P L D 1956 (W (PLP)
MESSRS. BAWANY VIOLIN TEXTILE MILLS LTD — Petitioners Versus (1) THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN
| Citation | P L D 1956 (W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Bakhsh and Munshi, JJ |
| Parties | MESSRS. BAWANY VIOLIN TEXTILE MILLS LTD — Petitioners Versus (1) THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1956 (W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1956 (W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Muhammad Bakhsh and Munshi, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1956 (W (PLP) (MESSRS. BAWANY VIOLIN TEXTILE MILLS LTD — Petitioners Versus (1) THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Shah Jamil Alam for Petitioners.
- S. Nasiruddin for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), Ss. 2 (b), 11 and 17‑Award given by person other than Industrial Tribunal‑Not an award under the Act‑Publication not necessary ‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑Limited application to Tribunal proceedings. Award as defined in section 2 (b), of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) means an interim or final deter mination by an Industrial Tribunal . . . . . . An award given by the employer himself on the appli cation of the Labour Union is not an award contemplated by the Act. There is, therefore, no question of publication of such an award which has no legal force or value. There is no provision in the whole Act for referring the matter to arbitration. Proceedings of the Tribunal are regulated by the Rules prescribed under the Act and not by the Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). The latter has only a limited application as set out in section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act
Judgment & Decree
Proceedings of the Tribunal are regulated by the Rules prescribed under the Act and not by the Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908). The latter has only a limited application as set out in section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act Shah Jamil Alam for Petitioners. S. Nasiruddin for Respondents. MUHAMMAD BAKHSH, J.‑--This is a petition for a writ of mandamus or a similar direction to be issued to respondent No. I directing them to publish the award as required by sections 15 and 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There was a dispute between the petitioners and res pondent No. 2, who represented the workers in the petitioners' mills. This dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal (Mr. Muhammad Baqir). Written statements were filed and issues were framed by the learned Tribunal. The parties also produced their documentary and oral evidence on these issues. Subsequently the parties approached the Industrial Tribunal for time in order to arrive at some settlement. This request was granted and 4th November 1955, was fixed for filing the compromise. On that date the following application was presented by the General Secretary of respondent No. 2 to the Tribunal. After hearing the statement of the learned counsel for management in the Court that the workers will be treated generously if they would leave the whole case to the sole arbitration of management; and the good gesture shown by the management in recognizing the Union as competent to bargain on behalf of the workers, the workers in the larger interest of labour management relations do hereby withdraw their whole case from this Hon'ble Tribunal's Court and leave the following issues among others (as framed by the Court and demanded by the workers in their demands) to the sole arbitration of the management (Seth A. L. Bawany). The petitioners accepted the arbitration and 10th Novem ber was fixed for the filing of the award. The award was then filed on that date before the Industrial Tribunal. Respon dent No. 2 then filed an application that the award may be rejected and the Tribunal should proceed with the case. They also prayed for the withdrawal of the application dated 4th November 1955, by which they had withdrawn the whole dispute from the Tribunal and had appointed Mr. Bawany as the sole Arbitrator. The learned Industrial Tribunal however rejected the application of respondent No. 2 and proceeded to decide the case. He made certain amendments in the award filed by Mr. Bawani and proceeded to give his own award which is now the subject‑matter of this petition. We have heard the learned advocate Mr. Jamil Aslam at great length. We find that he has no case whatsoever. The adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal appointed under the In dustrial Disputes Act, 1947 is called an award while the order of the Court is described as a judgment. The word "award" has been defined in this Act itself as meaning "an interim or final determination by an Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto." There is no provision in the whole Act for referring the matter to an arbit rator. The learned advocate, realising this difficulty, argued that the procedure of the Industrial Tribunal is the same as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Written state ments are filed, issues are raised and evidence is heard ; there fore, there was full authority for the Industrial Tribunal to allow this matter to be referred to the sole arbitration of Mr. Bawany. We, however, think that this position of law is not correct. The procedure which is to be followed by an Industrial Tribunal is to be the one that is prescribed by the rules framed under the Act and not by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 is important in this connection. Sub‑section (1) says that the Tribunal shall, subject to the pro visions of this Act, follow such procedure as may be prescribed. Subsection (3) however clearly lays down that every Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of four matters only viz., enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling the pro duction of documents, issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Further, every inquiry or investigation by a Tribunal is to be deemed a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the P. P. C. It is therefore clear that the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to those limited objects. Therefore, there was no provision for referr ing the matter to an Arbitrator in this manner. In the alter native, if the matter was referred to an Arbitrator and if the Tribunal thought he had to follow the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure then under the Arbitration Act the Tribunal had to hear all the objections raised by the parties and then decide the matter. That too has not been done. The Industrial Tribunal has given its own award based on the award of Mr. Bawany with such changes as it thought expedient. We are of the opinion that the award filed by Mr. Bawany has no legal force and value ands consequently the award of the Industrial Tribunal also goes out because it is not an award passed by it under the Act. In view of these reasons, we dismiss the writ petition. A. H. Petition dismissed