P L D 1952 Federal Court 118 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, J.‑This is a petition by one Qazi Aman Ullah an Overseer of the Punjab Public Works Department. It appears that he is one of several persons in respect of whom a charge of cheating and misappropriation of public money is being investigated by the police of Montgomery District. Appre hending arrest, the petitioner applied first to the Sessions Court at Montgomery and later in the Lahore High Court for an order for bail before arrest. The Sessions Judge granted interim bail which was later cancelled. In the High Court, the learned Chief Justice refused the order prayed for on the ground that the case "does not come within the conditions laid down by the Full Bench for taking bail before arrest". The prayer in the petition is for the grant of special leave to appeal from this order. The petition is misconceived and betrays failure to appre ciate the special nature of this Court's jurisdiction in criminal matters. By virtue of the Privy Council (Abolition of Jurisdic tion) Act, 1950, this Court exercises precisely the same juris diction which was exercised prior to the 1st of May 1950 by the Judicial Committee. As long ago as 1887 their Lordships of the‑Judicial Committee laid down in Dillet's case, 12 A C 459 that they would not advise the Sovereign to "review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of the powers of legal process or by some violation of the. principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done". In the more recent case of Mohindar Singh and others v. The King Emperor, 59 I A 233 Viscount Dunedin observed that their Lordships of the Privy Council did not sit as a Court of criminal appeal, and for them to interfere in a criminal matter "there must be something so irregular or so outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice". Very recently, in the case of Sarfraz Ali Khan v. Crown P L D 1951 F C 41 this Court, after bringing under examination all the relevant cases, declared that it would ordinarily apply the some rules of practice, in this respect, as were adopted by the Judicial Committee. It is sufficiently plain that the present matter bears no resemblance to any in which this Court, following the prin ciples enunciated above, would be prepared to consider the question whether it could rightly interfere. Nothing has occurred of a nature to shock the sense of justice. Indeed nothing in the nature of a judicial proceeding has yet been commenced, and therefore, the question of justice or injustice which alone could attract this Court's special jurisdiction, has not yet arisen. Consequently, this petition must be dismissed. Although attempts to bring before this Court criminal matters, like the present, which clearly do not satisfy the conditions requisite for interference by this Court, are rare indeed, we may justifiably ask why such an attempt should ever be made. We are strongly of the view that learned counsel who prefer petitions of this kind do a grave disservice not only to their clients, but also to themselves. For, in view of the repeated and careful enunciation of the principles governing this Court's jurisdiction, in the relevant respect, such conduct may, in certain circumstances, be thought to transgress the limits of professional propriety. A. H. Petition dismissed.