P L D 1979 Karachi 692 (PLP)

This Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is directed against an appellate order passed by Vth Sind Labour Court, Karachi maintaining an order of the Junior Labour Court No. 3, whereby the respondent No. 1 was directed to be re‑instated in service of the petitioner bank, with back benefits.

2. The facts in brief are that respondent No. I was employed as receiving cashier in M. A. Jinnah Road Branch of petitioner bank known in those days as National & Grindlays Bank Limited. In the year 1971‑72, a case of defalcation was discovered and it was found that the respondent and two other employees of the cash department in collusion, committed defalcations in respect of the cash amounts received in the bank and these amounts were not ,entered in the cash register, though the pay‑in‑slips were duly issued to the customers. In this manner an amount of Rs. 3,20,.131.61 was found to have been misappropriated by the receiving cashier, the head cashier and one Mr. Divecha of the cash department. A departmental enquiry was conducted after the respondent was served with a charge‑sheet. The respondent in the course of the enquiry practically admitted the whole case. He stated that he had to join this conspiracy on the assurance of the head cashier that he would shoulder the entire responsibility and he did not report this matter to the higher officers of the bank as he thought that the head cashier might bring him into trouble. On 10‑1‑1973 the respondent was supplied with a copy of the report showing that the charges of misconduct and defalcation. had been established against him. He was then served with a second show‑cause notice on 12‑1‑1973. His reply to the notice was received on 15‑1‑1973 and he was then dismissed from service on 18‑1‑1973. The respondent then served a notice on the employers regarding his grievance under section 25‑A of the I. R. O. on 2‑2‑1973. 21 months period allowed under section 25‑A expired on 17‑4‑1973. An application was thereafter filed in the Junior Labour Court regarding this grievance on 9‑5‑1973 and the application was late by 22 days. The petitioners then filed their objections before the junior Labour Court but the said application was clearly time barred. It has been stated at the bar that there was no application for condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. No order was passed regarding the objections and the matter was being adjourned from time to time. But suddenly on 24th July, 1973 an order was passed entertaining an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and an affidavit in support of it and condoning the delay ex parte. In the affidavit it was stated that the delay had occurred because the respondent hoped that the dismissal order would be taken back and he would be re‑instated in service.

3. The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has pointed out that this being a case of admission of guilt in a departmental enquiry, it was not proper that the respondent should thereafter have been continued in the service of the bank in its cash Department. The learned counsel has referred to a decision in 1963 P L C 80 that a Court is not supposed to act on mere conjectures nor base its orders on ideas of social justice. In a Supreme Court decision reported in 1975 S C M R 46 it was observed that the Labour Court was concerned only with a question whether action taken against an employee accorded with law. The question whether employee did or did not commit offence charged with was a question of fact and as such question should have been left for decision to the enquiry officer alone. The banks are functioning in this country because the public repose their utmost confidence in the integrity and honesty of the banking staff. If this confidence is shaken, then it will adversely affect the entire banking system in the country. It is, therefore of paramount importance that only such officers should be continued in the bank who enjoy the reputation of being above all temptations. In this case the respondent had admittedly joined the co‑employees in the cash Department to commit defalcations. It may be, that mere admission may not have been found sufficient for proving a criminal charge in a Court of law. But that consideration would not weigh with the bank Executives who had otherwise found the respondent to have been connected with this fraud. The bank employer's discretion in dispensing with the service of the respondent should not have been ordinarily interfered with, if all legal formalities had been duly complied with.

4. An objection was raised that the charge‑sheet had been served by an accountant of the bank and not by the Manager. There was, however, no ,hard and fast rule that the charge‑sheet in such cases should be served by the manager or officer higher to him. An accountant was stated to be a senior officer of the Cash Department holding higher rank than the respondent. He could, therefore, take administrative disciplinary action by serving the res pondent with a charge‑sheet. The personal opinion in such matters can have little weight.

5. Regarding the question of limitation the respondent under section 25‑A of the

1. R. O. had to bring his grievance to the notice of the employer within 7 days of the communication of the dismissal. Thereafter the result of his grievance was to be com municated to the respondent within 15 days. The respondent should then have filed application before the Junior Labour Court within a period of 2 months from the date of communication from the employer or on expiry of 15 days' time. Thus the respondent had 2J months from the date of communication of his grievance to the employer. This had been done on 2‑2‑1973. Under these circumstances the application should have been filed before the junior Labour Court by 17‑4‑1973, and this applica tion which was filed on 9th May, 1973 was clearly time barred. This delay could not be condoned by simply stating that the respondent had waited in the hope of being reinstated and the explanation was satisfactory. It was necessary for the respondent to explain each day's delay and this application had to be reasonably explained. The order condoning this delay to say the least is neither legal nor a valid order. Such applications if filed beyond time in the junior Labour Courts are liable to be dismissed, as observed in the decision of this Court reported in P L D 1976 Kar. 200 and 1972 PLC166.

6. It is accordingly declared that the application of the respondent under section 25‑A of the I. R. O. filed in junior Labour Court was clearly barred by limitation and even otherwise the decision in a domestic enquiry conducted by the bank officials observing the legal formalities should not have been lightly interfered with.

7. The petition is accepted accordingly. s. Q. Petition accepted.