CLD 2006

2006 PLP 764 (CLD)

Agha ABBAS HAIDER KHAN — Appellant Versus ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager — Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
2006-February-28
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2006 PLP 764 (CLD)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members N/A
Parties Agha ABBAS HAIDER KHAN — Appellant Versus ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager — Respondent
Primary Law Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2006 PLP 764 (CLD)?

This judgment primarily cites: Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2006 PLP 764 (CLD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2006 PLP 764 (CLD) (Agha ABBAS HAIDER KHAN — Appellant Versus ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)

Headnotes / Summary

S.18

Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.166

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90

Execution of decree

Setting aside of sale

Limitation

In satisfaction of decree, mortgaged property was auctioned and sale was confirmed on 12-3-1999

Judgment-debtor on 5-9-2005, filed objection petition under O.XXI, R.90, C.P.C. for setting aside the sale, which was dismissed by Banking Court being barred by limitation

Validity

Limitation period prescribed for filing application to set aside a sale in execution of decree was thirty days and limitation period was to start from the date of sale

Objection petition filed by judgment-debtor on 5-9-2005 was grossly barred by time and the same was rightly dismissed by Banking Court

Judgment- debtor failed to point out any illegality or legal infirmity in the process of auctioning the property and in ensuing proceedings

Sale was held competently made in accordance with law and no exception could be taken to the same

Order passed by Banking Court not suffering from any legal infirmity, High Court declined to interfere in the matter Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Judgment & Decree

Present appeal, filed by the appellant/judgment-debtor, proceeds against order dated 6-9-2005, whereby the learned executing Court dismissed appellant's petition under Order XXI, rule 90, C.P.C.

2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that pursuant to passing a decree, dated 25-2-1997, for a sum of Rs.12,16,232 along with costs of suit of Rs.47,464 by the learned Judge Banking Court, against the appellant, the decree-holder filed the execution petition. During the execution proceedings, appellant's mortgaged property was put to sale/auction and the decree-holder obtained necessary permission, from the executing Court, to purchase the property. The sale was held on 6-1-1999; the mortgaged property was purchased by the decree-holder; the auction was confirmed on 12-3-1999; the sale certificate was issued on 29-6-1999 and thereafter the execution petition was consigned to the record. The appellant, on 5-9-2005, filed the objection petition under the provisions of Order XXI, rule 90, C.P.C., seeking setting aside of sale, (which attained finality as far back as on 29-6-1999) however, the learned Banking Court, after finding, inter alia, that the objection petition is barred by time, proceeded to dismiss the same, vide impugned order dated 6-9-2005.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant, while reiterating the contentions, recorded in the impugned order, states that the ex parte decree was passed against the appellant and he was neither served in the suit nor in the execution petition, therefore, the sale/auction of the mortgaged property is not sustainable in law.

4. We have heard the learned counsel and examined the summoned record. Admittedly, as noted above, the sale was held on 6-1-1999; it was confirmed on 12-3-1999; sale certificate was issued on 29-6-1999, thereafter the execution petition was consigned to record being satisfied and the appellant filed the objection petition, under Order XXI, rule 90, C.P.C., on 5-9-2005. It flows therefrom that the petitioner filed the objection petition after the lapse of six years from the date of issuance of sale certificate. The application under the said provisions of law has to be made within 30 days of the date of sale, as envisaged under Article 166 of the Limitation Act, which Article, for facility of reference is reproduced below:-- "166:--Under the same Code to Thirty days The date of set aside a sale in execution of a the sale decree, including any such application by a judgment-debtor. It flows from the above that the limitation period prescribed for filing an application to set aside a sale in execution of the decree is 30 days and the limitation period will start from the date of the sale. In the instant case, the date of the sale, as noted above, is 6-1-1999, therefore, the objection petition, filed on 5-9-2005, was grossly barred by time and the same was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge Banking Court.

5. It is evident from the record that the mortgaged property could not be sold thrice and thereafter the decree-holder, after obtaining necessary permission from the learned executing Court, participated in the auction. The Court Auctioneer, after completing all the formalities and making the proclamation of sale/auction, auctioned the property in favour of the decree-holder against the reserve price of Rs.1,300,

000. The learned counsel could not point out any illegality or legal infirmity in the process of auctioning the property and the ensuing proceedings. To our mind, the sale was held completely in accordance with law and no exception can be taken to that.

6. In the above perspective, we have examined the impugned order and find that the same does not suffer from any legal infirmity, thus we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The impugned order is maintained.

7. Upshot of the above discussion is that the present appeal is devoid of merits, hence stands dismissed. M.H./A-47/L Appeal dismissed