1988 PLP 668 (PLC(CS))

(c) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑Ss. 25‑A(9)(a) & 38(3‑a)‑‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), 5.249‑A‑‑Suo motu revision powers of Labour Appellate Tribunal‑ Labour Court passing order summoning employer to stand trial on complaint of petitioner workman for non‑implementing order of Labour Court under S. 25‑A‑‑Order involved not specifying any period fixed by Labour Court would render complaint as incompetent‑‑Exercise of revisional jurisdiction against such order, held, was necessary‑‑Plea that employer, in circumstances was not entitled to ask for exercise of sup motu revisional powers of Appellate Tribunal and could ask Trial Court to dismiss complaint under S.249‑A of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 repelled‑‑Held: Magistrate who is competent to hear a case can record acquittal order under S.249‑A, Criminal Procedure Code, and such an order cannot be recorded on the basis that Court has no jurisdiction‑‑Employer could not ask for dismissal of complaint on ground that Labour Court had no jurisdiction. Asadullah Siddique for Petitioner. M.A. Javed for Respondent Date of hearing: 3rd March 1987 This is a revision reporting that the order dated 30‑11‑1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.4, Faisalabad summoning the petitioners to stand trial under sections 25‑A (8) and 55 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is without jurisdiction and of no legal effect.

2. Vide order dated 17‑11‑1986 the learned Lower Court directed the petitioners to pay Rs.4,392.05 to the respondent immediately on account of reimbursement of medical charges.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the present case the learned lower Court fixed the period within which the order was to be implemented, therefore, the complaint was rightly brought by the respondent himself instead of moving the learned Lower Court for the same. As mentioned above, the direction was to pay the amount immediately. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, period was fixed since the direction was to pay immediately. I cannot agree with the learned counsel to his arguments advanced on the points. The meanings of the word 'immediate' given in the 20th Century Dictionary are "with nothing between; not acting by second causes; direct, present; without delay." Since the meanings of the term are 'nothing between', 'present' or 'without delay', the learned Lower Court meant that the order be implemented forthwith. It, therefore, cannot be said that any period was fixed for the implementation of the order. Clause (a) of subsection (9) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 reads as, "by the workman if the order or decision in his favour is not implemented within the period specified therein." It means that some period is to be fixed from the date of announcement of the order to some other date or day within which the order is to be implemented. Since no period was fixed within which the order was to be implemented, it cannot be said that any period was fixed. Always that period is fixed which is reasonable. It could not be presumed that the petitioners had with them ready money to the tune of Rs.4,392.05, therefore, it could not be expected from them to comply with the order immediately. No period thus was fixed in the sense which clause (a) of subsection (9) conveys and, therefore, it could not lie said that the order had fixed a reasonable time. A direction to do a thing in a particular manner cannot be taken to be in accordance with law where compliance of that order is not feasible.

4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since no period was fixed for the implementation of the decision by the learned lower Court, complaint could not be brought by the respondent themselves. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the respondent had a right to bring the complaint himself. The line of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the words 'within the period specified therein' occurring in clause (a) subsection (9) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 mean the period fixed in subsection (8) and not by the Court. He has also made reference to section 35(5.)(c) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. There is no cavil between the parties about the criminal jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The point is whether the respondent could bring the complaint himself or should have moved the learned Lower Court for the purpose. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the words 'therein' used in clause (a) of subsection (9) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 refer to the period given in subsection (8) and not the period to be fixed by the Court. Subsection (8) only defines the offence. If the orders are not implemented either within seven days or within the period prescribed in the order or decision the offence becomes complete. Subsection (9) places an embargo upon the right of the worker in bringing the complaint. Ordinarily any person can set the criminal law in motion and if no restrictions had been placed in subsection (9), the respondent or any other person could have brought the complaint. If the intention of the Legislature had been that the complaint can be brought by the worker concerned irrespective of the fact whether the order is not implemented within a week, or within the period specified in the order or decision, there would have been no necessity of inserting subsection (9) and in those circumstances even clause (b) would have been redundant. Since the right of the worker was intended to be restricted, therefore, clause (b) was inserted providing that in other cases the Court or the tribunal which passed the order could bring the complaint. The learned counsel argues that since subsection (8) is mentioned in subsection (9), therefore, the word 'therein' refers to the said section. If subsection (8) had not been mentioned in subsection (9) then the restriction placed upon the worker would have applied even with regard to the offences which are covered by any other provision of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 such as sections 53, 54 etc. Since the intention was that restriction of bringing the complaint should be upon the worker only in respect of the offence defined in subsection (8), therefore, the said subsection was mentioned in subsection (9). The word therein therefore refers to the order or decision referred to in clause (9) and not subsection (8).

5. The other argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that since the petitioners have not complied with the orders, they are not entitled to ask for the exercise of suo moto revisional powers of this tribunal given by section 38(3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and that since section 249‑A of the Criminal Procedure Code gives right to the petitioners to ask the learned Lower Court for the dismissal of the complaint, this tribunal may refuse to exercise suo moto revisional powers. This argument too is without force. Since the complaint brought by the respondent is not competent, therefore. it appears necessary to exercise revisional jurisdiction. Section 249‑A of the Criminal Procedure Code does not authorise the Magistrate to refuse to adjudicate upon the case for the reason that it has no jurisdiction. According to the said section, an accused is to be E acquitted if after hearing both the parties the Magistrate finds that the charge is groundless. Only the Magistrate who is competent to hear the case can record order of acquittal and such an order cannot be recorded on the basis that the Court has no jurisdiction. The petitioners, therefore, cannot ask the learned Lower Court under section 249‑A for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the said Court has no jurisdiction.

6. As a result the revision is accepted and setting aside the impugned order by which the petitioners were summoned to stand trial under section 25‑A(8) of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the complaint is filed. A.E.13421Lb.P Revision accepted.