1995 PLP 1085 (PTD)
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, LAHORE Versus Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM
| Citation | 1995 PLP 1085 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore High Court |
| Bench Members | Ch. Khurshid Ahmad and Ahmad Saeed Awan, JJ |
| Parties | THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, LAHORE Versus Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM |
| Primary Law | Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1995 PLP 1085 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1995 PLP 1085 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Ch. Khurshid Ahmad and Ahmad Saeed Awan, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1995 PLP 1085 (PTD) (THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, LAHORE Versus Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Khawaja Muhammad Saeed on behalf of Muhammad Ilyas for Petitioner.
Headnotes / Summary
S.136
Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.3
Income-tax Department's application for framing question and referring same to High Court was dismissed by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on point of limitation-- Validity
Provision of S.3, Limitation Act, 1908, postulates that whether defence of limitation had been pleaded or not, Courts were bound to give effect to law
Section 3, Limitation Act 1.908, is couched in pre-emptory language and is addressed to Court making it its duty to take notice of limitation and give effect to it, even though same was not referred 'to in pleadings
Court was thus, bound to dismiss suit, appeal or application if same was barred by limitation
Competent Tribunal having rejected reference on point of limitation, High Court was not justified in re-opening question of limitation
Limitation being a matter of statute and provisions being mandatory, same could not be waived
Reference application moved before Income Tax Appellate Tribunal being time-barred, was correctly rejected by it
No interference was warranted with such order of competent Tribunal
Reference application was dismissed by High Court in circumstances. (1988) 58 Tax 60; Muhammad Akram v. Aurangzeb and another 1989 CLC 1405 and Hakeem Muhammad Boota and another v. Habib Ahmad and others PLD 1985 SC 153 ref.
Judgment & Decree
AHMAD SAEED AWAN, J.
The department had applied to the Tribunal for framing the question and referring the same to this Court. The Tribunal dismissed the department's reference on the point of limitation relying on (1988) 58 Tax
60. Hence this application.
2. Without going into the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to dispose of the issue of limitation.
3. Learned counsel argued that at the stage of admitting the reference application this issue cannot be taken into consideration.
4. In section 3 of the Limitation Act, it has been expressly declared that whether the defence of limitation be pleaded or not, the Courts whether of first instance or of appeal are bound to give effect to the law. The section is couched in pre-emptory language and is addressed to the Court making it its duty to take notice of the Limitation Act and give effect to it even though the same is not referred to the pleadings. The above section 3 has to be obeyed in full Therefore, an obligation is cast upon the Court to dismiss a suit, appeal or application if it is barred by limitation as held in case Muhammad Akram v.1 Aurangzeb and another (1989 CLC 1405 Lahore). 5. ' As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the High Court is not justified in reopening the question of limitation of the reference before admitting a reference and the objection raised by the respondents, the contention of the learned counsel is devoid of merits. As held in case Hakeem Muhammad Boota and another v. Habib Ahmad and others (PLD 1985 SC 153) that the words of section 3 of the Limitation Act are mandatory in nature., and that every suit or application instituted after the period of limitation shall, subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 25 of that Act, be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The law, therefore, does not leave the matter of limitation to the pleadings of the parties as it imposes a duty in this regard upon the Court itself. The limitation being a matter of statute and the provisions being mandatory, cannot be waived and even if waived can be taken up by the party waiving it and by the Courts themselves.
6. In the light of above discussion, we are of the opinion that as the reference application moved before the learned Tribunal was time-barred, so has rightly been rejected by the learned Tribunal here is no reason to interfere in the order passed by the learned Tribunal. As the reference application is not maintainable; hence is dismissed in limine. A.A./C-54/L Application dismissed.