P L D 1980 Karachi 267 (PLP)

"(1) Whether the opponent committed default in payment of rent? (2) Whether the Opponent has committed acts injurious to the property in question and has diminished the value and utility of it? (3) Whether the applicant needs the property in question for his bona fide use? (4) What should be the order? The learned Rent Controller as per his order dated 27-I1-1976 decided issue No. 1 against the appellant No. 2 in the negative and no finding was given on issue No. 3 as the same did not arise out of the pleadings. The appellant preferred appeal against the said order which was dismissed as per above-quoted perfunctory order without at all going into merits of the case.

4. This appeal was admitted to consider the short point as to whether the learned Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance of his earlier order granting adjournment on payment of costs and refusing a further request for adjournment.

5. I heard Mr. Hafiz A. Baqi, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. R. H. Farooqi, as amicus curiae in the matter.

6. The power to hear appeal is conferred on the District and Additional District Judges under subsections (1) and (1-A) of section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and the limit of their jurisdiction is circumscribed by the statute itself as laid down in subsections (2) and (3) of section 15 of the Ordinance. The mandate of the statute in subsection (3) is as follows : "(3) The Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the record of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller." According to plain language of the above subsection it is incumbent upon the appellate authority to decide the appeal brought before it after sending for the record of the case from the Rent Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing. The question as to whether an appeal under subsection (3) could be dismissed summarily, had come up for examination before the Supreme Court in the case of Humayun Zulfiquar Ismail v. Hamida Saadat Ali (1), and was answered in the negative. The learned Supreme Court held that subsection (3) of section 15 is a complete code of procedure in itself for the purpose of an appeal under that sub section. The impugned order is no better than an order dismissing the appeal summarily and cannot, therefore, be sustained. The other aspect of the case is that all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to cases under the Ordinance, save as are contained in sections 16 and 17 of the Ordinance. In the circumstances, the power to grant costs for adjournment, as laid down in sub-rule (2) of R. 1 of Order XVI (1) 1968 S C M R 828 C. P. C.. was not available and the learned Additional District Judge had equally no jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal on the consequently had equally decided ex parte ground of non-payment of costs. The case could at best b but on merits, which was not done:

7. In the result this appeal must succeed. The order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 18-9-1978 is set aside with the direction that he should now decide the appeal on merits after notice to the parties. The respondent will bear the costs of this appeal. S. A.

11. Appeal accepted.