2025 PLP 267 (PTD)
Messrs UNITED CARPETS LTD. through Director Versus PAKISTAN through Secretary (Revenue Division) Ex-Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others
| Citation | 2025 PLP 267 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Sindh High Court |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ |
| Parties | Messrs UNITED CARPETS LTD. through Director Versus PAKISTAN through Secretary (Revenue Division) Ex-Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others |
| Primary Law | (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2025 PLP 267 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2025 PLP 267 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Sindh High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2025 PLP 267 (PTD) (Messrs UNITED CARPETS LTD. through Director Versus PAKISTAN through Secretary (Revenue Division) Ex-Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ovais Ali Shah, Maryum Riaz, Fizzah Bucha, Muhammad Mushtaq and Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi for Petitioners.
- Muhammad Taseer Khan and Ayaz Sarwar Jamali for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
S.214D 1(a) & (b) [inserted through Finance Act, 2015 and deleted through Finance Act, 2018]
Audit proceedings, selection for
Scope
Petitioners (Taxpayers) filed constitutional petitions assailing impugned notices issued under S. 214D read with S.177 or 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') as being unlawful
Argument of the petitioners was that S. 214(D) was inserted through Finance Act, 2015, but was deleted through Finance Act, 2018, thus, after its omission, no further audit proceedings could continue as in view of the judgment passed in case titled Shah Nawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan reported as 2011 PTD 1558 ('Shah Nawaz case'), a vested right has accrued to the petitioners
Provisions under S.214-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, remained available in the Ordinance till 30.6.2018, therefore, it applies to the period starting from 01.07.2015 to 30.06 2018: the pertinent words used in said S. (214-D) is that a person shall be automatically selected if the person falls within any of the condition(s) so provided in subsection 1(a) & (b) of S.214-D
It is neither a case of accrual of any vested right as to a particular tax-year, nor of selection for audit on the basis of any criterion, and therefore, any reliance placed on the Shah Nawaz case was entirely misconceived
Admittedly, all petitioners failed to meet the threshold of S.214D(1)(a)(b) i.e. either failed to file the returns on the stipulated / extended time, or did not pay the tax determined under S.137; hence, they stood automatically / deemed to have been selected for audit immediately thereon when they defaulted in said terms
Therefore, the period of default would be from 01.07.2015 to 30.6.2018
Undisputedly, all petitioners had defaulted in the said period, hence, they were deemed to have been selected for audit for respective tax-years
Any omission of the provision-in-question from 2018 onwards, would not have any bearing on their selection for audit which became past and closed on their default as per S.214D(1)(a)(b)
In fact, in some of the cases pertaining to Tax year 2015, audit was conducted and responded by the petitioners and thereafter, notices to amend the assessment orders under S. 122(9) had also been issued
No right or vested right had accrued to the petitioners
Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.
S.214D 1(a) & (b) [inserted through Finance Act, 2015 and deleted through Finance Act, 2018]
Audit proceedings, selection for
Scope
Petitioners (Taxpayers) filed constitutional petitions assailing impugned notices issued under S. 214D read with 177 or 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') as being unlawful on the ground that said S.214D had already been repealed
There was no question of exercising any power or authority under a repealed or omitted provision inasmuch as the petitioners stood selected for audit by way of a deeming provision and to that extent, it was not in dispute that the petitioners were to be selected for audit in terms thereof as they were covered by the two basic conditions provided in S.214D(1)(a) & (b)
Petitioners had not been selected after omission or deletion of S. 214D but they stood selected automatically
The subsequent action of the Department on the basis of impugned notices was procedural in nature which was under the existing procedure of S.177 of the Ordinance, 2001 (manner in which audit has to be conducted), and thereafter, under S. 122 (amendment of a deemed assessment order)
Both said provisions were very much in existence when impugned notices were issued
Mere narration of facts in the impugned notices as to why they had been selected for audit in terms of S. 214D of the Ordinance, 2001, would not ipso facto mean that any jurisdiction was now being exercised under the said provision which stood omitted
No right or vested right had accrued to the petitioners
Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, J.
Through all these Petitions, the Petitioners have impugned Notices either under Section 177 or 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ("Ordinance") as being unconstitutional, unlawful, and void, ab-initio.
2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners1 have argued that these notices have been issued under the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance read with Section 214(D) which according to them was inserted through Finance Act, 2015 and was thereafter, deleted through Finance Act, 2018, whereas, after its omission, no further audit proceedings can continue. According to them in view of the judgment passed in Shah Nawaz (Pvt.) Ltd2 a vested right has accrued to the Petitioners after omission of Section 214D and therefore, the impugned Notices are without lawful authority. It has been further contended that Section 214-E ibid which was introduced by Finance Supplementary Act, 2018 and a holistic reading of this provision and the omission of Section 214D ibid, supports the case of the Petitioners and therefore, all these Petitions be allowed as prayed.
3. On the other hand, Respondents Counsel submit that no vested right has accrued, whereas, failure of the Petitioners in filing timely returns and deposit of tax payable has resulted in automatic selection of their cases for audit and therefore, notwithstanding the omission of Section 214D no right accrues to the Petitioners.
4. We have heard all the learned Counsel and perused the record. On perusal of the record, it appears that all but two of the cases in hand are for Tax Year 2015, whereas, C.P. No. D-142 of 2021 is for Tax Year 2016 and C.P. No. No. D-279 of 2021 is for Tax Year 2017. Before proceeding further, it would be advantageous to refer to the relevant provision of section 214D(1)(a) & (b) which was introduced by way of Finance Act, 2015 and was omitted through Finance Act, 2018. Before its omission it was as under:- "214D. Automatic selection for audit (1) A person shall be automatically selected for audit of its income tax affairs for a tax year, if-- (a) the return is not filed within the date it is required to be filed as specified in section 118, or, as the case may be, not filed within the time extended by the Board under section 214A or further extended for a period not exceeding thirty days by the Commissioner under section 119; or (b) the tax payable under subsection (1) of section 137 has not been paid. (2) Audit of income tax affairs of persons automatically selected under subsection (1) shall be conducted as per procedure given in section 177 and all the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply accordingly:"
5. The above provision provides that a person shall be automatically selected for audit of its income tax affairs for a particular tax year; (a) if he fails to file his tax return within the stipulated date as specified in Section 118 of the Ordinance, or within the extended time under Section 214A; or for that matter within the extended time under section 119 ibid; or (b) the tax payable under Section 137(1) has not been paid. This provision remained available in the Ordinance till 30.6.2018. Therefore, it applies to the period starting from 01.07.2015 to 30.06.2018. The pertinent words used in Section 214D is that a person shall be automatically selected if the person falls within any of the condition(s) so provided in subsection 1(a) & (b) ibid. It is neither a case of accrual of any vested right as to a particular tax-year; nor of selection for audit on the basis of any criterion; and therefore, any reliance placed on the case of Shahnawaz (Supra) is entirely misconceived. Admittedly, all petitioners before us failed to meet the threshold of section 214D(1)(a)(b); i.e. either failed to file their returns in the stipulated time or the extended time as the case may be; or did not pay the tax determined under Section 137; hence, they stood automatically selected for audit or one could say deemed to have been selected for audit immediately thereon when they defaulted in terms as above. The period of default will, therefore, be from 01.07.2015 to 30.6.2018. It is not in dispute that all petitioners have defaulted in the said period; hence, they deemed to have been selected for audit for respective tax-years. Any omission of the provision in question from 2018 onwards, will not have any bearing on their selection for audit which becomes past and closed on their default as per section 214(1)(a)(b). In fact, in some of the cases pertaining to Tax year 2015, audit was conducted and responded by the Petitioners and thereafter, notices to amend the assessment orders under Section 122(9) have also been issued. As to the other arguments of learned Counsel for the Petitioners are concerned, there is no question of exercising any power or authority under a repealed or omitted provision inasmuch as the Petitioners stood selected for audit by way of a deeming provision and to that extent, it is not in dispute that the Petitioners were to be selected for audit in terms thereof as they were covered by the two basic conditions provided in Section 214(1)(a) & (b). They have not been selected after omission or deletion of Section 214D ibid as they stood selected automatically. The subsequent action of the department on the basis of impugned notices is procedural in nature which is under the existing procedure of Section 177 (manner in which the audit has to be conducted), and thereafter, under Section 122 (amendment of a deemed assessment order). Both these provisions were very much in existence when impugned notices were issued. Mere narration of facts in the said notices as to why they had been selected for audit in terms of Section 214D of the Ordinance, would not ipso facto mean that any jurisdiction is now being exercised under the said provision which stands omitted. This contention of the Petitioners is totally misconceived. No right or a vested right had accrued in the facts and circumstances of the case.
6. In view of hereinabove facts and circumstances of these cases, we see no reason to entertain the objections so raised in respect of the impugned notices and therefore, all these Petitions are dismissed, whereas, Respondents shall proceed further against the Petitioners on the basis of respective notices already issued. MQ/U-1/Sindh Petitions dismissed.