P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

LARI. J.‑This appeal is directed against the judgment of our brother Muhammad Bakhsh, J., dated 4th August 1953 in Suit No. 1021 of 1952 by means of which he rejected objections to an award filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and directed that the award be made a rule of the Court and decree shall follow in terms thereof. It appears that three Factory Selection Contracts were entered into between the parties, the first on 15th November 1951, the second on 10th December, 1951 and the third on 15th December 1951. All these contracts contained a clause for reference of disputes to arbitration under byelaws of Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. Karachi. The Byelaws of Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. Karachi provide that in case of Factory Selection Contracts arbitration should be arranged in accordance with provisions of Byelaw 140 unless the parties by consent agreed to resort to byelaw

39. The r arbitration proceedings in this case were admittedly conducted in accordance with byelaw 39 and not byelaw 140 and the case of the plaintiff‑respondents was that the parties had agreed to have resort to byelaw

39. The defendant on the other hand denied this agreement and pleaded that the arbitration proceedings not being in accordance with byelaw 140 were wholly void. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the defendants had consented to the arbitra tion proceedings being taken under byelaw 39 and consequently the award was valid. The main question in this appeal is whether the defen dants had consented to arbitration proceedings being taken in accordance with provisions of byelaw

39. The plaintiffs relied on two letters one dated 13th June 1952 addressed by them to the defendants and the other dated 2nd July 195' written by the defendants to the plaintiff in reply to them letter dated 13th June 1952. The relevant portion of the plaintiff's letter dated 13th June 1952 is reproduced below :‑ " We hereby appoint Mr. Baboolal Narandas of Messrs. Kotak & Co., as our arbitrator under section a9 of the byelaws of Karachi Cotton Association Ltd., and hereby notice you to appoint your arbitrator within 15 days after receipt hereof under the said Byelaws acid, otherwise we shall be compelled to appoint one on your behalf to proceed with the job. Please note that objection, if any as regard to referring this case to the arbitration under this particular Bye‑laws be sent to us within 48 hours after the receipt of this letter, failing which we shall take it granted that you have no objection, if this case is arbitrated under section 39 of the Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. Karachi." The reply of the defendants is a short one and may be quoted in full: " Dear Sirs, Please refer to your letter No. I/C/67/1362 dated 13th June 1952 notifying the appointment of Mr. R. K. Doctor as arbitrator on our behalf. It was a result of indisposition of our Mr. Karamtullah Zia (incharge cotton department) that the appointment of arbitrator was held in abeyance. We, however, appoint Mr. S. A. Rehman of Messrs. M. Abdullah‑Maula Bakhsh as our arbitrator into the matter. We hope you will have no objection to the same. Faithfully yours. For Friends Trading Co. (Regd.) (Sd.) BARKATULLAH (Partner) The reply clearly shows that the defendants did not take any objection within 48 hours as required by the letter of the plaintiffs because they had in fact no objection to arbitration proceedings being initiated under byelaw

39. The two letters read together clearly show that the parties agreed to have their differences arbitrated under the provisions of byelaw

39. It was contended by Mr. Ibadatyar Khan the learned counsel for the appellants that mere silence would not amount to an agreement and relied on an unreported decision of justice Inamullah. The proposition is correct so far as it goes but in this case there is not mere silence. Inference from silence was actually confirmed by the defendants in their own letter quoted above. Our brother Muhammad Bakhsh, J., rightly came to the conclusion that the defendants had consented to arbitration proceedings being taken under by law 39 and the defendants could not subsequently turn round and challenge the award on the ground that the proceedings were invalid, being in contravention of the provisions of byelaw

140. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the consent expressed by their clients in their letter of 2nd July 1952 was conditional on the respondents agreeing to appointment of their nominees as a second arbitrator. We are unable to accept this interpretation as it is unwarranted by the language of the letter. The letter simply means that the appellants agreed to have arbitration proceedings under byelaw 39 but delay occurred in appoint ment of their nominee on account of illness of Mr. Zia and that delay should be condoned. No other point was urged. There is no force in this appeal and we dismiss it with costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.