1980 PLP 190 (PTD)

DORAB PATEL, J. ‑The description of the petitioners in this petition for leave is strange, but Mr. Bhatti explained that the petitioners had a third brothers and that they had, ill carried on business as a firm and that their partnership had been duly registered under section 26‑A of the Income‑tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the said Act). Now, the grievance of the peti tioners, who are brothers, is that they have been taxed as partners of the firm for the assessment years 1957‑58 and 1958‑59 although they had voluntarily wound up their firm. Their plea in this respect had, however, not been accepted by the Income‑tax Officer, therefore, the petitioners bad filed direct appeals before the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal, which were dismissed on 22‑10‑1966. The petitioners had, therefore, made an application under section 66 (1) of the said Act and the question referred to the Lahore High Court was "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding chat the status of an Association of persons assigned by the Income‑tax Officer (to the petitioners) was fully justifiable." As a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court answered this question in the affirmative by its judgment dated 27‑1‑1976, the petitioners have filed this petition for leave. Mr. Bhatti rightly submitted that a firm could be dissolved in any manner, therefore, his further submission was that there was no material in support of the finding that the firm of which the petitioners had been partners, had not been dissolved. But, this would be a gross over statement of the case. It is true that the petitioners had not informed the Income‑tax Officer of their desire to renew the registration of their firm and as submitted by learned counsel this was a circumstance in support of their claim. But, on the other and, the petitioners had not produced their books of account in order to prove their claim and the Income‑tax Officer rejected as false their explanation that the books of account had been stolen. No exception can be taken to the inference thus drawn by the Income‑tax Officer. Additionally the learned Judges have referred to other evidence which was inconsistent with the claim of the petitioners. This was that the name of the firm had been Javaid Transport Service Lahore and according to the impugned judgment the Income‑tax Officer found as a fact that the route permits, the Adda, the buses and everything else were still in the name of Javed Transport Service, Lahore and that the business had been carried on in the same style." In addition to this evidence Mr. Bhatti admitted that one of the petitioners, brother had filed a suit only for accounts. But the fact that a suit was filed only for accounts is a circumstance which goes against the claim of the petitioners, because it means that in view of one of the partners, the firm had not been dissolved. Clearly, therefore, there was evidence in support of the concurrent findings against the petitioner and therefore, the question referred to the Court was rightly answered in the affirmative. Mr. Bhatti referred us to some of the observations in the impugned judg ment and stated that the learned Judges had erroneously held that an infer ence from facts could never raise a question of law. We agree with learned counsel that an inference drawn from facts may raise a question of law, but nothing turns on this criticism of the judgment, because we are satisfied that there was material in support of the view taken by the Income‑tax Officer and by the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal. The petition is without metit and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.