P L D 1954 Sind 276 (PLP)
Mst. PIARI BAI (Songstress)‑Defendant Versus Mst. GOHAR BHAI (Songstress)‑
| Citation | P L D 1954 Sind 276 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Constantine, C. J and Vellani, J. |
| Parties | Mst. PIARI BAI (Songstress)‑Defendant Versus Mst. GOHAR BHAI (Songstress)‑ |
| Primary Law | Pakistan. (Administration of Evacuee Property), Ordinance (XV of 1949) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1954 Sind 276 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: Pakistan. (Administration of Evacuee Property), Ordinance (XV of 1949) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1954 Sind 276 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Constantine, C. J and Vellani, J..
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1954 Sind 276 (PLP) (Mst. PIARI BAI (Songstress)‑Defendant Versus Mst. GOHAR BHAI (Songstress)‑). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Headnotes / Summary
S. 12‑Order of injunction in respect of evacuee property cannot be passed by Civil Court. An order of injunction cannot be passed in respect of evacuee property in view of section 12 of the Evacuee Ordinance, 1949 in suits challenging orders of Rehabilitation authorities on the ground that orders passed by them were beyond their jurisdiction. S. Ali Muttagi Jafri in Suit No. 174 of 1953. Rahimtoola, in Suit No. 101 of 1953. E. V. Castellino, in Suit Nos. 244 of 1953 and 120 of 1953. Hafiz Sultan Ahmed in Suit No. 210 of 1953, for the Plaintiff. Mansoor Alam, for the Federation' of Pakistan. K. B. Sikander Beg Mirza A. G. as amicus curiae, for the Defendant.
Judgment & Decree
CONSTANTINE, C. J.‑In five suits our learned brother Inamullah has referred the following question to a Division Bench under section 12 of the Sind Courts Act 1926: "Whether an order of injunction can be passed in respect of evacuee property in view of section 12 of the Evacuee Ordinance 1949 in suits challenging orders of Rehabilitation authorities on the ground that orders passed by them were beyond their jurisdiction." It is common ground that these suits were in respect of evacuee property and for the purposes of this reference it is assumed that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suits, on the ground that the orders of the Rehabilitation Department have been passed without jurisdiction, or on the ground that the Rehabilitation authority has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Subsection (1) of section 12 of the Evacuee Ordinance of 1949 reads as follows:- "(1) Property which has vested in, or of which possession has been taken by, the Custodian shall be exempt from all legal process, including seizure, distress ejectment, attach ment or sale by any officer of a Court or any other authority and no injunction or other order of whatever kind in respect of such property shall be granted or made by any Court or any other authority." In interpreting a Statute, if the language of the statute is clear, the Court must give effect to that language, and is no entitled to modify or restrict that language on the ground of expediency or absurdity. Here the language is perfectly clear and we can see no justification for limiting its generality by reading into the section words suggested by Rahimtoola, either "as against evacuees" or "permanent", in connection with injunction. Similarly we attach no weight to the argument that since section 34 (4) prohibits an injunction against anything done or intended to be done under the Ordinance, or since section 43 similarly prohibits suits, qualification should be read into section
12. Mr. Castellino's argument that if a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit it has jurisdiction to grant all manner o relief is similarly inconsistent with the language of section 12; moreover section 4 expressly provides that the provisions of the Ordinance shall prevail over inconsistent provisions in any other law. Mr. Rahimtoola's premise that since an injunction is an order in personam, the words "in respect of such property" are repugnant being plainly untenable, we need consider no argument based thereon. It may be added that our learned Brothers Agha, Muhammad Bachal, Muhammad Bakhsh, Inamullah and Lari, sitting singly, have passed judgments in accordance with our view. Mr. Justice Muhammad Bakhsh at one time inclined to the other view, but in subsequent judgments he has adopted this unanimous view of section
12. The answer to the Reference is, therefore, in the negative. A. H. Reference answered.