1990 PLP 242 (PLC)

‑‑‑ Proper service of summons‑‑‑Petitioner who was on leave, applied for extension of leave, but employer refused extension and dismissed him on ground of being absent from duty without leave serving him at his home address instead of an address given by petitioner in his leave application‑‑‑Petitioner, held, was not properly served as all communications should have been addressed to petitioner on address given by him in his leave application. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction‑‑‑Scope‑‑‑Both Courts of competent jurisdiction, had decided cases in accordance with law‑‑‑Concurrent orders passed by Courts below, held, could not be interfered with .in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. Pervaiz Alamgir for Petitioners. Bashir Ahmad for Respondent No.

1. Briefly stated the facts are that Muhammad Sharif Bajwa an employee of WAPDA proceeded on leave on 10‑11‑1979. Subsequently he applied for three months extension of leave which was refused. Instead of joining duty he proceeded abroad for four years. Consequently he was dismissed from service. He reported for duty on 5‑10‑1983. On coming to know of the dismissal order he filed a grievance petition before the Punjab Labour Court No. 1 which was dismissed being time‑barred on 10‑7‑1986. He preferred appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which remanded the case to Labour Court to determine afresh the point of jurisdiction and his status as workman. The Labour Court by judgment dated 10‑8‑1987 accepted the petition. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Punjab Appellate Labour Tribunal on 28‑10‑1987 which was dismissed. Hence this petition.

2. It is contended that the Courts below had decided the case in favour of Muhammad Sharif Bajwa respondent on flimsy grounds, that he was served with notice on his permanent address while the Courts below observe that he should have been served on the address given by him in his leave application. That being a WAPDA employee the respondent was not a workman and as such only the Federal Service Tribunal was competent to take cognizance of the case. If for the sake of argument it is assumed that he was not a WAPDA employee but Punjab Government Employee on deputation to WAPDA then he should have gone to the Punjab Services Tribunal.

3. Learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 1 after exhaustive discussion held that respondent No. 1 was a workman and not a civil servant. According to him it was proved from the evidence that he had to perform his duty personally with his own hands in the field and his duty pertained to the supply of electricity and its maintenance and as such he came out of the category of a civil servant. Therefore, he could not approach the Punjab Civil Service Tribunal. He further observed that being a deputationist. WAPDA could not proceed against him and could have moved the Government only for his dismissal or removal from service on the charge of being absent from duty without leave. He further observed that all communications should have been addressed to the respondent on the address given by him in the leave application.

4. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore observed that admittedly no inquiry was held into the charge against the respondent, that the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 was not applicable to him being a Government employee on deputation to WAPDA.

5. It has been rightly held by the Punjab Labour Court that the petitioner was on deputation to WAPDA and as such the WAPDA was not competent to dismiss or remove him from service and could only initiate the above action against him and refer the matter to Punjab Government for necessary action. On account of nature of his duties he was rightly held to be a workman. It had been rightly observed by the Punjab Labour Court that the respondent was not properly served. Instead of serving him at his home address he should have been (I served on the address given by him in the leave application. Both the Courts below were possessed of the jurisdiction in the matter and had rightly decided the case in accordance with law. I do not, therefore, feel persuaded to interfere with the concurrent orders passed by them and accordingly dismiss the petition with costs. H.B.T./S‑580/L Petition dismissed.