1990 PLP 616 (PLC)

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.14‑‑‑Time spent in Civil Court, exclusion of‑‑‑Appellant, despite fully knowing that Labour Laws being applicable to his case, his remedy was in Labour Court and general jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred, instead of sending grievance notice to, his employer against his termination, directly brought a civil suit‑‑Contention of appellant that time spent in Civil Court should have been excluded, was repelled in view of the fact that in spite of knowing that Labour Laws were applicable, appellant could not be said to have brought civil suit and prosecuted it with due diligence and in good faith‑‑ Mandatory conditions `due diligence' and `good faith' having not been fulfilled by appellant, section 14 of Limitation Act would not be helpful to him. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 65‑B‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 14‑‑‑Delay in service of grievance notice ‑‑‑Condonation of‑‑‑Section 65‑B (I.R.O.) providing that delay in doing any other thing can also be condoned, delay in service of grievance notice, held, was covered by that section and Court had jurisdiction to condone delay in service of grievance notice‑‑‑Provisions of section 14 of Limitation Act not being attracted to the case of appellant, Court below rightly refused to exclude period spent by appellant in prosecuting civil suit and grievance notice also had been rightly adjudged as hopelessly time‑barred. [p. 6171 B This is an appeal directed against the decision dated 14‑12‑1989 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement has been dismissed.

2. The appellant was a library clerk and his services were terminated on the ground that his initial appointment was illegal since the recommendations from the Selection Committee had not been obtained. The grievance petition has been dismissed on merits and on the ground that the grievance notice was time‑barred. On merits the appellant had a good case because it was not the fault of the appellant if his case was not referred to the Selection Committee for approval before he was recruited. If the appellant had been directed to appear before the Selection Committee and he had failed to do so, 6f course, this could be a good ground for termination of services.

3. However, the grievance notice was hopelessly time‑barred. After the termination of service which took place on 3‑1‑198.4 the appellant did not serve any grievance notice but brought a civil suit on 7‑1‑1984 as is apparent from the copy of the plaint Exh. P.2. The plaint was returned to him on 24‑2‑1988 vide order, copy of which is Exh. P‑

3. On 7‑3‑1988 the appellant served a grievance notice and brought the grievance petition on 7‑4‑1988. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that section 14 of the Limitation Act was attracted, therefore, the time spent in the Civil Court should have been excluded by the learned lower Court and if it had been done, the grievance notice could not have been time‑barred. The argument has no force. For the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act the employee concerned has to show that he prosecuted with due diligence the proceedings in the Court which had no jurisdiction. The appellant admitted in cross‑examination that he knew at the time he was taken in service and at the time his services were terminated that his case was covered by the Labour Laws. He thus knew that his remedy was in the Labour Court and the general jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. In spite of knowing that Labour laws were applicable he cannot be said to have brought the suit and prosecuted it with due diligence and in good faith. Both the conditions mentioned above are mandatory and unless they are fulfilled, section 14 of the Limitation Act is not helpful.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that delay in bringing the grievance petition can be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act but delay in the service of grievance notice cannot be condoned. He says that although in section 65‑B of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 it is mentioned that the period within which any other thing is to be done under the Ordinance can also be extended but since these words do not occur in section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in the service of grievance notice cannot be condoned. The argument has no force. Section 5 is to be read alongwith section 65‑B of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Since section 65‑B provides that the delay in doing an other thing under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 can also be condoned, the delay in the service of grievance notice is covered by section 65‑B and the Court has jurisdiction to condone the same. However, section 14 is not attracted and there are no sufficient reasons even for the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 65‑B. The learned lower Court, therefore, rightly refused to exclude the period spent by the appellant in prosecuting the civil suit, and the grievance notice has been rightly adjudged as hopelessly time‑barred.

5. As a result of the observations made above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. H.B.T./725/Lb. P Appeal dismissed.