1988 PLP 595 (PLC(CS))

(d)Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A‑‑Grievance petition‑‑Parties‑‑Juristic person i.e. Factory, Mills, Establishment not essentially to be sued‑‑Only "Employer" is required to be sued‑‑Petition against Deputy General Manager and Manager/Attorney of employer Bank, _held, was competent. (e) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑S.37‑‑Appeal‑‑Aggrieved person‑‑Grievance petition against Deputy Manager and Manager of Bank falling within definition of "employer"‑ Appeal signed by one of such persons, held, was signed by an aggrieved person and competent. Javed Altaf for Appellants. S.M. Arif for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th May, 1987. Since common questions of fact and law are involved in all the six appeals, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment. The appeals mentioned at serial Nos.2 and 4 above are proceeding ex parte against the respondents as they have not appeared in spite of service of notices. Notices were sent twice to then by registered post and they have not been received back unserved. Therefore, it has been presumed that the notices have been served.

2. The facts of the case are that the appellants terminated the services of the respondents vide orders dated 26‑12‑1985 on the ground that the bank has ceased to exist in Pakistan with effect from 1‑1‑1986 and the business is to be wound up. All the shares had been purchased by the Union Bank of the Middle East which has its branches at Karachi, Lahore and Faisalabad. The purchaser bank has re‑employed twenty‑one employees of the appellant bank. The case of the appellants is that since the appellant bank closed business and the shares were purchased by the Union Bank of the Middle East, there was no other alternative but to terminate the services of the respondents and other employees. There is no force in this. argument. The business was not closed; rather it was sold to the other bank, and the said bank is now doing the business under its own name with the capital and other assets of the Dubai Bank, Where a business is transferred, the services of the employees are also transferred to the transferee and the transferee has to see how much strength it requires. The transferee may terminate the services of certain employees giving cogent reasons. The learned counsel for the appellants has said that since fifty per cent employees could be terminated under Standing Order 11 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, the learned lower Court should not have accepted the grievance petitions. Since a provision of law was not followed by the appellants, the very orders of termination are illegal and are not sustainable. Unless both the parties agree, the action of the appellants to the extent of termination of fifty per cent employees cannot be regarded as legal. The orders being illegal have no force in the eye of law.

3. The other point argued is that since service benefits including one month's pay, gratuity and bonus were paid and leave encashment was also made, the respondents were estopped from challenging the orders of termination. According to service agreement, three months' notice of termination or three months' salary in. lieu of notice should have been given. Since only one month's pay was paid, the orders of termination are illegal for this reason also. Moreover, no estoppel operates, inasmuch as in Exh.R‑1 the details and break‑up of the amounts paid are not given. There is another document on the record, which is an annexure, but firstly, since it was not tendered in. evidence, it cannot be looked into and secondly it does not bear the signatures of the respondents, therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents received the money with the knowledge that all their dues including the ones which could be paid only on the termination of their services‑were being paid to them. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellants i.e. 1973 P L C 297, 1980 P L C 64 (v), 1981 P L C 670 and 1984 P L C 786, therefore, have no bearing on the present case.

4. The other point raised is that the impugned order is void as at the time it was announced, it was not in writing. No doubt, according to section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a decision of the Labour Court should be in writing and delivered in open Court, but the impugned order is in writing and bears the date on which it was announced, meaning thereby that it was existing at that time. No doubt, in the grounds of appeal it has been said that the order was not present on the date of its announcement and that the reader had announced the order, but there is no affidavit in support of it. It has also been argued that the case was decided without hearing the arguments, inasmuch as the learned counsel for the appellants was ill and had sent an application for adjournment. Since there is no affidavit, it cannot be said that the order was announced without having been reduced into writing or that the order was announced by the reader. So far as this assertion is concerned that the learned counsel was not heard, no reasons were given for the non‑appearance of the second counsel of the appellants. Since there were two counsel, the second counsel could have argued the case if 11r. Javed Altaf, Advocate, was per chance ill and had sent an application for adjournment. Apart from it, since the learned counsel for the appellants has been heard at length in appeals, the impugned order should not be set aside simply for the reasons that the learned lower Court had not heard the learned counsel for the appellants.

5. The last point argued by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the grievance petitions should have been made against the Dubai Bank and not the Deputy General Manager and Muhammad Akram, Manager/ Attorney. In civil cases no doubt such an objection can prevail because where there is a juristic person, only it can be sued, but in labour cases the employer is to be made party. Since in section 25‑A of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the word I "employer' is used and not the factory or bank where the worker was employed, the grievance petitions against the Deputy Generall Manager and Muhammad Akram, Manager/ Attorney were competent.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the appeals are incompetent, inasmuch as they do not bear the signatures of appellant No.l and although appellant No.2 signed the memo of appeals, but he cannot be said to be an aggrieved person since during the pendency of the cases before the learned trial Court he had ceased to remain the Attorney. Since Mr. Muhammad Akram, Manager/ Attorney was party in the learned lower Court and direction was given, he was the aggrieved person and thus, he rightly participated in the appeal and it cannot be said that he was not an aggrieved person. Since one of the appellants signed memo of appeals, the appeals are competent.

7. As a result of what has been said above, all the six appeals fail and are dismissed. A. E. /365/Lb.P Appeals dismissed.