P L D 1977 Supreme Court 49 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-This petition for leave is from the judgment of a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court dated 17-6-1976 dismissing the petitioners' Criminal Miscellaneous No. 363/Q of 1976 under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, for quashment of proceedings against them. The petitioners are accused in a case under sections 380/468, P. P. C. The allegations against them are that they stole a number of blank cheques from the United States' Embassy and by forging authorised signatures on the stolen cheques secured transfer of certain sums from the Embassy's account to another account. This happened early in 1968 and the case was registered in the month of January. Complete challan was put in May 1968. But the trial has not concluded so far. However, the petitioners are on bail. In all there are 36 witnesses for the prosecution. Of them 33 have been -examined and three still remain to be examined. The petitioners sought quashment of the proceedings on the sole ground -of lapse of about 8 years period since the commencement of the trial against them. It appears that the petitioners had earlier made similar application (Criminal Miscellaneous No. 614/Q of 1975) in the High Court which was dismissed on 28-11-1975 on the ground that although the proceedings in the trial Court were "very slow but that the material had already come on the record which could not be ignored" and that therefore, the case was not fit for quashment. At the same time the High Court directed that the remaining evidence in the case should be examined with expedition and the case be disposed of within a period of three months. However, despite that direction by the High Court. no further witness appears to have been examined since the dismissal of the first application for quashment. This obliged the petitioners to file fresh application (Criminal Miscellaneous No. 363/Q of 1976) on 11-5-1976 which too has been refused by the impugned order. Ch. Muhammad Hussain appearing for the petitioners complained that it was more than eight years ago since the trial began against the petitioners and that this cannot continue ad infinitus. To allow the proceedings to drag on like that would be an abuse of the process of the Court as also harrassing to the petitioners. However, it is hard to see how in the face of this Court's judgments in Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan P L D 1967 S C 317 and M. S. Khawaja v. The State P L D 1965 S C 287 it is open to the petitioners to seek quashment of proceedings merely on the ground of lapse of long period since the initiation of the case. In both these cases, the High Court's orders quashing the proceedings in the trial Courts on account of inordinate delay were recalled by this Court. It was observed in the former case that if "an offence has been committed justice required that it should be inquired into and tried". This is all the more so in the instant case, when the bulk of evidence has already been recorded. On the other hand, if the petitioners are not guilty they have a right to be declared as "honourably acquitted." Learned counsel also complained that during the interregnum since the dismissal of the previous application for quashment by the High Court no witness has been examined. One of the three witnesses remaining to be examined was present on one date, but it appears that he was not examined by the trial Court because of the incorrect statement by one of the accused before the trial Court that the proceedings in the Court had been stayed by the High Court because of pendency of certain miscellaneous application. Then it also appears that on the petitioner's application, the case has since been transferred to another Court. This also partially contributed to the delay in the conclusion of the trial. However that may be, because of the dicta of this Court in the above-mentioned two cases, the petition is clearly misconceived and is dismissed. Towards the close of his argument petitioner's learned counsel earnestly/ requested, that this Court may record some observation so that the High Court could in any fresh proceedings before it, issue appropriate directions, to the transferee !Court to so conduct the proceedings, that the trial should conclude within appointed time. No such observation is called for, that would impinge upon the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and section 439, Cr. P. C. To record any such observation and at the same in dismiss this petition as wholly misconceived would appear incongruent or at any rate a private act of grace which, it would be well to avoid. Such charitable observations sometimes encourage parties to embark on further litigation. S.A.H. Petition dismissed.