2026 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

ANWAAR HUSSAIN, J.

By way of factual background, it is noted that the petitioner was appointed as Sanitary Worker in Tehsil Municipal Committee, Kamoke, vide order dated 15.11.1976. However, his services were terminated on a complaint filed by one Muhammad Nasser Ahmed Chattha, through order dated 01.01.2015, under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 ("the Act"). The termination order was maintained, in appeal, vide order dated 18.03.2015 passed by respondent No.1. The petitioner thereafter approached the Punjab Service Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), where the service appeal of the petitioner remained pending for more than three years and was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn, vide order dated 17.01.2018. The petitioner then filed another (second) departmental appeal before the Secretary, Local Government and Community Development Department, Punjab ("Secretary, LG and CD"), which too was dismissed, vide order dated 21.03.2018. Hence, the present constitutional petition has been filed, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner has been vexed more than once, allegedly in violation of Article 13 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the first two inquiries, the petitioner was not found involved in the alleged misconduct and therefore, the third inquiry was based on mala fide. It is contended that respondent No.2, while passing order dated 01.01.2015 terminating the petitioner's services, did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 13 of the Act inasmuch as neither any show-cause notice was issued nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner. It is further contended that the appellate authority/respondent No.1, while dismissing the appeal, failed to consider the evidence available on record in its true perspective.

3. Conversely, learned Law Officer contends that the petition is hit by laches, inasmuch as the petitioner had earlier approached the Tribunal to lay challenge to his termination order dated 01.01.2015 as well as order dated 18.03.2015 passed in appeal, thereby making a conscious choice of forum, and his service appeal was admitted for regular hearing, hence, there was no justification to withdraw the said proceedings and subsequently pursue a remedy (second appeal before the Secretary, LG and CD), which was otherwise not available under the law.

4. Arguments heard. Record perused.

5. The allegation against the petitioner is that he is not the son of Peer Muhammad but of one Sultan Muhammad, and that he concealed this fact and procured a bogus CNIC, which was subsequently cancelled by National Database and Registration Authority ("NADRA"), thereby rendering him ineligible for the government service on the basis of false particulars. It is not disputed that the petitioner's matriculation certificate reflects the name of Sultan Muhammad as his father and contains a different date of birth from his CNIC. The petitioner, however, takes the stance that he is the son of Peer Muhammad but was adopted by one Sultan Muhammad, and that such adoption was acknowledged through an affidavit/agreement purportedly executed by his mother, the wife of Peer Muhammad. It is also not denied that the inquiry was initiated on an application filed by one Muhammad Nasser Ahmad Chattha son of Ch. Muhammad Yousaf Chattha, who is admittedly the grandson of Peer Muhammad and the petitioner not only committed cheating while procuring government service but also through such fraudulent act aims at claiming inheritance in respect of property left by deceased Peer Muhammad. Furthermore, the petitioner had also instituted a suit challenging the action of the NADRA regarding cancellation of his CNIC with Peer Muhammad as his father, which has been dismissed. It is an admitted position that his parentage is recorded as Sultan Muhammad in matriculation certificate and original CNIC.

6. However, the petitioner asserts that his services were terminated without adherence to due process, as no material was confronted to him and he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine any witness during the inquiry proceedings. Argument is misconceived. Holding of successive inquiries are not against law. The fact that the petitioner himself submitted an affidavit of his purported mother, stating that he was the son of Peer Muhammad and had been adopted by Sultan Muhammad clearly shows that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity during the inquiry proceedings to explain his position; thus, the plea of denial of due process is untenable. Moreover, even before this Court, upon a pointed query, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to explain the relationship between the petitioner's mother-being the wife of Peer Muhammad-and Sultan Muhammad, which could justify or explain the giving of the petitioner in adoption. This unexplained aspect renders the petitioner's stance inherently doubtful.

7. In these circumstances, the contentions of the learned Law Officer carry weight, particularly as the petitioner has approached this Court after a lapse of more than three years against his termination order. The case is, therefore. squarely hit by the principle of laches. Cases reported as State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others (2012 SCMR 280) Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax and others (2013 SCMR 587) and Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi (2014 SCMR 1594) are referred in this regard.

8. Moreover, the stance taken by the petitioner that even if his parentage is recorded as Sultan Muhammad in the matriculation certificate while he claims to be the son of Peer Muhammad, the same has no bearing on the complainant-on the premise that he did not secure public employment as a son of Peer Muhammad under any employee-son quota-is misconceived. Once such discrepancies in parentage, coupled with inconsistencies in official record, came to the notice of the authorities, the matter ceased to be of mere formality and directly impinged upon the petitioner's identity. In public employment, which rests upon trust and confidence, such contradictions cannot be overlooked. Consequently, a person whose identity remains clouded by inconsistencies cannot claim an indefeasible right to continue in service.

9. Similarly, there is also no satisfactory explanation from the petitioner as to why the Tribunal was initially approached; why the said proceedings were withdrawn; and why, after dismissal of the appeal by the Secretary, LG. and CD the remedy before the Tribunal was not availed.

10. In view of the foregoing, this constitutional petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

11. Since the main writ petition has been decided, C.M. No.1/2026 filed for restoration of C.M. No.1/2019 (application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) has become infructuous, which is accordingly disposed of. UN/G-11/L Petition dismissed.