1994 PLP 87 (CLC)

PLD 1969 Lah. 365 and 1988 SCMR 1449 ref. Sardar Muhabat Ali for Petitioners. Sh. Hamid Asghar for Respondent. Date of hearing: 11th June, 1991. Brief facts of the case are that the consolidation scheme of the village Dolekey, Tehsil Hafizabad, District Gujranwala was confirmed under section 10(3) of the Consolidation Ordinance, 1960 by the Consolidation Officer on 31‑12‑1985. The respondent feeling aggrieved preferred an appeal with delay of one year 3 months and 7 days in the Court of Collector (Cons.), who vide his order dated 25‑11‑1987 rejected it on the ground of limitation. This order was assailed in revision by the respondents in the Court of Additional Commissioner (Cons.) who vide his impugned order dated 14‑3 1989 accepted it. Hence this revision petition.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the appeal filed by the respondent before the Collector (Cons.) was barred by one year 3 months and 7 days, which was rightly rejected, that the consolidation scheme was confirmed with the consent of the respondent through his son who put his thumb‑impression on the resolutions in which he admitted that the land in question may be given to the petitioner. He further argued that the respondent was satisfied with his allocation but when bypass was constructed he developed greed and filed a time‑barred appeal. He' finally urged that the amendments made by the Additional Commissioner (Cons.) be set aside restoring the original consolidation scheme.

3. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the learned Additional Commissioner (Cons.) has very rightly decided the case after examining the record minutely and taking all pros and cons of the matter into consideration and by ignoring the justifiable delay caused in filing the appeal before the Collector (Cons.). He argued that as and when he knew that he has been deprived of his valuable land he preferred an appeal before the Collector (Cons.) who did not consider the merits of the case and decided it on the point of limitation. He further argued that valuable land measuring 7 Kanals 6 Marlas in Khasra No.1172/419 which was located adjacent to the road was previously owned by him but it was unjustifiably and fraudulently taken away from the respondent in the consolidation operations with the connivance of the field staff. He further stated that the land in question is still in his possession. He further contended that during the consolidation operations two resolutions of the same date were passed with the fake and forged thumb‑impressions of the respondent. In support of his contentions he referred PLD 1969 Lahore 365, 1988 SCMR 1449. 4. 1 have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties, perused the impugned orders and as well examined the record produced by the Patwari. The perusal of the record shows that Khasra No.1172/419 measuring 6 Kanals, 7 Marlas was Banjar Oadeem and was in the ownership of Taja, a disabled person. This valuable land is located in the corner on Lahore‑Sargodha Road. Likewise Khasra No.343 (8 Kanals‑18 Marlas) is in the joint ownership of one Nek Alam etc. out of which one Kanal is in the ownership of Taja while 15 Marlas are under the mosque. Moreover, the report of the Consolidation Officer was to the effect that the respondent had been and is still in possession of the land in dispute which is situated on the metalled road. The so‑called consent of the respondent is highly doubtful as possession has not still been changed and one is justified in presuming that this land was allocated to the petitioner without the knowledge of the respondent. This consent still becomes more doubtful as the record shows that two resolutions were passed in respect of the same land on the same date, one of which bears the thumb‑impression of the respondent and the other that of his son. If the respondent was present on the same date what was the necessity of another resolution to be passed with the thumb‑impression of his son. There is no doubt in my mind that the concerned consolidation staff joined hands with the petitioner to deprive the respondent of his valuable land. The contention of the respondent that the respondent woke up to lodge the appeal when a bypass was constructed through the disputed land is also not borne out from the record because this bypass .existed even at the time when these resolutions were passed. No sensible person would part with his valuable land and in lieu of it would get land of lesser value. During the hearing in the Court of learned Additional Commissioner both the parties had agreed that the respondent be summoned and his statement recorded to find out whether he had put his thumb‑impression on the Register Scheme or not. The respondent being disabled and while sitting in the car had denied affixing of any thumb impression on the Register Scheme. As enunciated in PLD 1969 Lahore 365, it is an established law that "party obliging Court by conduct to adopt course contrary to Court's practice cannot subsequently raise objection to such course". The principle of estoppel would stand in its way to challenge such a course. Moreover, in the presence of the parties the Court compared the thumb‑impression of the respondent in the light of section 73 of the Evidence Act, wherein no party raised any objection at the time of comparison of the thumb‑impression and therefore, they are barred from challenging the same at this stage. The learned .Additional Commissioner while accepting the revision has given cogent reasons, for coming to the conclusion that the appeal was not time‑barred. Moreover, as earlier stated as the respondent had been deprived of his valuable land as a result of fraud, the question of limitation does not arise.

5. In view of the foregoing discussion, I see no illegality or infirmity which would compel me to interfere in the impugned order which is exhaustive and well‑reasoned. Consequently the revision petition is rejected. H.B.T./524/R Revision rejected.