2017 PLP 981 (YLR)
MUHAMMAD ABBAS — Petitioner Versus SAIFULLAH and others — Respondents
| Citation | 2017 PLP 981 (YLR) |
| Forum / Court | Peshawar (D.I. Khan Bench) |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, J |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD ABBAS — Petitioner Versus SAIFULLAH and others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2017 PLP 981 (YLR)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2017 PLP 981 (YLR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Peshawar (D.I. Khan Bench) bench comprising: Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2017 PLP 981 (YLR) (MUHAMMAD ABBAS — Petitioner Versus SAIFULLAH and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Yousaf Khan and Nouman Akbar Khan for Petitioner.
- Latifullah Khan and Sh. Inamullah Khan for Respondents.
- 4. On the contrary, the learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the spirit of Order XXXIX Rule 4-A, C.P.C. is that when an application for grant of temporary injunction is allowed, it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of six months or till the case is finally decided whichever becomes earlier. They maintained that in the instant case, the application of present petitioner was refused by both the Courts below in first round of litigation and he had not been granted temporary injunction, so, after commencement of trial and after recording some evidence, he again moved the present application which too met the same fate up to appellate Court and rightly so because the law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner does not provide moving fresh application after passage of six months.
Headnotes / Summary
O. XXXIX, R. 4-A
Injunction to cease to be in force after certain period
Order XXXIX, R. 4-A, C.P.C. was enacted for speedy disposal of cases.
O. XXXIX Rr. 1, 2 & 4-A
Re-agitation of temporary injunction on fresh grounds
Effect
Plaintiff, in the present case, moved application for temporary injunction along with plaint which was refused by the Trial Court and lower appellate court
Plaintiff, after recording of evidence in main case moved fresh application for temporary injunction on fresh grounds with emphasis on O. XXXIX R. 4-A, C.P.C.
Held that O. XXXIX R. 4-A, C.P.C. was of no help to a person who was lingering on case on one pretext or the other
Once the relief had been refused on the same footing and same record, it could not be re-agitated before any forum
Orders of both the lower courts were in consonance with law
Revision was dismissed accordingly.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD GHAZANFAR KHAN, J.
Through the instant petition, the petitioner Mohammad Abbas has called in question the judgment dated 02.3.2016 rendered by learned Additional District Judge, Paharpur, D.I.Khan, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 06.10.2015 of learned Civil Judge, Paharpur, D.I.Khan was dismissed.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the instant petition are that the petitioner filed a suit against the respondents for declaration cum mandatory injunction in respect of land fully detailed in the heading of plaint. Along with the plaint, he had moved an application for temporary injunction which was dismissed and appeal of the petitioner against the said order was also dismissed. After recording some evidence in the main case, the petitioner moved another application for grant of temporary injunction which was dismissed by the Courts below, hence the instant petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the second application for grant of temporary injunction is not barred as envisaged in Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A, C.P.C, so, the learned Courts below, while misinterpreting the law and skipping over the jurisdiction vested in them, illegally dismissed the application for grant of temporary injunction. He solicited for setting aside orders of both the Courts below.
4. On the contrary, the learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the spirit of Order XXXIX Rule 4-A, C.P.C. is that when an application for grant of temporary injunction is allowed, it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of six months or till the case is finally decided whichever becomes earlier. They maintained that in the instant case, the application of present petitioner was refused by both the Courts below in first round of litigation and he had not been granted temporary injunction, so, after commencement of trial and after recording some evidence, he again moved the present application which too met the same fate up to appellate Court and rightly so because the law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner does not provide moving fresh application after passage of six months.
5. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
6. It is a matter of fact that the petitioner had moved an application for temporary injunction along with his plaint. He was refused temporary injunction by the trial Court and his appeal also met the same fate. Thereafter, he did not challenge the order of appellate Court before any forum, so, that order attained finality. After recording evidence in the main case, the present petitioner moved fresh application for grant of same relief on fresh grounds mainly emphasizing on Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A, C.P.C. which reads as under:-- "4-A. Injunction to cease to be in force after certain period
An injunction granted by a Court in a suit which seeks to question the validity or legal effect of any order made, proceedings taken or act done by any authority or person, which has been made, taken or done, or purports to have been made, taken or done, under any law which is specified in Part I of the First Schedule to the Constitution or relates to, or is connected with, assessment or collection of public revenues shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months following the day on which it is made, unless the case is finally decided, or the injunction is discharged or set aside, by the Court earlier."
7. Bare perusal of above rule shows that it has been formulated for speedy disposal of cases and remedy has been provided fairly to a person having a good prima facie case and litigating in his own interest according to law, but is not of any help to a litigant who is lethargic in producing evidence or is involved in lingering on the case on one pretext or the other. In the instant case, once the relief has been refused on the same footing and same record, it cannot be re-agitated before any forum. The orders of both the Courts below are in accord with law and need no interference.
8. For the reasons mentioned above, the instant petition being bereft of merit and substance is hereby dismissed. WA/281/P Petition dismissed.