1988 PLP 980 (MLD)

MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.--This appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 21-2-1985 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupura, on reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal briefly stated are that out of the land owned by respondents No.1 to 3 land measuring 196 Kanals 7 Marlas was acquired through notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, published in the official Gazette on 22-8-1978, for the benefit of the appellant for construction of Polyester Staple Fibre Plant. The Land Acquisition Collector, delivered his award on 4-8-1979 assessing the compensation at Rs.28,322.70 per acre for cultivable land and for the uncultivated land at the rate of Rs.26,974 per acre. Respondents No.1 to 3 feeling aggrieved by the assessment made by the Collector moved an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, for making reference to the Court for resolving the controversy. Consequently reference was made to the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupura. The learned Senior Civil Judge, after recording evidence of the parties enhanced compensation as follows:- (a) For land measuring 15 acres situated on the front road at the rate of Rs.72,000/- per acre; (b) For the remaining land behind the said 15 acres at the rate of Rs.68,000/- per acre; (c) 25% compulsory acquisition charges were also allowed. The appellant has assailed the said judgment and decree through this appeal.

3. This appeal in view of provisions of sections 18 and 50(2) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in case Pir Khan through his Legal Heirs v. Military Estate Officer, Abbottabad and others (P L D 1987 S C 485) is not maintainable. .

4. Learned counsel for the appellant in his endeavour to distinguish the said reported case from the facts of this case argued that in the reported case the land was acquired in the year 1969 before amendments made in sections 20 and 20-A. According to the learned counsel clause (c) of section 20 as amended requires issuance of notice to the company in the reference for which the land was acquired and section 22-A as amended has granted a right to said company to lodge cross-objections to the reference, as such, the company having been treated to be a party in the proceedings in the reference before the learned trial Court and as a legal consequence thereof such a company could maintain the appeal , against this decision. He also argued that these amendments were not brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court at the time of disposal of the said reported case, therefore, the said ruling is not attracted to this case.

5. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant have no force. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were aware about the right of local authority and company in proceedings before the Court to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation which tact has been duly noted in the judgment, as such, it could not be argued that the said judgment was distinguishable on this account. Apart from this the reasons for which it has been held that such company had no right to challenge the award are that reference under section 18 on its behalf was barred and that under subsection (2) of section 50 the award of the Collector as substituted by the learned trial Court on reference is final whic4 mot be challenged except by a party which has been B expressly conferred the right of appeal and no such right expressly having been granted by the Statute to such company, therefore, it could not maintain the appeal. Admittedly the provisions of sections 18 and 50(2) have not been amended so far, therefore, the ratio of the reported case is applicable to the case of the appellant with full force. The law-maker while omitting to amend sections 18 and 50(2) simultaneously with clause (c) of sections, 20 and 22-A of the Act has unmistakably manifested its intention, not to confer any right on the company to challenge the award through appeal. The intention behind the amendments in sections 20 and 22-A appears to be to allow the company merely to join the proceedings before the learned trial Court in reference for the purpose of determining the compensation.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that the Government executed sale-deed transferring the land in dispute to the company on 8-10-1979 and whatever rights the Government possessed including the right to file appeal against the award of the Court stood transferred to the appellant as such the appellant having stepped into the shoes of the Government could maintain the appeal.

7. We are afraid the argument is wholly misconceived. Execution of sale deed by Government is just a formal and administrative act which is intended to transfer ownership rights in the land to the appellant which was acquired for its benefit and nothing else. The right of the Government to file appeal against the award was not a right attached to the land, as such, therefore, such a right cannot be claimed to have been transferred to the appellant with the execution of the sale-deed in its favour. It has been categorically held on the interpretation of relevant provisions of law by the Supreme Court that appeal against the award could only be filed by such party on whom right of appeal was expressly conferred by the Statute and such a right has been hell to have net been conferred on the company by Statute itself, therefore, the same could not be claimed by the appellant through administrative act of the Government of execution of sale deed. Learned counsel for the appellant faced with this situation then maintained that if the appeal at the instance of the appellant was not maintainable, the appellant by virtue of section 53 of the Act which makes provisions of C.P.C. applicable to the proceedings under the Act, can invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Court under section 115, C.P.C. and the appeal may be treated as revision petition on its behalf and disposed of as such. This argument has absolutely wrong angle, and is so fallacious therefore, hardly deserves any serious consideration. It is not the question as to whether appeal or revision is competent against the award of the Court. If under the law as has been interpreted the company has been precluded from invoking the provisions of section 54 of the Act relating to appeal we see no reason as to how it could be permitted to invoke section 53 of the same Act to achieve the same purpose indirectly. According to well-established law what cannot be done directly cannot also be permitted to be done indirectly. On no rude of interpretation of Statutes the appellant can be permitted to maintain revisl6n petition. The bar against the appellant to challenge the finality of the award made by the Court is absolute and the appellant is not entitled to challenge the same through kind of proceedings, may be in the nature of revision or appeal. This is apart from well-established law that the right to institute revision petition like appeal is a substantive right which cannot be exercised unless it has been expressly conferred by relevant Statute regulating the proceedings and in the instant case none has been expressly conferred under any provision of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 53 of the Act merely provides that in proceedings before the Court the provisions of the C.P.C. would be applicable which only means that the procedure to be followed by the Court in the proceedings under the Act would be that as provided in the C.P.C. and substantive provisions of C.P.C. such like revision and appeal w6uld not become available unless expressly made applicable. Considered from whatever angle this argument has no substance. The interpretation of section 53 as suggested by the' learned counsel for the appellant to maintain the revision petition to challenge the finality of the award cannot be adopted without doing violence to the express provisions of the act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the said reported judgment.

8. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is held to be not maintainable) which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. AA./1-72/L Appeal dismissed.