1976 PLP 744 (PLC)

Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and others v. Rostem Ali P L D 1966 S C 848 and Rostem Ali v. Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and others P L D 1964 Dacca 721 rel. Raja Muhammad Muzaffar for Petitioner, S. H. Jafry for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th January 1967. S. A. MAHMOOD, J.-These three petitions (W. Ps. Nos. 1392 of 1963, 1393 of 1963 and 982 of 1964) will be disposed of by the same order as they arise out of similar facts and involve the same question of law.

2. The brief facts are that Muhammad Sharif was employed as a Conduc tor and Abdul Jabbar and Ghulam Chishti wereemployed as Checkers by the Road Transport Corporation when they were removed from service, but were re-instated. On being re-instated, their period of absence from duty was treated as leave without pay. In the case of Muhammad Sharif, the period of absence is from the 30th of September 1959 to the 12th of February 1963, and in the case of the other two, the period is from the 12th of February 1963, and in the case of the other two, the period is from the 1st of October 1959 to the 9th of October 1962, have been ordered to be treated as leave without pay. In all these cases, their writ petitions against the order of their removal were accepted and their order of removal was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petitioners pray that the order of the respondents declaring the period of their forced absence to be leave without pay be declared to be without lawful authority and that the respondents be directed to pay them all the arrears of pay arid emoluments to which they are entitled.

3. The order, which the respondent has passed in the case of the petitioners, has not the support of any rules or the sanction of law. It is opposed to rule 25.1 of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Service Rules, 1959, which provides as under- "25.

1. A competent authority may suspend an employee of the Board, pending inquiry/inquiries into his conduct. In such case the emolu ments permitted shall not exceed 1/4th of his pay plus full allowance. If on inquiry the employee is honourably acquitted he shall be re-instated from the date of suspension and shall draw full pay aria allowances. If the employee gets a benefit of doubt and is not honourably acquitted the competent authority shall pass such orders as he deems fit. If the employee is found guilty of the charge/charges framed against him, then besides other punishments that may be imposed, be shall draw 1/4th of his pay, and allowances already sanctioned." The spirit and intention of this rule is that employees, who have been suspended or removed without any fault shall, on re-instatement, be paid full pay and allowances. The petitioners have not been found guilty of any charge r. or charges framed against them. In consequence for the period of absence. which was forced on them. By their wrongful removal by the Board, they are entitled to full pay and allowances. Under Standing Order 13 (5), which forms as Schedule to the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, read with section 2 (f) of the Ordinance, if the order of removal or dismissal of a workman is rescinded, the workman shall A be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension and shall be entitled to the same wages as he would have received if he were not suspended. The learned counsel for the respondents however, contended that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of this Standing Order, but we are unable to agree as "workman" has been defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Ordinance as meaning "any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or reward, but does not include any member of the armed forces of Pakistan". This is a definition of a "workman" of general application in the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961, "worker" in clause (10) of section 2 of the Ordinance means "a person engaged on mobile duty, and includes drivers, cleaners, conductors and checkers employed by or in a road transport service" This is a definition for, the purpose of the Ordinance, but since the Road Transport Board is a commercial establish ment within the meaning of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, we hold that the workers in the Road Transport Board are entitled to the protection of Standing Order 13 (5), the petitioners, who are conductors and checkers in the service of the Board, fall within the definition of "work" and are entitled to remuneration for the period of absence from duty by- reason of their removal from service by the board. We are unable to accept the contention that they are not entitled to the benefit of Standing Order 13 (5).

4. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of Article 98 (2) of the Constitution, since it is a statutory corporation and the petitioners are not civil servants B who have the protection of Article 177 of the Constitution. On their behalf, reliance was placed on Rana Muhammad Jamil v. The Punjab Road Transport Board, Lahore and others (P L D 1975 Lah. 1) and Irshad Muhammad Mirza v. Road Transport Corporation, West Pakistan (P L D 1966 Lah. 632). It is true that the petitioners are not civil servants within Article 177 of the Constitution, nor have the portection of the Constitution, but, is claimed on their behalf, they are servants of a statutory corporation, which is a person within the meaning of clause (2) of Article

98. We have come to this conclusion in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court regarding of the case of East Pakistan Industrial Development Cor poration reported as Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and others v. Rostem Ali (P L D 1966 S C 848) read with the judgment of the Dacca High Court Rostem Ali v. Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and others (P L D 1964 Dacca 721), wherein it was observed as follows: -- "The term 'person' as defined in clause (5) of Article 98, includes any: body politic or corporate, any authority of or under the control of the Central Government or of a Provincial Government etc. The E. P. I. D. C. being a body corporate under the authority and control of the Government is a 'person' within the meaning of Article 98 (2). As such, 'person', the E, P.

1. D. C- at any rate, performs functions in connection with the affair.; of the Province, namely the economic and industrial development of the Province. That being, so an application under Article 98 (2), is maintainable against the E. P. I. D. C. in any view of the matter." The above abervations apply to the Road Transport Corporation for the reasons stated above, we accept these writ petitions and declare the order of the Road Transport Board to be without lawful authority, and direct that the case of the petitioners shall be decided in accordance with the Standing Order 13 (5) and rule 25 (1) of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board Service Rules, 1956, and they be paid such emoluments as are due to them in accordance with the Rules. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions accepted.