1978 PLP 139 (SCMR)

QAISAR KHAN, J.‑Mst. Zanib sued Abdur Rauf and Abdul Munaf sons of Abdul Khanan residents of Jangle Khel of Kohat District for possession of a house situated in Village Jangle Khel. The defendants contested the suit and the two material issues for decision were as to whether plaintiff was owner of the house and as to whether the defendants had matured title by adverse possession. The learned Senior Civil Judge after proper trial by his judgment dated 2‑10‑1914 held That the plaintiff was owner of the house and that the defendants has not matured title by adverse possession. He therefore decreed the suit. Abdur Rauf and his brother eat up in appeal to the Court of District Judge but their appeal was dismissed on 26‑1‑1976. They then filed a second appeal in the High Court but it too was dismissed on 310‑1977. They have, therefore, filed this petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the ‑High Court. Mr. Muhammad Afzal Lone, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised the following contentions :- (1) That the findings were arrived at in violation of the established principles of law and were based on misreading of evidence. (2) That the admission of Abdur Rauf petitioner in another case could not be used against him. (3) That the said admission was not a legal piece of evidence as the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act, were not complied with. (4) That the dower deed dated 27‑12‑1943 to which the husband of the plaintiff eras an attesting witness had not been considered (5) That the question as to whether possession had, matured into adverse possession was a question of law and could be raised is second appeal : (6) That the decision of tae Jirga was wrongly excluded from consideration : and (7) That in view of the preponderance of the documentary evidence the suit should have been dismissed. After hearing the learned counsel at length we have come to the conclu sion that the judgments of the Courts below do not call for interference and that the petition deserves dismissal. So far as the admission of Abdur Rauf in the previous suit was concerned it was put to him during his examination in Court and he admitted in his statement that the house belonged to the plaintiff, that they had purchased it from her and that the sale deed was with them. In view of the above the admission of Abdur Rauf sat takes into consideration against him not in violation of any provisions of law. So far as the dower deed and the l other mortgage deed referred to by the learned counsel are concern‑ these were documents executed by the petitioners themselves and could not bind the opposite‑party especially when these were not at all put to the other party at the trial and no occasion given to the other party to controvert them. So far as the Jirga findings is concerned, counsel for the petitioners after consulting his client admitted that the house belonged to the father of the plaintiff respondents and that since they bad maintained her when she became orphan, the house was therefore given to them in lieu of their maintaining her. In this respect copy of the Jirga Award revealed that during the period the plaintiff was maintained by the petitioners she was rendering manual service throughout to the family of the petitioners. In these circumstances the petitioners were thus not entitled to get her house in lieu of maintaining her. The plaintiff was a female orphan living with the petitioners who were related to her and under the circumstances the possession of the petitioners of her house, could not be adverse to her. At any rate substantial justice had been done and we do not think any interference is called for in the circumstances of the case. We, therefore, dismiss the petition. Petition dismissed.