2017 PLP 1461 (YLR)
RAHMAT BAR KHAN — Petitioner Versus DAULAT KHAN and 4 others — Respondents
| Citation | 2017 PLP 1461 (YLR) |
| Forum / Court | Peshawar (Mingora Bench) |
| Bench Members | Ikramullah Khan, J |
| Parties | RAHMAT BAR KHAN — Petitioner Versus DAULAT KHAN and 4 others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), (b) Criminal trial |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2017 PLP 1461 (YLR)?
This judgment primarily cites: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), (b) Criminal trial as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2017 PLP 1461 (YLR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Peshawar (Mingora Bench) bench comprising: Ikramullah Khan, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2017 PLP 1461 (YLR) (RAHMAT BAR KHAN — Petitioner Versus DAULAT KHAN and 4 others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Aziz Ahmad for Petitioners.
- Asghar Ali and Sabir Shah, A.A.G. for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 561-A
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-A(ii), 337-F(iv) & 34
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act (I of 2005), S. 4-C(i)
Shajjah-i-mudihah, ghayr-jaifah, common intention
Power of Public Prosecutor to withhold prosecution
Quashing of order for discharging the accused persons
Accused were charged by complainant for causing injuries to him and his son
Complainant filed compromise deed during pendency of application for pre-arrest bail of accused persons, with the assertion that parties had compromised
Complainant and the injured had no objection on confirmation of ad-interim pre-arrest bail of the accused persons as well as their acquittal
Ad-interim bail was confirmed by the Trial Court in view of the compromise
Public Prosecutor submitted application for discharging the accused, which was allowed
Admittedly, parties had compromised
Complainant and the injured had expressed their no objection on the confirmation of bail before arrest as well as their acquittal during trial
If the complainant was aggrieved of the compromise having not been effected with his consent, he could file application for cancellation of bail
No such application having been moved by the complainant nor he had pointed out any illegality or irregularity in the order for discharging the accused persons by allowing the application filed under S. 4-C(i) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2005
Said provision of law described that District Public Prosecutor was empowered to withhold the prosecution and to move application for discharge of such accused persons if the offence was compoundable, carrying punishment up to seven years
When complainant party had expressed their no objection on the acquittal of accused persons on the basis of compromise effected between the parties, they could not resile from their such deposition unless proved that accused compelled them to compromise through coercion, influence or force
Petition for quashing the order for discharging the accused person was dismissed accordingly.
Principle
Once a compromise always a compromise, unless it was brought on record that the same was effected through any influence, coercion or force.
Judgment & Decree
IKRAMULLAH KHAN, J.
Through the instant petition, petitioner Rahmat Bar Khan, seeks quashment of order dated 21.3.2016 rendered by learned Judicial Magistrate Timergara, whereby in light of application under section 4C(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Services (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2005 (Act) submitted by District Public Prosecutor Dir Lower, at Timergara, the respondents involved in case FIR No.350 dated 10.7.2015 under section 337-A(ii), F(iv)/34, P.P.C., Khall, were discharged by learned Judicial Magistrate, Timergara.
2. In essence, respondents were charged by complainant for causing injuries to him and his son Jehanzeb by giving them sharp edged article/weapon blows as well as hitting them with stones.
3. I have heard arguments of learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
4. Perusal of record reveals that during pendency of bail before arrest application of respondents, in the Court of learned Sessions Judge/Zilla Qazi, Dir lower, the complainant Rehmat Bar Khan and his son Jehanzeb (injured) had submitted a deed Ex.PA in respect of compromise with the respondents and on the back of the same, their joint statement was also recorded wherein they had stated that the matter between the parties has been patched up through elders of locality and that they have got no objection on confirmation of ad interim pre-arrest bail of respondents as well as their acquittal during trial, so on the basis of said compromise, the learned Sessions Judge, had confirmed the bail before arrest of respondents.
5. Since the matter had been patched up between the parties and the offences were compoundable in nature therefore, the District Public Prosecutor Dir Lower at Timergara, withheld the prosecution on the basis of compromise by exercising his powers under Section 4-C(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Service (Constitution, Function and Powers) Act, 2005, who also submitted application before the learned trial Court for discharging the respondents. The learned Judicial Magistrate, being agree with the opinion of District Public Prosecutor while allowing application under section 4-C(i) of the Act ibid, discharged the respondents from the charges leveled against them. Being dissatisfied from the same, petitioner/complainant has preferred the instant quashment petition.
6. Admittedly, the matter had been patched up between the parties through elders of locality and to this effect joint statement of complainant and injured Jehanzeb is available on file, according to which, they had expressed their no objection on the confirmation of bail before arrest of respondents as well as their acquittal during trial. The offence is compoundable in nature and once a compromise always a compromise unless it is brought on record that the same was effected through any influence, coercion or force. If the petitioner/complainant was aggrieved from the said compromise being not effected with his consent, then he should have filed a bail cancellation application against the said order but no such application has been moved nor the complainant pointed out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order of learned Judicial Magistrate, Timergara, thereby allowing the application under section 4-C(i) of the Act, filed by learned District Public Prosecutor. Section 4-C(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Service (Constitution, Function and Powers) Act, 2005, reads as under:-- 4(c) in respect of compoundable offences, other than those which are punishable by death or life imprisonment, the Director General Prosecution, and in respect of compoundable offences punishable with imprisonment for seven years or less, the District Public Prosecutor, may- (i) withhold prosecution if reasonable ground exists to believe that the offence is compoundable; provided that if the offence is not compounded within a period of one month, a report shall be lodged in the court of competent jurisdiction for prosecution and trial; or"
7. In view of contents of above provisions of law, it is clear that the District Public Prosecutor has been empowered to withhold the prosecution if the offence is compoundable, carrying punishment upto 7 years, who may also apply to the Court for discharge of such accused. Moreover, when the complainant party had expressed their no objection on the acquittal of respondents on the basis of compromise effected between the parties, then they cannot resile from their such deposition, who failed to point out any coercion, influence or force used by respondents for compelling them to compromise the matter with the respondents. Hence, the learned District Public Prosecutor has rightly withheld the prosecution followed by learned Judicial Magistrate, by discharging the respondents, which needs no interference by this Court. Consequently, the instant petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed. JK/82/P Petition dismissed.