1998 PLP 637 (MLD)

6. The appellant neither opted to make the statement on oath nor produced any witness in his defence. However, he tendered 3 documents in his defence which are as follows:-- (1) Exh. D.A. certified copy of the affidavit of Mst. Khursheed Bibi, complainant filed during the proceedings of the case in which she exonerated the appellant (2) Exh. D.B. affidavit of the father of Mst. Balqees Bibi to the same effect; and (3) Exh. D.C. copy of the F.I.R. against the appellant under section 382, P. P. C.

7. The learned trial Court on the conclusion of the case by his impugned judgment, dated 22nd of December, 1996 acquitted the appellant and the co -accused from the charge under section 10(2) of .the Hudood Ordinance and without amending the charge convicted the appellant under section 16 of the Hudood Ordinance and sentenced him as stated above.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following contentions: -- (i) That the appellant could not be convicted under section 16 without having had recourse to the amendment of the charge before the pronouncement of the judgment; (ii) that no credible evidence is available on record to record the conviction under section 16 of the Hudood Ordinance specially in view of the statement of P.W.4 Muhammad Hussain who is the father of the co-accused Mst. Balqees Bibi and the 3 documents produced by the appellant in defence viz. Exh. D.A., Exh. D.B. and Exh. D.C.; and (iii) In any case the appellant being a young person the sentence awarded to him is liable to be reduced.

9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State very candidly submitted that the conviction under section 16 of the Hudood Ordinance cannot be maintained and the case merits to be remanded as charge was not amended before the pronouncement of the judgment which should have been done as provided by section 227, Cr.P.C. if there was evidence available on record for so doing. He submitted that in view of the position that he is urging the remand he would not attend to the merits of the case.

10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no useful purpose will be served by remand and that agony of the appellant will also be perpetuated thereby. He urged that in view of the appellant already having undergone a sentence of about 1-1/2 years of imprisonment he would be satisfied if the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone.

11. Having given consideration to the respective contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and the State it appears to me that it will be just and proper to accede to the request made by the learned counsel for the appellant to reduce the sentence to that he had already undergone. It has been correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that if the case is remanded the appellant would remain under continuous torture for another long period till the conclusion of the case by the Trial Court and thereafter, during the appeal that may have to be filed if he is again, convicted.

12. Before parting with this case I must observe that the trial Courts should be careful in the conduct of proceedings before them and ensure that no technical lacunae which may impel the Appellate Courts to remand the cases should be allowed to creep in as the cardinal principle of dispensation of justice is that prolongation of litigation must of necessity be avoided to bring harmony and peace in the society. The slipshod manner and haste in the disposal of the cases or the desire to achieve the maximum disposal by the trial Courts is in fact leading to unnecessary accumulation of pendnecy on account of remands and also creates agitation in the public minds.

13. I would also like to observe at this stage the necessity of giving proper training to the judicial officers both at the pre-induction stage as also during the service period. The imparting of training to judicial officers at 01 levels is a matter of paramount importance as it would keep them abreast with the developments in law as also with the amendments brought therein from time to time.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, I would dismiss this appeal but reduce the sentence awarded to the appellant to imprisonment which he has already undergone. The sentence of stripes is set aside as the same has been B abolished by an Ordinance promulgated in April, 1996. The sentence of fine is alos set aside. The appellant shall be released forthwith if not required in any I other case. H.B.T./1165/FSC Order accordingly.