P L D 1961 W P (Rev (PLP)
THE AFGHAN BUS SERVICE RECD. SARGODHA‑Appellant Versus THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, LAHORE-Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1961 W P (Rev (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | M. W. 4bbasi, Member, Board of Revenue, |
| Parties | THE AFGHAN BUS SERVICE RECD. SARGODHA‑Appellant Versus THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, LAHORE-Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1961 W P (Rev (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1961 W P (Rev (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: M. W. 4bbasi, Member, Board of Revenue,.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1961 W P (Rev (PLP) (THE AFGHAN BUS SERVICE RECD. SARGODHA‑Appellant Versus THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, LAHORE-Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Headnotes / Summary
Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), S. 64‑Refusal to vary terms of permit‑No. appeal competent. A right of appeal is expressly conferred by a statute and its scope strictly restricted to the limits prescribed by it the terms of the statute cannot be expanded or curtailed in the discretion of the appellate authority, and to infer that a "refusal to grant a permit" includes "refusal to vary the terms of the permit" would be an undue extension of the terms of clause (a). If this interpretation were allowed, the effect would be that the mandatory provisions of section 57, laying down an elaborate procedure for granting permits, would be circumvented and defeated. Clause (b) of section 64 provides an appeal against variation of the original terms of a permit as a safeguard against unwarranted interference to the prejudice of the permit‑holder; but nothing similar in the nature of a right can be claimed by a permit‑holder whose prayer to vary the terms of his permit to his benefit is refused. Nor can the permit holder claim the need for any safeguard. On the other hand, when a permit‑holder accepts a permit subject to certain conditions, the R. T. A. has a right to insist that those conditions are observed during the currency of the permit. Conversely, if it refuses to vary the terms of the permit, it commits no infringement and no question of appeal arises. Kh. Abdur Rahim for Afghan Bus Service. S. M. Zafar for Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service. Secretary R. T. A.
Judgment & Decree
Kh. Abdur Rahim for Afghan Bus Service. S. M. Zafar for Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service. Secretary R. T. A. No. 1 (R. O. A. M. No. 21) is an appeal against R. T. A's order dated 22‑10‑1958, refusing to vary the appellant's existing route; No. 2 (R. O. A. M. No. 23) is a cross‑appeal by the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service which would claim alternative relief as an aggrieved party, if the Afghan Bus Service's prayer for variation of the route is granted. The Afghan Bus Service is a permit‑holder on a route com prising 26 miles from Sargodha to Marulianwala via Choki Bhagat, Matela and Chak No.
67. A small part of this route between Chak No. 67 and Marulianwala is said to be unmotorable on account of water logging. The Afghan Bus Service, therefore, applied to R. T. A. for an extension of its route by about 21 miles beyond Matela and on Marulianwala via Kot Moman and Laliani. The major portion of this extension, comprising 151 miles, is the route of the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service. The later, therefore, objected to the application of the Afghan Bus Service for extension and variation of its route. At the outset a preliminary legal objection has been made on behalf of the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service as to the competency of the appeal on the ground that it is not sanctioned by any pro vision of law. In reply it has been urged on behalf of appellant Afghan Bus Service that the appeal is competent in so far as its sanction can be inferred by implication from clause (a) of section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 64 (a) confers the right of appeal on a person "aggrieved by the refusal to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him." So far as the first part of this clause goes, it is specifically limited to "refusal to grant a permit." The point of the learned counsel for the appellant, however, is that this part of clause (a) includes refusal to grant a variation of the permit. In the alternative, he argues, the appellant's prayer should be interpreted as an application for a new permit. A right of appeal is expressly conferred by a statute and its scope strictly restricted to the limits prescribed by it; the terms of the statute cannot be expanded or curtailed in the discretion of the appellate authority, and to infer that a "refusal to grant a permit" includes "refusal to vary the terms of the permit" would be an undue extension of the terms of clause (a). If this interpretation were allowed, the effect would be that the mandatory provisions of section 57, laying down an elaborate procedure for granting permits, would be circumvented and defeated. Clause (b) of section 64 provides an appeal against variation of the original terms of a permit as a safeguard against unwarranted interference to the prejudice of the permit‑holder; but nothing similar in the nature of a right can be claimed by a permit‑holder whose prayer to vary the terms of his permit to his benefit is refused. Nor can the permit holder claim the need for any safeguard. The R. T. A. has not after all acted in contraven tion of the terms and conditions on which the permit‑holder accepted the permit. On the other hand, when a permit‑holder accepts a permit subject to certain conditions, the R. T. A. has a right to insist that those conditions are observed during the currency of the permit. Conversely, if it refuses to vary the terms of the permit, it commits no infringement and no question of appeal arises. The terms of clause (a) of section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are practically identical in Pakistan and India. I have been shown some decisions of Indian Courts on the question whether R. T. A's refusal to vary the conditions of a permit is or is not an appeal able order and I find that the view taken therein is the same as I have expressed above. I have no doubt that an appeal against R. T. A's order refusing to vary the terms and conditions of a permit is not an appeal able order under the Motor Vehicles Act and as such the appeal is incompetent and must be dismissed. The second appeal Sargodha Bhera Bus Service v. R. T. A. Lahore (R. O. A. M. No. 23) becomes in fructuous and is also dismissed. K.B.A Appeals dismissed.