1998 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

SH. RIAZ, AHMAD, J.

This appeal through leave of this Court is directed against the judgment and order dated 12-4-1995 delivered by the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal whereby an appeal preferred by the respondent calling in question the adverse remarks entered in his Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.) was allowed.

2. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment the Lahore High Court, Lahore through its Registrar sought leave to appeal, which was granted by this Court vide order dated 17-12-1995 to consider the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Lahore High Court, Lahore v. Muhammad Jehangir Khan Goraya and another (Civil Appeal No. 823 of 1990) which had a direct bearing on the controversy in the present appeal.

3. The brief facts giving rise to the institution of this appeal are that respondent Sh. Abdur Rashid while posted as Magistrate Section 30 was given following adverse remarks in his A.C.R. by the Reporting Officer Ch. Taj Muhammad, formerly District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi:-- Pen-picture: There are so many complaints of corruption against him. Counselling: I had advised him to improve his integrity, but he did not improve. Overall Grading: Meets bare minimum standards (Below average). Fitness for promotion: Not yet fit for promotion. Integrity: Corrupt." Mr. Justice Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, Judge, Lahore High Court, as he then was, in his capacity as Countersigning Officer endorsed all the remarks in respect of the respondent, but it is alleged, that he did not endorse the remarks contained in columns of overall grading, fitness for promotion and integrity. Aggrieved by these adverse remarks the respondent made representation to the High Court, which was looked into by the Administration Committee of the Lahore High Court, but the said representation was rejected and the orders were communicated to the respondent by the appellant on 21-7-1988. The respondent then invoked the jurisdiction of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal and vide order impugned the said appeal was allowed.

4. With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for both sides we have carefully considered the contentions raised by them. The Tribunal while accepting the appeal observed that since no complaint about the corruption of the respondent had been moved in writing, therefore, the conclusion as to the respondent being corrupt arrived at by the reporting officer was erroneous being without any foundation. The Tribunal also observed that an adverse entry in the A.C.R. even if not endorsed by the Countersigning Officer does not lose its weight yet the Countersigning Officer having endorsed certain remarks, but not endorsing the remarks about corruption makes the A.C.R. doubtful and questionable. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that if a person is to be treated as corrupt and such entry is to be made in the A.C.R., then there should be cogent material and justification for recording such remarks in the A.C.R.

5. It was vehemently argued on behalf of the appellant that although there was no complaint about corruption in writing, but the possibility of oral complaints being made to the reporting officer cannot be ruled out and therefore in the absence of mala fides the entries in the A.C.R. could not have been struck down. It was also contended that non-endorsement of certain entries by the Countersigning Officer would mean that the same are correct and had been believed by the Countersigning Officer. It was further argued that to demand any material in writing or complaints in writing to justify the entry of corruption in the A.C.R. is preposterous and has the effect of rendering the entire law on the subject as nugatory. It was also urged before us that the reporting officer is the best judge to assess the working of a subordinate after watching him and taking stock of overall performance of an employee. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the judgment reported as F.Q. Mati Ullah Khan Alizai v. Chief Secretary, Government of N.-W.F.P. and 5 others (1994 SCMR 722).

6. We have examined these contentions and we Pave also gone through the judgment in Civil Appeal No.823 of 1990. In this judgment Instruction 36 contained in Punjab ESTACODE Book VII dealing with the confidential reports was considered. Its effect and the decision of the Administration Committee of the High Court in the aforesaid case were also considered. Since we have decided to remand this case to the Tribunal in the light of Instruction 36 and other relevant material, we would refrain to dilate upon the judgment in Civil Appeal No.823 of 1990 because it will be for the Tribunal to judge its applicability in the light of facts and circumstances of this case. Suffice it would be that in our view the Tribunal has not applied its mind to the instructions and as to the overall effect of judgment of the reporting officer and non-endorsing of certain remarks by the Countersigning Officer and its consequences. However, we are not giving any definite finding in view of our decision to remand the case for fresh decision by the Tribunal.

7. In the light of the observations made by us, we dispose of this appeal by remanding the case to the Tribunal to decide the case afresh in the light of Instruction 36 and the law laid down on, the subject. The parties are left to bear their own costs. M.B.A./L-8/S ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Case remanded.