P L D 1954 Lahore 87 (PLP)

Sh. Qumar Din for Petitioner. Muhammad Iqbal Khan for Respondents. MUHAMMAD JAN, J.‑This is a petition for revision, under section 115, C. P. C., of the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Sargodha, dated 10th October 1952, dismissing the petitioner's application under sections 148 and 151, C. P. C. praying for extension of time and condonation of delay in the payment of the pre‑emption money which was ordered in the pre‑emption suit (Mardan Shah v. Sattara and others) to be deposited by 16th June 1952, failing which the suit would stand dismissed. It was urged in the petition that the petitioner had come with the money to the Court on 16th June 1952, that some time was spent in complying with legal formalities and when the petitioner went to the bank with the challan for payment the bank was closed and on his return he found that the Court had also closed. He, therefore, deposited the money on the next day, i.e., 17th June 1952, and prayed that, in, view of the circumstances mentioned above, the delay should be condoned and the time for payment of the pre‑emption money should be extended from 16th June 1952, to 17th June 1952. The learned Senior Civil judge held that he had no jurisdiction to interfere with the time stated in the decree for the deposit of the money. Section 148, C. P. C. was to be read in conjunc tion with Order XX rule 3, C. P. C. which says that the judgment once signed shall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by section 152, C. P: C. or on review. The petitioner's application was not for review of the judgment and section 152, C. P. C. merely permitted correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising in judgments, decrees or orders, from any accidental slip or omission. This section had no application to the facts of this case. The learned counsel for the petitioner has conceded that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the pre‑emption money under section 148, C. P. C. The petition being under sections 148 and 151, C. P. C. learned counsel admits that the Court was right in dismissing the petition under section 148, C.\P. C. but contends that under section 151, C. P. C. the Court should have granted the relief asked for and extended the time for payment or it should, at least, have condoned the delay of one day in the payment of money on account of the circumstances mentioned in his petition. On being asked whether the condonation of the delay would not have amounted to extension of time, the learned counsel has argued that condonation of delay does not always amount to extension of time. He has given two, examples in support of his contention. I shall reproduce those examples verbatim as stated by the learned counsel. (a) Where a petitioner requests the Court that, as he has no money available at the time to deposit in Court, time should be extended to enable him to find the money for depositing in Court. (b) Where money has been deposited in Court a day or two after the date fixed for payment and a request is made for condonation of the delay. ' It was pointed out to the learned counsel that in the first illustration he himself has used the words that the time should be extended to enable him to find the' money and, therefore, this example is merely an illustration of a case where exten sion of time is asked for. In the second example given by him he has merely used the expression 'condonation of delay' without adding what was sought by the condonation of the delay. It is perfectly obvious that the relief sought by the condonation of delay is extension of time for payment and the learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted that the Senior Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to extend the time under section 148, C. P. C. The Senior Civil Judge has, there fore, not failed to exercise any jurisdiction vested in him as contemplated by section 115, C. P. C. It is not the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judge has exercised a jurisdiction, which was not vested in him by law. The only other clause in section 115, C. P. C. under which the petitioner can bring his case is clause (c) which requires the petitioner to show that the lower Court has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Since the learned counsel admits that the judge had no jurisdiction to grant the relief asked for under section 148, C. P. C. the question of his having exercised the jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity does not arise. Reliance is, therefore, placed by the learned counsel on section 151, C. P. C. In this regard the finding of the Senior Civil judge is that section

151. C. P. C. cannot be invoked in view of Order XX, rule 3, C. P. C. which directs that a decree once signed cannot be altered or added to, save as provided by section 152 or on review. 1t has been held on various occasions that section 151 does not confer any powers but only indicates that there is a power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. It is also settled law that there is no room for the application of the inherent power where there is an express provision negativing the claim of the petitioner. Since the relief asked for by the petitioner could not be granted according to law, as admitted by his counsel, he cannot benefit by the provisions of section 151 C. P. C. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Himmun v. Fauja (AIR 1921 Lah. 6.) that a decree can be altered in appeal review or revision but neither section 148 nor sec tion 151, C. P. C. can be utilized for this purpose. I, therefore, do not find any force in this petition which is hereby dismissed with costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.