P L D 1962 Dacca 487 (PLP)

8. Mr. B. N. Chowdhury, the learned Advocate for the opposite‑party has argued that once the defence not having challenged the occurrence it was for them to prove their posses sion beyond any shadow of doubt. The defence not brought forward the vendor nor having produced any rent receipts, Mr. Chowdhury has submitted that the stand taken by the defence could not be established.

9. Coming further into the facts of the case Mr.

13. N. Chowdhury stated that so far as the Civil Court decree goes, the boundaries as given conclusively fixes the identity of the land and that the suit was duly advertised in the paper under rule 8, Order I of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. B. N. Chowdhury has also pointed out that in cases of the present kind the proprietary right or other wise of the l9nd is not so very material; that witnesses have come forward to state that in that particular place there was a `Debastan'.

10. In the circumstances as stated, no doubt is left with regard to the identity and location of the `Debastan'.

11. Section 295 of the Pakistan Penal Code is as follows: "Whoever destroys, damages or defile any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the inten tion of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both".

12. The section as above speaks of defiling of any place of worship or any object held sacred by any class. The section, to A me, does not seem to require investigation into the possession or ownership of the land in the sense urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioners.

13. Mr. A. W. Chowdhury has cited the decision in Bechan Jha and others v. Emperor (A I R 1941 Pat. 492) in which it was held inter alia as follows: "The use of a but standing on the belangan plot of an agri cultural tenant as a public mosque without the landlord's permission is so inconsistent with the purpose for which the land is let as to render the tenant liable to be ejected from the whole of his holding: Such use being entirely unwarranted the mere attempt to convert the hut into a mosque cannot render it a place of worship within the meaning of S.

295. The Azan or public call to prayers by Moulvi at the hut cannot make the hut a public mosque inasmuch as none of the villagers can be said to be in a position validly to make the implied dedication. Nor can the but be regarded as an "object" held sacred by any class of persons within the meaning of section 295 since the attempt to convert it into a mosque is itself contrary to law. The destruction of the hut therefore cannot constitute an offence under section 295".

14. Mr. A. W. Chowdhury wants to state that since the bedi was raised without the consent of the, landlord, it could not have any recognition in the eye of law.

15. The landlord has not come forward here and the decision relates to a different situation, namely, that the landlord wanted to eject a tenant to whom the land was given for agricultural purpose.

16. Further, it appears that in that decision the mosque itself was not treated as sacred in the same sense as a Hindu temple.

17. Under the circumstances stated, although there may be some discrepancy in the evidence on the point of exact location of the place of worship, I do not think that the petitioners could be immunised from the reach of this particular section.

18. A. W. Chowdhury has ultimately craved for a more lenient sentence.

19. It appears that the Court below has already considered the question of sentence leniently.

20. Under those circumstances, there can be no further reduction of sentence.

21. The Rule is, therefore, discharged. It is directed that the petitioners should surrender to their bail bonds and serve out the sentence imposed on them by law. K. B. A. Rule discharged.