1993 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

SYED ALLY MADAD SHAH (CHAIRMAN).‑‑‑Appellant Mr. Ejaz M. Khan was serving a; a Manager with the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PlAC) when: his service reached its end by acceptance of his resignation by the Managing Director on 10‑2‑1987. He preferred appeal to the Chairman, PIAC on 26‑2‑1987 for review of the action taken against him alleging that he was forced to resign. He was informed under letter dated 12‑8‑1987 that his appeal was not accepted. He then preferred this appeal on 17‑9‑1987.

2. The case of the appellant is that he was falsely involved in much publicized scandal of fraudulent/dubious conversion of "MCOs" (Miscellaneous Charges Orders) issued by M/s. Pakistan Travel Dublin and accepted by the Karachi Booking Office in the year 1982, when he was District Manager of Karachi. To his surprise, he received a letter dated 6‑11‑1985 from the General Manager (Investigations) to answer a questionnaire annexed with the letter and another questionnaire in the year 1986 and he submitted his answers and thereafter he was served with show‑cause notice dated 20‑10‑1986 and he submitted his reply. In January, 1987, he received a notice for personal hearing under section 10 of the PIAC Act, 1956. He was afforded personal hearing between 26/27th January, 1987. He was again called at the Head Office on 9th and 10th of February, 1987 to appear before the Managing Director and others, and he was given two options one of facing removal from service under section 10 of the PIAC Act, 1956; the other of tendering unconditional resignation. Getting confused by the unforeseen situation, he signed the resignation application which was already typed and the order of' acceptance of his resignation was accordingly made. He appealed against the order but did not succeed.

3. The respondents have resisted the appeal contending that the appellant was involved in the scandal of conversion of MCOs and proceedings under the PIAC Act were taken against him and during the course of the proceedings, he voluntarily submitted his resignation application which was, accepted by the competent authority and there is no merit in appeal. They have also taken the plea that the appeal is time‑barred.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the appellant was falsely involved in the alleged scandal of conversion of MCOs and he was placed under harassment by issuance of questionnaires and initiation disciplinary proceedings and finally placing him in a difficult situation of tendering resignation of facing removal from service there and then and he, feeling confounded signed the resignation application which was already type. He contended that the resignation was thus obtained under duress and it could not be construed to be resignation in normal course as to have abruptly ended the twenty‑three years service of the appellant and the order of its acceptance is liable to be set aside with the direction that the appellant may be reinstated in service with all back benefits.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that the appellant feeling apprehensive of action against him under the provisions of section 10 of the PIAC Act for his involvement in the fraudulent conversion, of the MCOs, voluntarily tendered his resignation as to save himself from the order of his removal from service. He refused the allegations by the appellant that he was made to tender resignation under the threat of order of his removal from service.

6. The appellant did admittedly put in resignation application in the, situation that he was being proceeded against under the disciplinary proceedings which could entail his removal from service. He was holding a responsible post of Manager and could have resisted if resignation had been obtained from him under duress. Even if it were believed that he was given option of facing removal from service or tendering resignation, it could not be a case of duress or coercion but he was rather given a fair chance, after affording him hearing in person, of escaping proposed punishment of removal from service by tendering resignation as to save himself from a blot on his service career of removal from service and to preserve the status he had enjoyed for such a long period. In any case, there is no evidence that the appellant was forced or coerced or put under any form of duress to submit resignation and there is no merit in his appeal as to set aside the order of acceptance, of his resignation and give him relief of his reinstatement in service with the PIAC. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. A.A./681/Sr,L Appeal dismissed.