P L D 1982 Lahore 553 (PLP)

The dispute involved in this second appeal relates to a shop in New "Anarkali, Lahore. It is 6wt4d by the respondent, Mst. Farhat Begum, and is occupied by the appellant, Sh. Ghulam Rasool, as a tenant. The respon dent made an application for eviction of the appellant on the ground that she required the shop for the use of her son. Her plea had found favour with a Rent Controller of Lahore who had decided the application. He, therefore, directed the appellant to vacate the shop. His order was challenged by the appellant by carrying an appeal before the District Judge, Lahore, but with out success. Hence this second appeal.

2. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that according to the statement of Syed Kabir Ahmed Bokhari, who appeared as one of the witnesses of the appellant, the respondent's son, namely. Ahsan Sayyed, for whom the shop was needed by her, was about eleven years old and, therefore, he was unable to run the shop. It was, therefore, urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the requirement of the respondent was not bona fide.

3. On the other hand, it was pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent's son was about thirteen years old at the time of the making of the application and by now he is aged 23 years. 1n this connection, he referred to the statement of Syed Kabir Ahmed Bokbari to the effect that the respondent's son was studying in the 4th year.

4. Syed Kabir Ahmed Bokhari did not give the precise age of Ahsan Sayyed. His statement, which is required to be considered in the light of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, reads as follows;- This statement was made by Syed Kabir Ahmed Bokhari in 1978 and the ejectment proceedings were launched by the respondent in 1972. Thus, according to the first part of, the aforementioned statement of Syed Kabir Ahmed Bokhari, Ahsan Sayyed was about eleven years old at the time of the making of the ejectment application but in view of the later part of his statement his age was about 13 years at that time. Be that as it may, this much is clear from the evidence of Syed Kabir Ahmed Bokhari that at the time of the making of the application Ahsan Sayyed was only a lad and had not attained majority. This, however, is immaterial because by the time of the disposal of the ejectment application in 1979 he had become major even according to the estimate of learned counsel for the appellant. And by now he is aged not less than 20 years. It was not disputed by learned counsel for the appellant that for the purpose of deeding matters like the one in hand, even developments taking place after the order of the Rent Controller can be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding appeals arising out his order. The ejectment order has not been executed as yet. In the circumstances, the fact that the respondent's son was minor at the time of the initiation of ejectment proceedings is of no help to the appellant.

5. The disputed shop was an evacuee property and was transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita tion) Act, 1958. As the appellant was in possession of that shop at the time, of its transfer, he became a statutory tenant by virtue of the provisions of section 30 of the said Act. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the protection of six years, afforded by section 30 to statutory tenants, was still available to the appellant when the ejectment application was filed and, therefore, the application was incompetent.

6. Admittedly, the said period of six years had run-out long before the application was decided by the learned Rent Controller. The law is well settled on the point that if the cause of action for any legal proceeding matures during the pendency thereof, the proceeding cannot be thrown away on the short ground that the cause of action was immature at the time of its commencement. The said Act was also repealed before ejectment of the ,appellant was ordered by the learned Rent Controller. The provisions oil section 30 of the said Act are, therefore, of no avail to the appellant.

7. Resultantly, this second appeal fails. It is dismissed with costs. The appellant is, however, allowed four months' time to vacate the premises in question. s. Q. Appeal dismissed.