2002 PLP 776 (PTD)

"Wholesaler' means any person .who carries on, whether regularly or otherwise, the business of buying and selling goods by wholesale or of supplying or distributing goods, directly or indirectly; by wholesale for cash or deferred payment or for commission or other valuable consideration."

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that an essential feature of the wholesale ‑business, is the buying and selling of goods. In the case of the petitioner, although it manufactures and sells synthetic carpets, it does not buy such carpets for sale.

4. In response, learned counsel for the respondent‑.department, has argued that even though the petitioner is a manufacturer and is registered under the Said Tax Act, as such, it is required additionally to be registered as a wholesaler. In support of this argument, learned counsel for the department referred to the definition of the term "supply" contained in subsection (22) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, the relevant parts of which reads as under: " `Supply' means sale, transfer, lease or other disposition of goods in the course or furtherance of business carried out for consideration and includes‑ (a) ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑ (b) ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑ (c) ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑ . (d) removal of goods from the manufacturing premises to the sale point or place of storage owned or operated by the manufacturer or his agent; (e)‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑

5. On the above basis, learned counsel for the respondents stated that the removal of the manufactured goods from the manufacturing premises of the petitioner to a place of storage owned by the petitioner would constitute supply. This contention is based on the aforesaid statutory provision but has little relevance to the matter in contention in the present petition.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the supply of goods by the petitioner directly or indirectly, from the petitioner's godown, brought the petitioner within ‑the definition of the term "wholesaler" even though it was not buying the manufactured carpet which were being supplied by it from such godown. This contention of learned counsel for the respondents, is not well‑founded because it does, not take into account the word "wholesale" which has been used by the legislature even in connection with the supply or distribution of goods.

7. The word "wholesale" has a specific commercial meaning although it has not been defined in the Sales Tax Act. Resort can, therefore, be had to the dictionary meaning of the term. Learned counsel for the petitioner has produced before me the Dictionary of. Marketing published by Peter Collin Publishing in which the word "wholesale" is defined asunder: "Wholesale noun and adverb, buying goods from manufacturers and selling in large quantities to traders who then sell in smaller quantities to the general public."

8. From the above definition, it is abundantly clear that the business of wholesale entails both buying and selling of goods. The sale of goods by a manufacturer of such goods cannot, therefore, be termed as wholesale even though such sale may be made in large quantities. The legislature must be deemed to have consciously used the word "wholesale". twice in subsection (31‑A) of section 2 referred to above and, in particular, the second time the said word .has been used. If, indeed, it had been the intent of the legislature to bring a manufacturer into the definition of the term "wholesaler", it would have used other words such as "in bulk" instead of the words "by wholesale" appearing a second time in section 2(31‑A) above. Since such wording has not been adopted by the legislature, it is only proper that the dictionary meaning of the word noted above, is relied upon to interpret 'the provisions of subsection (31‑A) of section 2 of the Sales Tax Act.

9. In view of the above discussion, this writ petition is allowed and it is declared that the order, dated 22‑1‑1992 passed by respondent No.1 is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Q.M.H./O‑4/L Petition allowed.