1993 PLP 2549 (MLD)

Muhammad Abdul Aziz Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 10th February 1992. Those two appeals call in question the two orders passed by the learned Eighth Rent Controller, Karachi (South) in Rent Cases No.535 of 1984, respectively, ordering the appellants' ejectment from the premises in question within sixty days from the date of the respective orders.

2. Ejectment was sought by the respondent in the two cases on a number of grounds but ejectment of the appellants has been ordered solely on the ground that the premises were required in good faith by the respondent for his personal use.

3. In this regard, the case. of the respondent was that he was residing in a flat consisting of a single room measuring 12' by 12' on the second floor of the building known as "Parbhat Building", which had been rented out by the respondents father. The respondent was residing in the said flat with his wife, two minor children, father, mother and grandfather who was aged about 83 years. The case of the respondent was that his father was a heart patient and his grandfather was a patient of asthma and, therefore, they were not in a position to climb stairs leading to the flat. Consequently, they were compelled to remain confined in the same flat day and night. The case of the respondent further was that since he was residing in the said flat alongwith the members of his family and father, mother and grandfather the premises in his possession were insufficient and unsuitable for his requirement and consequently, the respondent needed the premises in possession of the appellants for his personal bona fide use.

4. The application was resisted by the appellant on the ground that previously the building was owned by the respondent's grandfather Haji Allah Banda, who had earlier filed ejectment applications against the appellants, being Rent Applications Nos.557 of 1986 and 6227 of 1980, however, the same were dismissed. Even appeals filed before this Court were dismissed.

5. The learned Controller, found that the case of the respondent for the personal bona fide need had been fully established. As regards the two ejectment applications earlier filed by the respondent's predecessor, the learned Controller observed that the mere fact that the ejectment applications filed by the respondent's predecessor had earlier been dismissed, cannot debar him from filing a fresh application before him. In any case, according to the learned Rent Controller, decisions in the previous applications could not have any binding effect in the matter. Consequently, he ordered the appellants ejectment from the premises as pointed out earlier.

6. I have heard Mr. Amir Raza Naqvi, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. MA. Aziz Khan, learned counsel for the respondent.

7. The first contention of Mr. Amir Raza Naqvi was that the grandfather of the respondent which was one of the family members of the respondents had died during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Rent Controller and this fact appears to have been completely overlooked by him, No doubt, if the respondent's grandfather died during the pendency of the proceedings, as has been admitted by him during his cross‑examination, but the mere fact that the respondent's grandfather died during pendency of the proceedings would hardly make any material alternation in the situation considering the number of remaining members of the respondent's family. The argument, therefore, has no force.

8. The second argument of Mr. Amir Raza Naqvi, is that the contentions that the two cases earlier filed by the respondent's grandfather, Allah Banda, had been dismissed, is also without merit as neither it was shown on what grounds ejectment of the tenant had been sought in the said case nor p, anything was brought on record from which the reasons for dismissal of the said cases may be spelt out. In any case, the mere fact that who applications filed by the respondent's predecessor were also dismissed cannot by itself provide a ground for dismissal of the ejectment applications filed by the respondent or JA could militate against the bona fides of his claim. The second argument of Mr. Amir Raza Naqvi, must, also fail.

9. The third argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the property was transferred in the name of the respondent only with a view to create a ground for appellants' ejectment from the demised premises. This argument has no force and deserves to be summarily rejected. Nothing could be pointed out from the record from which such an inference may be drawn. Therefore, even the third argument of the learned counsel has no force.

10. It was lastly contended that the respondent was guilty of concealing the previous litigation, which could only point out towards his mala fides. I also find no force in this argument of the learned counsel, as the respondent would be guilty of concealment of material facts only if the same had any relevancy to the present case. In my view, the fact that the previous litigation initiated by the respondent's predecessor had failed to bear fruit, in any way, cannot be pleaded as a valid defence to the present proceedings. The last argument of Mr. Amir Raza Naqvi, therefore, must also fail.

11. On the other hand as has been observed by the learned Controller, the 'evidence led on behalf of the respondent was consistent with the averments earlier made by him in his eviction application. The respondent's testimony also could not be shattered in the cross‑examination. Consequently, in my opinion, the case of the respondent against the appellants has been fully established. No doubt, the respondent had sought the eviction of the two tenants at the same time, but, as was held in the case of Haroon Kassam v. Azam Suleman Madha PLD 1990 SC 394 "all that is, required by the landlord is to prove that the premises are required by him in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children". The issue whether the accommodation sought by the landlord is more than his needs would not be a relevant issue as it is for the landlord to determine his needs and the same cannot be determined by the tenant.

12. In the result, I find no force in the two appeals and the same are, therefore, dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. H.B.T./W‑79/K Appeals dismissed.