2010 PLP 610 (CLC)

ABDUL AZIZ KUNDI, J.

Impugned herein are the judgments and decrees dated 16-11-2007 and 5-5-2009, passed respectively by Civil Judge, Banda Daud Shah, District Karak and District Judge, Karak in a suit filed by petitioners, challenging the inheritance Mutation No.212, attested on 24-10-2004, in favour of defendants-respondents 1 to 4 in the legacy of their deceased grandfather Noor Shah Jehan. Rehman Ghani and others through plaint dated 2-12-2006 sued the defendants-respondents, seeking declaration, injunction and possession of the land transferred through inheritance Mutation No.212, dated 24-10-2004 to defendants-respondents 1 to 4, who are the children of Usman Ghani, pre-deceased son of Noor Shah Jehan. In their plaint, the plaintiffs-petitioners' claim is that Usman Ghani father of defendants-respondents 1 to 4 and husband of defendant-respondent No.5 had died on 23-1-1991, while Noor Shah Jehan, father of Usman Ghani and of the plaintiffs-petitioners died on 3-8-2003 and thus defendants-respondents 1 to 4 are not entitled to any share in the legacy of Noor Shah Jehan and accordingly have prayed for reversal of the inheritance mutation aforesaid in their favour. The learned trial court, as it appears, without giving his mind to the plaint on its presentation as a routine issued process to the defendants-respondents, who entered appearance and contested the suit, which led the trial Court to frame the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiffs have got any cause of action? (2) Whether the inheritance Mutation No.212, dated 24-10-2004, attested in favor of defendants Nos.1 to 4 is wrong and against law? (3) Whether the suit is within time? (4) Relief. On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree, dated 16-11-2007, non-suited the plaintiffs-petitioners, holding that under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1916, the children of the deceased son of Noor Shah Jehan were entitled to the share equivalent to the one which their father would have received, if alive, at the time of the opening of the succession. It was further held that though section 4 of the Ordinance (ibid) has been declared un-Islamic by the Federal Shariat Court, but the judgment stands suspended till the decision of the appeal by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 203-D of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Accordingly, the disputed mutation was held to be perfectly correct. Plaintiffs-petitioners assailed the judgment and decree of the trial court before the Appellate Court but their appeal was also dismissed by learned District Judge, Karak through his judgment, dated 5-5-2009. Still being aggrieved, they have filed the present revision petition.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, who reiterated the grounds as raised in the plaint and repelled by the two courts below. Record of the case made available with this revision petition has been gone through. It is not denied that defendants-respondents 1 to 4 are the children of Usman Ghani, a pre-deceased son of Noor Shah Jehan, whose inheritance devolved upon the said defendants-respondents to the extent of the share of their deceased father. The provisions of section 4 of the Ordinance (ibid) are clear in its contents and so are the provisions of Article 203-D of the Constitution. The proviso reads as under:

"Provided that no such decision shall be deemed to take effect before the expiration of the period within which an appeal therefrom may be preferred to the Supreme Court or, where an appeal has been so preferred, before the disposal of such appeal".

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any illegality in the impugned judgments and decrees of the two courts below and I have also found none therein which could attract the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

4. Before parting with this judgment, it would be appropriate to observe that luxury of frivolous litigation by vested interests can hardly be afforded by courts administering justice, therefore, trial courts are under a legal obligation to apply their mind to the suit as and when the same is presented for institution. Suit of such-like nature should be buried at their very inception and be not allowed to be put to lengthy trials, which ultimately results in unnecessary burden on the diary of the of courts. These cases are the main cause of the huge pendency. Provisions of Order XIV, rules 2, C.P.C. should be strictly adhered to. Instant was a suit where only one legal issue was involved which could have been resolved at the very initial stage of the suit if the learned Judge ceased of the suit had attended to the plaint and the aforesaid provision of law. This would save the precious time of the court, the parties and their hard earned money. The goals of National Judicial Policy announced recently could also be easily achieved if the trial courts attend to the above observations. Finding not merits in this revision, the same is dismissed in limine. H.B.T./35/P Revision dismissed.