1990 PLP 635 (PLC)
JAVED REHMAN Versus PAKISTAN NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION
| Citation | 1990 PLP 635 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh |
| Bench Members | Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | JAVED REHMAN Versus PAKISTAN NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 635 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 635 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 635 (PLC) (JAVED REHMAN Versus PAKISTAN NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- ‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) O. XVII, R. 3 & O.IX, R. 8‑‑ Grievance petition‑‑‑Dismissal for default‑‑‑Application for restoration‑‑‑Counsel for management was present on date of hearing whereas counsel for applicant and applicant himself were not present‑‑‑Matter was fixed for evidence of applicant on various dates of hearing when it was adjourned at the request of counsel for applicant‑‑‑Held, under Order XVII, R. 3, C.P.C., Court might proceed with case to decide matter when plaintiff failed to appear‑‑‑Where, however, plaintiff did not appear but defendant appeared Court shall make an order that suit might be dismissed‑‑‑Court having chosen to pass order under O.IX, R. 8, C.P.C. was not unjustified.
- M. Shaiq Usmani for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 5th March, 1990.
- ‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Grievance petition‑‑‑Dismissal for default‑‑‑Application for restoration‑‑‑Application for restoration had been made after period of limitation of thirty days‑‑‑Contention of applicant was that he had been busy in repairing his house which was hit by floods and then in looking after his mother who was ill and died later on‑‑‑No indication was found of any flood at place where his house was situated‑‑‑Mother of applicant was ill in the same city from which he could easily inquire about his case either from Court or from Advocate, explanation tendered by applicant thus did not satisfactorily explain his position‑‑‑Application for restoration had been moved after expiry of three and a half months for which there was no plausible reason‑‑‑No application for condonation of delay was either made‑‑‑Application for restoration of grievance petition was therefore dismissed being hopelessly barred by time.
- 2. I have heard Mr. Sohad Hameed, Advocate for the applicant and Mr. M. Shaiq Usmani, Advocate for the respondent and have gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
- 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant has shown sufficient cause for non‑appearance on 7‑1‑1989, as well as for his making application for restoration after the period of 30 days had expired. The applicant's contention that in January he went to his home town to repair the house which was damaged due to floods does not appeal to reason. In Pakistan floods occur in summer season and not in winter season. However, even if the contention of the applicant is accepted, that flood did come and he had to stay to repair his house, still admittedly he came to Karachi in the first week of February, which means that he had come to Karachi within 30 days of the passing of the order of the dismissal. He contends that he could not contact his Advocate due to illness of his mother who subsequently died on 28‑4‑1989. It does not satisfactorily explain why the applicant could not have taken time to find about the case either from the Court or from the Advocate at Karachi. Even if this contention of the applicant is accepted, then also it can explain delay in making application upto 28‑4‑1989, but the application has been filed after 3‑1/2 months of this date for which there is no explanation. The application for restoration was hopelessly time‑barred. It is always duty of the litigant to pursue his case diligently.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑ ‑‑‑O. IX, Rr. 8 & 9‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 163/181‑‑‑Suit‑‑‑Dismissal for default‑‑‑Application for restoration‑‑‑Limitation‑‑‑Application under Order VIII, R. 9, C.P.C. to be made within thirty days‑‑‑Held, Art. 163 and not Art. 181, Limitation Act, which specifically dealt with application of the nature would apply. (c) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Grievance petition‑‑‑Dismissal for default‑‑‑Application for restoration‑‑‑Application for restoration had been made after period of limitation of thirty days‑‑‑Contention of applicant was that he had been busy in repairing his house which was hit by floods and then in looking after his mother who was ill and died later on‑‑‑No indication was found of any flood at place where his house was situated‑‑‑Mother of applicant was ill in the same city from which he could easily inquire about his case either from Court or from Advocate, explanation tendered by applicant thus did not satisfactorily explain his position‑‑‑Application for restoration had been moved after expiry of three and a half months for which there was no plausible reason‑‑‑No application for condonation of delay was either made‑‑‑Application for restoration of grievance petition was therefore dismissed being hopelessly barred by time. (d) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ ‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 65‑B‑‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX, R.8‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5‑‑‑Application for restoration of grievance petition dismissed for default‑‑‑Limitation‑‑‑Although no provision existed in Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for moving restoration application, however, in practice aid of Civil Procedure Code is taken for moving such an application. Sohail Hameed for Applicant.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 65‑B‑‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX, R.8‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5‑‑‑Application for restoration of grievance petition dismissed for default‑‑‑Limitation‑‑‑Although no provision existed in Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for moving restoration application, however, in practice aid of Civil Procedure Code is taken for moving such an application. Sohail Hameed for Applicant. M. Shaiq Usmani for Respondent. Date of hearing: 5th March, 1990. DECISION This is a revision application against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. IV at Karachi, dated 1‑10‑1989, whereby he dismissed the application of the applicant for restoration of his grievance petition, which was dismissed on 7‑1‑1989 for default.
2. I have heard Mr. Sohad Hameed, Advocate for the applicant and Mr. M. Shaiq Usmani, Advocate for the respondent and have gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
3. The admitted facts appear to be, that the grievance petition filed by the applicant was dismissed on 7‑1‑1989. He filed application for restoration on 8‑8‑1989. The reason given by him for non‑appearance as well as for the making application after such along time was, that he had gone to his home town, where he stayed to repair the house, which was damaged due to floods. In first week of February, 1989 he came to Karachi, but he was attending his sick mother, who expired on 28‑4‑1989.
4. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the learned trial Court instead of dismissing the grievance petition, should have pronounced judgment as required under Order 17, Rule 3 of C.P.C. It appears that on the date of hearing, the learned counsel for the respondent was present whereas, the counsel for the applicant and the applicant were not present. The matter was fixed for evidence of applicant on various dates of hearing and lastly it was fixed on 2‑1‑1989, when it was adjourned at the request of the Counsel for applicant to 7‑1‑1989. It may be pointed out that under Order 17, Rule 3, C.P.C., the Court `may' proceed with the case to decide the matter when plaintiff fails to appear. The word `may' used therein confers discretion on the learned Court either to proceed with the case to pronounce the judgment, or may adjourn the case. However, under Order 9, Rule 8, C.P.C. where the plaintiff does not appear but the defendant appears when the suit is called for hearing, the Court shall make an order that suit may be dismissed. The learned trial Court has chosen to pass order under Order 9, Rule 8 and there appears to be no illegality in passing such order.
5. For restoration of such dismissed suit an application under Orders VIII and IX has to be made within 30 days under Article 163 of Limitation Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant, that Article 181 would apply is not tenable as Article 163 specifically deals with applications of this nature.
6. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant has shown sufficient cause for non‑appearance on 7‑1‑1989, as well as for his making application for restoration after the period of 30 days had expired. The applicant's contention that in January he went to his home town to repair the house which was damaged due to floods does not appeal to reason. In Pakistan floods occur in summer season and not in winter season. However, even if the contention of the applicant is accepted, that flood did come and he had to stay to repair his house, still admittedly he came to Karachi in the first week of February, which means that he had come to Karachi within 30 days of the passing of the order of the dismissal. He contends that he could not contact his Advocate due to illness of his mother who subsequently died on 28‑4‑1989. It does not satisfactorily explain why the applicant could not have taken time to find about the case either from the Court or from the Advocate at Karachi. Even if this contention of the applicant is accepted, then also it can explain delay in making application upto 28‑4‑1989, but the application has been filed after 3‑1/2 months of this date for which there is no explanation. The application for restoration was hopelessly time‑barred. It is always duty of the litigant to pursue his case diligently.
7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that I.R.O. does not provide any limitation for filing restoration application. In fact there is no provision in I.R.O. even for moving restoration application. However, in practice the aid of Civil Procedure Code is taken for moving such application, therefore, the period prescribed for moving such application would be applicable to the application for restoration of the grievance petition. It may also be pointed out that the provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act have been specifically mention applicable under section 65‑B of I.R.O., 1969. However, even application under section 5 of Limitation Act has not been moved for condoning delay in moving restoration application. I find no merit in this application. The application is accordingly dismissed. M.Y.H./1690/Lb. S Petition dismissed.