1982 PLP 305 (PLC)

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S. 25‑A (10)‑Word "grievance"‑ Includes reference to more than one grievance‑Grievance petition by an individual workers for more than one grievances‑Maintainable. Petitioner challenged two separate punishments inflicted consequent to two different charge‑sheets by way of a single grievance petition under section 25‑A of Industrial, Relations Ordinance, 1969, Petition was rejected by Labour Court on grounds that this section does not envisage filing of one grievance petition in respect of more than one grievance. It was contended that by anology upon sub section (10) of section 25‑A that if a specific provisions was considered necessary by Legislature for entitling several persons to make or file a common grievance petition, then the absence of any specific provision entitling a workman to file a grie vance petition covering more than one grievance should be considered as implied bar 0 the maintainability of such a grievance petition. Labour Appellate Tribunal on appeal seta-side decision of Labour Court. Held: Section 25‑A, is headed as "redress of individual grievance". In other words, this provision has been specially made for the adjudication of grievance of individual workman. Collective grievances are dealt with in other provisions of the I. R. O. In view of this position, it was found necessary to make a specific provision enabling several workmen, having a common grievance, to make a joint grievance petition instead of having to make separate grievance petition. No such difficulty, however, arises in the case of a grievance petition covering more than one grie vance. The General Clauses Act specifically provides that,. in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the Law, the singular is deemed to in clude the plural. As such, reference to "grievance" in section 25‑A, I. R. O. will include reference to more than one grievance. WA. Hakeem for Appellant. Shabbir Ahmad Awan for Respondent, Date of hearing: 12th April, 1981. The appellant who was working as Assistant Station Master at Tharu Shah, was served with 2 separate charges in respect of loss of cer tain packages on or about 24th October, 1974 from the Parcel Godown under his charge. In respect of the first charge which related to one car ton, he was awarded the punishment of withholding of increment temporarily for a period of one year and also recovery of an amount of Rs. 1,148, being the value of the lost carton, and in respect of the second charge, which related to loss of.3 packages, he was awarded the punish ment of withholding of increment permanently for a period of one year plus recovery from him of an amount of Rs. 1,744 being tile value of the 3 lost packages. ‑The appellant challenged the imposition of these penal ties through a single grievance petition filed before the learned VIIth Labour Court on 9th February, 1979. The learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition solely on the ground that sec tion 25‑A, I. R. O., does not envisage the filing of one grievance petition in respect of more than one grievance. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant has come up in appeal to this Tribunal. 2. Mr. Shabbir Ahmad Awan, the learned counsel for the railway administration was unable to cite any authority in support of his conten tion that section 25‑A, I. R. O., does not contemplate the filing of a single grievance petition in respect of more than one grievance, but he relied, by anology upon the provisions of subsection (10) of sec tion 25‑A, and contended that if a specific provision was considered neces sary by the Legislature for entitling several persons to make or file a com mon grievance petition, the absence of any specie provision entitling a workman to file a grievance petition covering more than one grievance, should be considered as implied bar to the maintainability of such a grievance petition. I find no substance in this, contentions as the anology is not relevant. It may be pointed out that section 25‑A is headed as "redress of individual grievance". In other words, this provision has been specially made for the adjudication of grievances of indivi dual workman. Collective grievances are dealt with in other provision of the I. R. O. In view of this position, it was found necessary to make a specific provision enabling several workmen, having a common grievance, to make a joint grievance petition instead of having to make separate grievance petition. No such difficulty, however, arises in the case of a grievance petition covering more than one grievance. The Gene ral Clauses Act specifically provides that, in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the Law, the singular is deemed to include the plural. As such, reference to "grievance" in section 25‑A, I. R. O. will include reference to more than one grievance. Furthermore the basic principle of interpretation of legislation is to further the intention of the Legislature and to construe it in a manner, as far as possible, so that it becomes workable. If a workman is required to submit a separate grievance petition in respect of each grievance, there would be multiplicity of proceedings which could not possibly be the intention of the Legislature. To take a single example, a person whose services have been wrongfully terminated or who has been dismissed from service can, file a single grievance peti tion not only against his dismissal or termination of services but also in respect of the payment of back benefits including payment of notice pay, gratuity and the provident Fund. This, in fact, is the normal practice in the Labour Courts. I am, therefore, of the view that the grievance petition of the appellant cannot be considered to be invalid or not main tainable merely by reason of the fact that it covered more than one grie vance which in fact related but to one incident of the same date. 3. As the learned Labour Court has not decided that case on merits, but has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition solely on the ground that it covered more than one grievance, 1 would, while setting aside the decision of the learned Labour Court, remand the case to it for deciding the case on merits, particularly the issue whether the appellant has been dealt with in accordance with law.