1975 PLP 46 (SCMR)

WAHEEDUDIN AHMAD, J: The petitioner was dismissed from service by respondent No. 1 on the ground that he &had committed theft. His dismissal order was challenged in an application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before the Junior Labour Court. The Junior Labour Court allowed the application by order dated the 5th February, 1973. This order was set aside on appeal by the Sind Labour Court No. 1 by order dated the 3rd April 1973. The petitioner challenged this order in Constitutional Petition No. 770 of 1973 which was dismissed on the 8th April 1974. The petitioner seeks permission to file an appeal against the said order. Mr. Shehinshah, who was given special permission to appear in this case, has attacked the order of the High Court on the following four grounds:‑

(i) That the enquiry report should have been supplied with the second show‑cause notice, (ii) that the dismissal of the petitioner was on the ground of theft. This being an offence should have been taken to the criminal Court and the petitioner should not have been dismissed by the disciplinary proceeding. (iii) the Inquiry Officer bad no approval of the employer under Stand ing Order No. 15(4), (iv) the Labour Court should have gone into the question whether the petitioner has committed theft. The contentions raised before us have no force. The first contention that a copy of the enquiry report should have been sent along with the Show cause notice is not supported by any standing order. The Standing Order No. 15(4) only requires that no order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct. In the present case he was given an opportunity to explain the allegations made against him. Mr. Shehinshah has referred to a decision of this Court in Punjab Road Transport Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others (1973 S C M R 455). In that case, it was held that it was necessary and consistent with the principles of natural justice that not only the respon dent should have been furnished with a copy of the inquiry report but also he should have been given an opportunity to show cause why the order of dismissal should not be passed against him. This case is distinguishable from the present case. In this case, a show‑cause notice was given in writing. The result of the inquiry report was also communicate to hint. It is admitted that the petitioner did not ask the respondent to supply a copy of the inquiry report. In such circumstances, the petitioner can have no legitimate grievance in that respect. We would, therefore, repel this contention. The second ground that the petitioner should have been prosecuted in the criminal Court before his services were terminated is also nut well -founded. It was open to the respondent to prosecute the petitioner in the criminal Court. It was also open to him to take disciplinary action. The respondent took the disciplinary proceedings and he was justified in law to do so. This contention is also repelled. The third contention that the Inquiry Officer had no approval of the employer is also not well‑founded. It will be noticed that according to the charge‑sheet the enquiry was to be made by the Factory Personnel Manager. It was pointed out by Mr. Shehinshah that the enquiry was held by the Assistant Personnel Superintendent. It was explained by the respondent No. 1 that the Factory Personnel Manager was on leave from 10th Novem ber, 1972 to 4th December, 1972 and during this period the Assistant Personnel Superintendent was officiating as the Factory Personnel Manager. This explanation is satisfactory and the High Court was justified in holding that the Inquiry Officer had the approval of the employer. The last contention that the Labour Court should have gone into the question whether the petitioner had committed any theft or not is also devoid of force. The Labour Court is only concerned with the question whether the action taken against the petitioner was in accordance with law. The question whether the petitioner committed the theft was a question of fact and could only be enquired into by the Inquiry Officer. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, we are satisfied that the petitioner has been rightly dismissed. There is no ground to interfere. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.