2002 PLP 1426 (CLD)
Mst. RUKHSANA BASHIR‑‑‑Appellant Versus HABIB BANK LTD. through President and 4 others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 2002 PLP 1426 (CLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ |
| Parties | Mst. RUKHSANA BASHIR‑‑‑Appellant Versus HABIB BANK LTD. through President and 4 others‑‑‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2002 PLP 1426 (CLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2002 PLP 1426 (CLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2002 PLP 1426 (CLD) (Mst. RUKHSANA BASHIR‑‑‑Appellant Versus HABIB BANK LTD. through President and 4 others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Ch. Rashid Ahmad for Appellant.
- Nemo for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑Art.29‑‑‑Compensation for wrongful seizure‑‑‑Provision of Art.29 of Limitation Act, 1908‑‑‑Applicability‑‑‑Provision of Art.29, Limitation Act, 1908 is only applicable where movable property is wrongfully seized under legal process. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 29‑‑‑"Legal Process"‑‑‑Meaning‑‑‑Term "legal process" can only mean a process of some Court established under law. (c) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S.9‑‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 29 & 49‑‑‑Wrongful seizure of vehicle‑‑‑Suit for recovery of damages‑‑ Limitation‑‑‑Vehicle of plaintiff was wrongfully seized by the Bank on 23‑3‑1997, without any process of law‑‑‑Suit for damages was filed by the plaintiff on 11‑2‑2000, which was dismissed by the Banking Court as being time‑barred under the provisions of Art. 29 of Limitation Act, 1908‑‑‑Contention of the plaintiff was that the provisions of Art.49 of Limitation Act, 1908, were applicable and the suit was within time‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Article 49 of Limitation Act, 1908 and not Art.29 of the Act was applicable to the suit filed by the plaintiff‑Judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were set aside and the case was remanded for decision afresh‑‑‑Appeal was allowed accordingly. (d) Words and phrases‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ "Legal process "‑‑‑Meanings.
Judgment & Decree
JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.‑‑‑None has appeared for the respondent‑Bank although the case was adjourned for hearing to an actual date for today in the presence of learned counsel for the respondent‑Bank. The name of learned counsel for the respondent‑Bank has also appeared in the cause list. The bank is, therefore, proceeded against ex parte.
2. This appeal impugns the judgment and decree, dated 2‑4‑2001 passed by the learned Banking Court‑V, Lahore. By means of the said judgment and decree a suit filed by Mst. Rukhsana Bashir appellant/plaintiff for recovery of Rs.26,50,000 was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
3. The facts of this case are simple. Mst. Rukhsana Bashir filed a suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount in view of the wrongful seizure and detention of a vehicle by the respondent‑Bank. The vehicle was seized by the Bank on 22‑3‑1997 while the suit for damages was filed by Mst. Rukhsana Bashir on 11‑2‑2000. The learned Banking Court proceeded to dismiss the suit on the ground that Article 29 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act was applicable to the case and since the said Article provided limitation period of one year, the suit of Mst. Rukhsana Bashir was time‑barred. We have considered the contents of Article 29 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. The same reads asunder:‑‑‑ "
29. For compensation for (One year) The date of the wrongful seizure of movable seizure." property under legal process. From the above provision, it is clear that the same is only applicable where movable property is wrongfully seized under legal process. Legal process can only mean a process of some Court established under law.
4. In the present case the admitted position is that the movable property of Mst. Rukhsana Bashir comprising of a vehicle was impounded by the Bank without any legal process having been issued by any Court. In this view of the matter, learned counsel for the appellant contends that Article 49 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act is applicable. Article 49 aforesaid reads as under:‑‑‑ "
49. For other specific (Three When the property is movable property, or for years). wrongfully taken or compensation for wrong‑ injured, or when the fully taking or injuring or detainer's possession wrongfully detaining the becomes unlawful." same. We are in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant Mst. Rukhsana Bashir that it was Article 49 reproduced above which was applicable to the suit filed by her and not Article 29.
5. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and decree, dated 2‑4‑2001. The case shall be remanded to the learned Banking Court for decision on the remaining issues. Q.M.H./M.A.K./R‑138/L Case remanded.