1978 PLP 89 (SCMR)

DORAB PATEL, J.‑The dispute in this petition for leave relates to a house in Rawalpindi owned by the respondent. The respondent had leased it to the petitioner, but in 1968 the respondent fled an eviction application under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 (hereafter called the said Ordinance) in too Court of Rent Controller, Rawalpindi for the eviction of the petitioner on two grounds. The first was that he (the respondent) requires the house for his own use and the use of his children, and the second was that the petitioner had sublet the demised premises. The petitioner contested his eviction and in the events that happened, the Rent Controller, Rawalpindi held that the respondent had proved that he required the demised premises in good faith, but he held that the allegation of subletting by the petitioner had not been proved. In these circumstances, the Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the petitioner and gave him two months time to find alternative accommodation. The petitioner filed an appeal against his eviction in the District Court, Rawalpindi. The learned District Judge agreed with the Rent Controller's finding that the respondent required the demised premises for his own use and reversing the Rent Controller's finding on the question of subletting, the District Judge held that the petitioner had sublet the demised premises. He, therefore, dismissed the petitioner s appeal. The petitioner then filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court but as a learned Judge of the High Court agreed with both the findings of the Rent Controller, he dismissed the petitioner's second appeal by his judgment dated 1st of October, 1977. Hence this petition for leave. Mr. Mujeeb‑ur‑Rehman submitted that the eviction application filed against the petitioner was not bona fide because the respondent had been enhancing the rent and the eviction application was filed after the petitioner had been served with a notice by which the petitioner was informed the rent was being raised from Rs. 50 per month to Rs. 150 per month. This plea was, however, rejected by all the Courts because the demand for rent at its. 150 per month was based on the revision of the value of the property by the local Municipality, therefore, no exception can be taken to the concurrent findings against the petitioner by all the Courts. Learned counsel then submitted that the respondent had not proved his requirement because he owned another house in which he was living with his family. But according to the judgment before us that house consisted of four rooms whilst the petitioner had eight children and even when evidence was given eight years ago, six of those children were adults. Therefore, it is likely that all the children of the respondent are now adults in any case, the respondent had proved eight years ago that six of his Children were adults and that one was going to be married. In these circumstances, it cannot be reasonably contended that the respondent haul not proved his requirement for the house in dispute. Learned counsel then referred us to the respondent's cross‑examination and it would appear that the respondent was asked whether he would shift to the house in dispute or whether his children would live in that house. As the respondent's reply was that he had rot decided where he would stay, learned counsel's contention was that this admission was sufficient to show that the respondent had not succeeded in proving his case under subsection (3) of section 13 of the said Ordinance. In order to prose his claim under this subsection, a landlord bas to prove that he requires the demised premises in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children, therefore, nothing turns on the fact that the respondent bad not decided, when ho gave evidence eight years ago, whether ho would shift to the house leased to the petitioner or whether some of his children would shift to that house. As the respondent bad proved that the two houses were required for his oven occupation and that of his children it is immaterial as to which member or members of the respondent's family will shift to the house in dispute. No exception can be taken to the judgment under appeal. The petition is without merit and is dismissed. But we give the petitioner time up to the 28th of February, 1978 to vacate the demised promises provided ho continues to pay the monthly rent to the respondent. Petition dismissed.