1988S28 (PLP)

JUSTICE MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH (CHAIRMAN).‑‑This review petition is barred by 285 days. The payer for condonation of this inordinate delay is, as argued by the learned Deputy Attorney General, based on two factors; One, that by the judgment of this Court, review of which is being sought, the appeal filed by the petitioner Government was allowed and the case was remanded, therefore, the functionaries concerned did not consider it necessary; to examine the contents of the judgment so as to discover whether there were any directions for the Government to comply with. And two, that the copy sent by the Supreme Court Office on its own without application of the petitioner for compliance with the directions contained in the judgment was received late in the concerned office. None of the points raised by the learned counsel is enough for condonation of delay. It was the duty of the concerned functionary to examine the judgment even if it was of remand so as to see whether something was to be done on the petitioner‑side. The second point similarly is of no help to the petitioner. If the judgment would have been read and examined at proper time and/or an application for supply of copy had been made within due time, the question of delay might not have arisen at all. The only circumstance that the office of the Supreme Court sent a copy for compliance with the directions contained in the judgment at a subsequent stage is of no consequence in so far as the condonation of delay is concerned. If the petitioner would have made an application for the supply of copy and the Office would have taken time to supply the same, that much time would have been excluded as of right even without an application for condonation of delay. For all these reasons, this petition for review merits dismissal as being time‑barred. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the relief; sought in the review petition can also be granted by way of clarification. According to him, the suggestions made in the judgment regarding the process of Islamisation could not, in the circumstances of the case, be made as directions to be complied with by a certain date; therefore, according to him if this is clarified that the relevant directions were not mandatory but were only directory, the purpose of filing of this review petition would be served. In this behalf, he has pointed out the following sentence at page 19 of the judgment which, a now suggested, needs clarification: "The laws and provisions suggested above in the two preceding paragraphs of this judgment may be made till 30th June, 1986." We have also noticed that on his request we had by an interim order dated 7‑5‑1986 partially suspended the effect of this direction. It is as follows: "impugned order as to the date only i.e. , 30th June, 1986, shall not be operative till the decision of the review petition." The suggestion made by the learned counsel is fair. Although, the word "may" has been used in the relevant sentence pointed out in the judgment which ordinarily would convey a sense that the direction is not mandatory; however, as requested by the learned counsel, we further clarify that it was meant to be only directory. It may also be further remarked that this does not mean that no attention has to be paid to the subject‑matter concerned. With these observations and the above suo motu clarification, this petition for review, is dismissed as time‑barred. There shall be no order as to costs. M.B.A./F‑32/S Petition dismissed.