CLD 2005

2005 CLD 314 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF‑‑‑Appellant Versus MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through GENERAL ATTORNEY and others‑‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
R.F.A. No.42 of 2000, heard on 14th January, 2004
Honorable Judges
Mian Saqib Nisar and Syed Sakhi Hussain Bokhari, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2005 CLD 314 (PLP)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members Mian Saqib Nisar and Syed Sakhi Hussain Bokhari, JJ
Parties MUHAMMAD ASHRAF‑‑‑Appellant Versus MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through GENERAL ATTORNEY and others‑‑‑Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2005 CLD 314 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2005 CLD 314 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Mian Saqib Nisar and Syed Sakhi Hussain Bokhari, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2005 CLD 314 (PLP) (MUHAMMAD ASHRAF‑‑‑Appellant Versus MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED through GENERAL ATTORNEY and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Atif Amin for Appellant.
  • Javed Jalal for Respondent No. 1.
  • Abdur Rehman Madni for Respondent No.3.
  • Date of hearing: 14th January, 2004

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 9 & 10‑‑‑Contract Act (IX of 1872), 5.135‑‑‑Recovery of bank loan‑‑‑Application for leave to defend the suit‑‑ Property of minors as surety‑‑‑Property under surety in the name of minors was discharged under S.135 Contract Act, 1872, by Wafaqi Mohtasib and no appeal was‑filed, that order‑‑‑In application for leave to defend the suit, the guarantor raised such plea but the application for leave to defend was dismissed by the Banking Court and the suit was decreed against the guarantor‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Surety of properties of minors could not have at all been given by the guarantor,. even if he was their natural guardian and legal guardian‑‑‑ Transaction to the extent of the property in the name of minors was void ab initio and had been rightly so held by Ombudsman‑‑‑As the Ombudsman had discharged the guarantor under S.135 of Contract Act, 1872, and the order had not been challenged, the same had become final‑‑ What could not be done directly, that could not be done indirectly=‑‑Even while deciding application for leave to appear and defend the suit, the Banking Court indirectly could not ignore or violate the order of Ombudsman, which, if done, would mean the exercise of jurisdiction, excluded by express provisions of law‑‑‑Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court was set aside and application for leave to appeal was allowed and matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh‑‑‑Appeal was allowed in circumstances. (b) Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order (I of 1983)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 29‑‑‑Order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib‑‑‑Validity‑‑ Such order, under the provisions of Art.29 of Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, cannot be called in question and determined by any Court including Banking Court.

Judgment & Decree

MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.‑‑‑The respondent‑bank, brought a suit for the recovery of an amount of Rs.3,50,174, inter alia against the appellant, claiming that the finance facility was granted to defendants Nos.l and 2; the appellant stood as a surety for _the repayment of the loan amount and had deposited as security for Investment Certificates amounting to Rs.2,00,000, out of which, three Certificates of the value of Rs.1,50,000 belonged to the minor children of the appellant, whereas one Certificate of Rs.50,000 was in his own name; thus, the appellant being a surety is also liable for the payment of the suit amount.

2. The appellant filed the application for leave to appear and defend, which has been disallowed by the learned Banking Court and the suit has been decreed. Hence this appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant, by relying upon the order of the Honourable Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) dated 8‑10‑1986, which was passed on the complaint of the appellant against the respondent‑bank, has argued that, as far as the Certificates of the minors are concerned, it has been declared by the Ombudsman that such transaction of surety was void ab initio; for the appellant, it has been categorically concluded that he stood discharged under section 135 of the Contract Act; this order was not further challenged by the respondent through a representation before the President of Pakistan and had thus, attained finality for all intents and purposes; despite of the above, the leave has been illegally and erroneously refused to the appellant.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and find that, according to the law, surety of the properties of the minors, could not have, at all been given by the A appellant, even if, he was their natural and legal guardian, therefore, to this extent, the transaction was absolutely void ab initio and has been rightly so held by the Ombudsman. As far as the appellant himself is concerned, the learned Ombudsman has determined that he stands discharged under section 135 of the Contract Act. Such order of the Ombudsman has not been challenged and thus, has become final. According to the provisions of section 29 of the Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, the validity of the order passed by the Ombudsman cannot be called in question and determined by any Court. This obviously, includes the Banking Court as well. It may be pertinent to state here that, as per, the settled law, what cannot be done directly, that cannot be done indirectly. Meaning thereby that even while deciding the application for leave to appear and defend, the Court indirectly could not ignore or violate the order of the Ombudsman, which if done, would mean the exercise of the jurisdiction, excluded by the express provisions of law. In the light of above, we allow this appeal with the consequences that the judgment and decree of the learned Banking Court qua the appellant is set aside; leave application of the appellant is allowed, and the Banking Court is directed to decide the matter in accordance with law. No order as to costs. M. H. / M‑29 / L Appeal allowed