2004 PLP 417 (MLD)

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial Court for the ends of justice and keeping in view the case of hardship of the petitioner had rightly extended the time for deposit of Zar‑e‑Soem. He relied on cases of Abdul Wahid v. Sardar Ali (2000 SCMR 650) and Ch. Muhammad Yaqub v. Nazim Hussain (1995 CLC 1271).

3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, Nos.2 to 7 has vehemently opposed the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and supported the judgment of revisional Court contending that the Court is not empowered to extend time for the deposit of Zar‑e‑Soem.

4. I have heard both sides and perused record. Section 24 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991 enunciates as under:‑‑ Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property:‑‑ (1) In every suit for pre‑emption, the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one third of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix: Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of filing of the suit: Provided further that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale- deed or in the mutation, or the price so mentioned appears to be inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one third of the probable value of the property. (2) Where the plaintiff fails to make a deposit under section (1) within the period fixed by the Court, or withdraws the sum so deposited by him, his suit shall be dismissed. (3) Every sum depositing under subsection (1) shall be available for the discharge of costs. (4) The probable value fixed under subsection (1) shall not affect the final determination of the price by the pre‑emptor.

5. The Court had granted time to the petitioner for the deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price within a period of one month and this order was not complied with by the petitioner instead an application for extension of time was moved which was allowed by the trial Judge and time for deposit of Zar‑e‑Soem was extended upto 21‑2‑2003.

6. From the plain reading of section 24, it is manifestly clear that the time for the deposit of one third of the pre‑emption money cannot be extended by the Court. A restriction was imposed on the power of the Court by the Legislature and it has been held by the Supreme Court in case of Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan v. Government of Punjab Province Lahore (NLR 1993 Revenue Cases 145) that the legislature while framing section 24 of the Act has perhaps taken into consideration the long period of litigation, which is normally spent before the final decision of the suit of pre‑emption. If Imam Muhammad could have subjected the right of pre‑emption to the condition of depositing the sale price, while the legal suits in those days used to conclude within few days time, the legislature of today can put such a condition for the more obvious reason that non‑depositing of the sale price may encourage the frivolus suits of pre‑emption.

7. It has been held in case of Awal Noor v. District Judge, Karak (1992 SCMR 746) that time for the deposit of one third of pre‑emption money has been fixed by the statute itself and it cannot be extended by the Court. "This principle was followed by the Lahore High Court in case of Muhammad Ismaeel reported as (1995 MLD 1011). It is the judicial dignity to follow the principle laid down by the apex Court of the country and I am in agreement with the dictum laid down in case of Awal Noor (supra) which is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case, therefore, by following the principles land down in the cases referred to above, I am constrained, to hold that the Court is not empowered to extend time for deposit of one third pre‑emption money. The trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. The lower Appellate Court has rightly interfered with the order passed by the trial Court which calls for no interference.

8. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition being devoid of force is dismissed. M.H./N‑371/L Petition dismissed.