P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

Ch. Farzand Ali and Fakharuddin Pirzada for Appellants. Pirzada Muhammad Saleem Aslam and Muhammad Abdul Aziz for Respondents. ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑This regular first appeal is directed against an order dated the 30th of March 1965, passed by Ch. Muhammad Sharif, Senior Civil Judge, Rahimyarkhan, rejecting the appellants' plaint in a pre‑emption suit on the ground that 1/5th pre‑emption money was not deposited by the due date. The suit was institute before him on the 23rd of February 1965 and on the 24th of February 1965, he had made an order that summons be issued to the defendants for the 30th of March 1965 and 1/5th of the pre‑emption money should be deposited before the date fixed. On the 30th of March 1965, an application was presented before him by Malik Khadim Hussain, Pleader, praying that the time be extended by one day for the reason that although the plaintiffs had deposited the amount in question with the Pleader yet the Pleader could not deposit the same in Court due to a misunderstanding on his part to the effect that the money could be deposited on the 30th of March 1965. In the first paragraph of 'this application he, however, clearly stated that the money was to be deposited before the date fixed, i.e., before the 30th of March 1965. The learned trial Judge rejected this application on the same day holding that no satisfactory ground had been shown for the extension of time, and having rejected this application he then proceeded to reject the plaint as well under section 22 (4) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act.

2. On behalf of the plaintiff‑appellants it is submitted by Ch. Farzand Ali that the plaintiffs themselves had acted diligently inasmuch as they paid the money to their counsel on the 28th of March 1965, as is mentioned in the application of the counsel dated 30th of March 1965, and that the delay which occurred on the part of the counsel was due to a bona fide mistake regarding the correct import of the order passed by the trial Court on the 24th of February 1965. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred us to several authorities in support of his submissions. We may mention Ram Rattan v. Raja Ram (A I R 1923 Lah. 643), Mehr Muhammad Din v. Pandit Anandram and another (A I R 1939 Lah. 25), Narsingdas v. Ghulam Nabi (3 I C 605) and Murad Ali Khan v. Mian Abdullah Shah and others (P L D 1965 Pesh. 90).

3. On behalf of the respondent‑vendees, Mr. Peerzada, has pointed out, relying on the observations of Cornelius, J., as he then was, in Saeed Ahmad and others v. Karam Singh (P L D 1949 Lah. 380) that "the civil law leans always in favour of freedom of contract, and security of title. The statutory law of pre‑emption constituted a drawback on both these principles, and its provisions must, therefore be construed and applied strictly against the claims of pre‑emptors." The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the order passed by the trial Court in this case on the 24th of February 1965 was very clear in its terms, namely, that the money was to be deposited before the 30th of March 1965, and the mere inexperience of the counsel was no excuse for not complying with this order and having the time extended. In support of his submissions Mr. Peerzada has also referred us to several decided cases. We may here mention only two of them, namely, Garib Shah v. Aslam Shah and others (P L D 1952 Pesh. 26) and Shah Muhammad and others v. Hayat and others (P L D 1960 Lah. 975) besides P L D 1949 Lah 380 to which reference has a ready been made

3. We consider that it is not necessary to refer at any length to the cases cited by the learned counsel, for the reason that the law is clear, namely, time discretion does vest in the Court to extend time if sufficient cause is shown, and that if the amount is not deposited within the time originally fixed or within the time so extended, the plaint shall be rejected in terms of subsection (4) of section 22 of the Pre‑emption Act. The answer to the question whether in a particular case the time should or should not be extended would obviously depend on the peculiar circumstances of the case, keeping in view, of course, the consideration that the right of pre‑emption is predatory in its nature and constitutes, a drawback on the freedom of contract, and for this reason the provisions of the pre‑emption Act have to be constrained and applied strictly against pre -emptors.

5. Now, in the instant case, it is true that it is stated in the application submitted by the plaintiffs' counsel that they had given the money to him on the 28th' of March 1965, yet no satisfactory explanation has been given as to why the same was not deposited in Court by tree due date. The order passed by the trial Judge on the 24th of February 1965, is clear in its terms, namely, that the money was to be deposited before the 30th of March 1965. There does not seem to us any valid or sufficient justification for a misunderstanding on the part of the counsel as to the true import of this order, notwithstanding the fact that the counsel may have been inexperienced. In fact; there is no material before us to hold that Malik Khadira Hussain, Pleader, is a person not sufficiently experienced in these matters. It was a clear case of negligence to comply with the order of the Court and, therefore, the consequence mentioned in subsection (4) of section 22 of the Pre‑emption Act, rightly followed. We see no justification to interfere with the refusal of the trial Court to extend time in this case.

6. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.