammad Hanif submitted an application against heirs of Eida, the transferee mentioned in above sub‑para (F) (who in the meantime had died), to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner praying for clarification of his order dated 24‑1‑1960 on the ground that the room of the first floor had been transferred to them, whereas in the P.T.O. of Eida, a room had also been shown transferred to him alongwith the shop on the ground floor adjacent to the stair‑case, which was not mentioned in the original order. The matter was litigated up to the level of this Court and one of the questions which was agitated was, whether the transferee of one room on the first floor was entitled to the roof of the whole building. On this aspect, this Court made the following observations:‑‑ "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perusing the plan placed on the file we have come to the conclusion that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for respondents Nos.4 and 5 the heirs of Eida that the whole of the roof over portion `D' has been transferred to them. It is evident from the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated the 27th of June 1964 that the open roof in the property has been transferred to the transferees of the corresponding portions on the ground floor and that was reasonable too because the transferees of the only room on the first floor could not have been given the open roof of the whole building. There is also no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that respondents Nos.4 and 5 should have no right of access to the room on the first floor over any portion of the roof of portion `D' transferred to them, for in that case it would not at all be possible for respondents Nos.4 and 5 to approach the room on the first floor transferred to them. The order of the Settlement Commissioner that respondents Nos.4 and 5 the heirs of Eida would have the right to pass over the open roof for approaching the room on the first floor was. therefore reasonable and justified. However, to obviate the recurrence of any dispute between the parties in future we amend the order of the Settlement Commissioner to the extent that the Settlement Authorities concerned should demarcate the passage over the roof of portion `D' transferred to the appellants which respondents Nos.4 and 5 the heirs of Eida transferees of portion `B' on the first floor could find access to it. The passage should be demarcated in such a way as to cause least inconvenience to the appellate is." The above case is applicable .on all fours to the present case. Reference may also be made to the case of Nazir and others v. Syed Israr Ahmad etc. (1981 SCMR 829). In the above case this Court, while declining leave to appeal, observed as follows:‑‑ "
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the finding of the Courts below that the property in dispute belonged to the plaintiff -respondent by virtue of P.T.D. issued to him was not correct. This is a question of fact and has been thrashed out by all the Courts below and cannot be reopened specially when the learned counsel has not been able to point out any omission or misreading of evidence. It may be mentioned that the precise portion in dispute is the roof of the barsati over the shop which stands transferred to the plaintiff Tufail Ahmad. It is obvious, that unless otherwise mentioned the transfer of the shop would mean the transfer from bottom to the sky, as is the position in this case."
6. We are inclined to hold that unless and until the Settlement Commissioner would have recorded a finding of fact that one room bearing No.B‑436 and the roofs of all the shops constituted one unit under the Evacuee Laws, the unauthorised use of the roofs of the shops by the occupant of above Room No.B‑436 would not entitle him to claim the transfer of the roof of the entire building. In the instant case, as pointed out hereinabove, the original P.T.D did not include the roofs of the shops nor respondent No.l had paid the price for the roofs. The amendment of the P.T.D., the effect of which was to transfer the roofs even without charging the price, was not warranted by law and, therefore, the orders .of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Additional Settlement Commissioner were in consonance with law. We, therefore, allow the above appeals and set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, and restore the orders of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Additional Settlement Commissioner. However, there will be no order as to costs. A.A./M‑1910/S Appeals allowed.