P L D 1998 Karachi 124 (PLP)

The applicant is charged under section 147/148/149/436, P.P.C. read with section 20, Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance and section 324 covered by the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance. To be precise he was allegedly involved in a bank dacoity as also setting such bank (N.D.F.C.) on fire etc. The accused was refused bail per order dated 12-5-1996 passed by the learned Presiding Judge of Special Court 1V (S.T.A.), Karachi. He was arrested way back on 18-7-1995 when already in custody in another case. The learned counsel for the applicant has urged that the only evidence against the applicant consists of confessional statements of two co-accused namely, Muhammad Rafi and Arshad Aleem Khan and first information together with another witness only, some two weeks after the registration of the F.I.R. included the applicant's name in the statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. It is further contended that no recoveries have been made, no empties have been found and no other independent or reliable evidence has been forthcoming. What is more on account of the attraction of section 87, Cr.P.C. even the charge so far has not been framed, let alone recording of any evidence. While the ground of statutory delay enshrined in section 497, Cr.P.C. is not available in this case as yet, it should be shortly available because the accused, as aforesaid, was arrested way back on 18-7-1995. Even so that Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, which essentially is a departure from the ordinary Criminal Law, contemplates its own procedure and section 5-A thereof mandates that on taking cognizance of a case the Special Court shall proceed with the trial from day to day and shall decide the case speedily, not adjourning the trial for any purpose except when in the interest of justice, no adjournment granted by the Court going beyond a period of two days. While on the question of non-mention of the applicant's name in the F. I. R., at the outset, learned counsel for the applicant relies on Kamranuddin v. State 1994 PCr.LJ 561, where bail was granted on that ground, we are not inclined to accept that contention because in criminal matters each case has to be decided on its own facts and the circumstances of the instant case did not warrant any ready knowledge of the name of the accused with the first informant, who merely was performing guard duty at the relevant bank. However, and even though, as said, the ground of statutory delay is not yet available to the applicant, the applicant has been incarcerated for far too long a period of time than can be brooked by section 5-A(1) and (2) of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. Liberty of a person is one of the primary constitutional guarantees and cannot be trifled with. In such circumstances, and on such ground alone, we admit the applicant to bail in the sum of Rs.1,00,000 with one surety and P.R. bond in like amount to the satisfaction of the Nazir of the Court. Application disposed of H.B.T./Z-23/K Bail granted,