P L D 1965 Dacca 492 (PLP)

(a) Sales Tax Act (III of 1951), S. 7 (1) read with Government of Pakistan Finance Department Notification (Sales Tax) No. 9, dated 27th June 1951, item No. (6)‑Expressing "products of re‑rolling mills"‑Does not connote and include all products produced direct by re‑rolling, mills and those manufactured from them‑Such products not exempt from sales tax. (b) Sales Tax Act (III of 1951), Ss. 3, 4, 7 & 8‑Provisions neither ultra vires the Constitution (1962) as amounting to delegated legislation nor violative of Fundamental Right No. 15 as being discriminatory‑Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Arts. 48 & 131‑ Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Art. 6, Fundamental Right No.

15. The Sales Tax Act, 1951, considered as a whole, envisages that in the matter of imposition of sales tax there cannot be a rigid rule as to the rates of tax in regard to certain classes of goods and the exemption to be granted to goods which come within the purview of the Act from payment of tax. It is evident that the Legislature felt that in regard to these two matters, decision, will be dependent upon the trade conditions prevailing in the country at a given time. It is because of this that wide powers in regard to the rates of tax exemption have been given to the Central Government. In this view of the matter, it cannot be accepted that the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the Act amount to delegated legislation and are therefore ultra vires. The argument that the provisions admit of wide power of unguided discretion and that by refusing to grant exemption to a particular company while some of the manufacturers of similar goods were granted exemption it has as a matter of fact been left to a situation of unfair competition, is equally unsubstantiated. The requirements which would justify exemption could not be anticipated by the Legislature and, therefore, it was not possible to enumerate them in the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Discretion had to be left, therefore, to the Executive Government to take decisions from time to time in this regard within the framework of the Act according to the exigencies of trade, and in the absence of any clear proof that the discretion has been abused against the petitioner to his prejudice, the contention that the impugned provisions are ultra vires as delegated legislation or violative' of the 15th Fundamental Right guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be accepted. When the subject dealt with by the Legislature by its very nature suggests that a wide discretion has to be left to the Executive Government, allowing such discretion does not amount to delegated legislation, and in the absence of any proof of exercise of the power resulting in discrimination, the Court cannot interfere. In a system as in Pakistan, where separation of powers of the Legislature and the Judiciary and the Executive is provided for by the written Constitution, all that the Legislature is required to guard against is that it does not surrender or abdicate its power. In a given case, whether the Legislation amounts to surrender or abdication, will depend upon the nature of the impugned provisions read along with the other provisions of the law in question. If it is found that the power given to the Executive does not allow it to modify any essential feature of the law, then it does not amount to delegation of legislative power. The power to work out details within the framework of the law, if given, will be within permissible limits of delegation so as not to render it unconstitutional. Messrs East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 41 rel. Queen v. Burah 5 I A 178; Baxter v. Ah. Way (1909) 8 C L R 626 and Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer A I R 1955 S C 25 ref.