P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

INAMULLAH KHAN, C. J.-This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of S. A. Mahmood, J., dated the 30th of November 1961. The facts giving rise to this appeal, though not very necessary to give as only a question of law is involved, briefly stated are these. The appellant filed a CH Form for the transfer of a property situated on Mcleod Road, Lahore. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner divided the property and transferred some portion of the same to the appellant. On appeal to the Additional Settlement Commissioner the said R officer on 13th of July 1960 transferred the whole of the residential portion to the appellant holding the property to be indivisible. This order was maintained by the Settlement Commissioner as well as by Malik Fateh Khan, Settlement Commissioner with powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order, dated the 26th of August, 1961. Malik Fateh Khan, however reviewed (sic) his order on the 2nd of October, 1961, whereby he divided the property. The order, dated the 2nd of October 1961 was challenged before this Court, under Article II (4) of Laws Continuance in Force Order, 1958, for quashment.

2. The petition came up before S. A. Mahmood, J., who held that Malik Fateh Khan could review his order passed as a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

3. Bashir Ahmad, learned Advocate for the appellant, relying on Mst. Zaniab Khatoon v. Mian Ghulam Shabbir etc. (P L D 1965 S C 55), contended that in the absence of any delegation by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to Malik Fateh Khan to review, he had no power to review. The question before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether a Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, who is delegated with the revisional power under section 31 (2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Act), by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise the order passed by the Settlement Commissioner, should be deemed to be automatically conferred with the powers to review his own order, as such delegatee. Their Lordships (S. A. Rahman, B. Z. Kaikaus andh Hamoodur Rahman, JJ) held "that the power of review to this contest could not be regarded as ancillary to the revisional power conferred on the delegatee." It was further observed that "the revisional power and the power of review of his own order, conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner, are contained in two separate sections of this Act." We respectfully bow to' the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The difficulty has, however, arisen because the Ordinance XVIII of 1965, which appears in Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary of 2nd June, 1965, whereby certain amendment was introduced after subsection (2) of Section 31 of the Act. It would be necessary to reproduce the amendment in order to consider the effect of the same on the point before us. It reads as under :- "(3) Any order passed by a Settlement Commissioner or any Additional, Deputy or Assistant Settlement Commissioner in exercise of any power delegated to him under subsection (2) shall be, and be deemed always to have been, subject to the provisions of Chapter VI in the same manner and to the same extent as any other order passed by a Settlement Commissioner, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Settlement Commissioner, as the case my be, is so subject."

4. After hearing the learned Advocate for the appellant, we have come to the conclusion that with the change of law, the order passed by Malik Fateh Khan in review cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. On a fair analysis of the above provision it comes to this (1) That where a delegatee passes an order, the same shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter VI of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. (2) That the order passed as a delegatee will be subject to the provisions of Chapter VI (Appeal, Revision and Review) to the same extent as any other order passed by the Settlement Commissioner, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Settlement Commissioner in exercise of their own jurisdiction. If an order passed by a delegatee is subject to the provisions of Chapter VI, it means, in the first place, that if an order is passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner as a delegatee, it will be subject to appeal to the Additional Settlement Commis sioner and revision to the Settlement Commissioner. In the second place, if the delegatee had passed the order, it should be deemed to be "as any other order passed by him. "In other words the delegatee should be deemed to have passed the order in ordinary course subject not only to appeal or revision but also to review under section 21 of the Settlement Act as it stood prior to Ordinance II of 1962.

5. Mr. Bashir Ahmad, learned Advocate for the appellant, submitted that as the power of review had not been delegated to the Settlement Commissioner, who reviewed his order, he had no jurisdiction to do so. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the clear provisions of section 31 (amended) of the Act. To us the words "as any other order passed by a Settlement Commissioner," are very clear. It indicates that if under the provisions of the Act he could review the order passed by him, he could do so by virtue of this amendment.

6. We would, for the reasons given above, dismiss this appeal but make no order as to costs. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.