P L D 1991 Supreme Court 222 (PLP)

S.USMAN ALI SHAH, J.‑‑This service appeal by leave of the Court has arisen from the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 1342‑1984 and 16‑1‑1985, whereby service appeal of the appellant for the grant of special pay denied to him by the Finance Department, was dismissed. The appellant was appointed as Technical Assistant (then a Grade‑III post) in the Pakistan Forest Institute, Peshawar on 19‑5‑1972, on ad hoc basis and was subsequently regularized, vide Office Order dated 31‑3‑1973. This post was upgraded to Grade‑16 and the appellant was placed as such. The appellant was promoted to Grade‑17 with effect from 2‑12‑1980 and posted as Assistant Soil Chemist. The appellant considered himself to be eligible to the Special Pay of Rs.100 which was then authorized to Assistant Soil Chemists or to those holding equivalent posts in the four Provincial Govts. who were appointed on superivsory posts. So he moved the Authority for the grant of such Special Pay on the basis of the decision of the Provincial Governments. The Authority submitted a favourable proposal in this regard to the Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. The Finance Department turned down the proposal so the appellant filed appeal in the Federal Service Tribunal which was dismissed through the impugned judgment. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Special Pay has been defined in clause (25) of Fundamental Rule 9 as under:‑‑ "(25) Special pay means an addition, of the nature of pay, to the emoluments of a post or of a Government servant granted in consideration of‑ (a) the specially arduous nature of the duties; or (b) a specific addition to the work or responsibility, or (c) the unhealthiness of the locality in which the work is performed." In order to establish his legal entitlement to Special Pay the appellant had to prove any one of the requirements prescribed. That has not been canvassed at any stage. Even now it is not the case of the appellant that his case squarely falls in the defined category. The Federal Government employee cannot in the matter of emoluments compare himself with employees of 'Provincial Government, nor can the Provincial Govt. employee compare himself with the Federal Govt. employee. The categories are different. The classification is obvious. The reasonableness of it needs no proof. Under the circumstances and foregoing facts there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. M.BA./S‑596/S????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed. P L D 1991 Supreme Court 224 Present. Muhammad Afzal ZuIlah, CJ, Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry and Sajjad Ali Shah, JJ MURTAZA KHAN and 2 others‑‑Appellants versus Mst. DIL ARA NASRIN and 2 others‑‑Respondents Civil Appeal No.5‑P of 1982, decided on 5th November, 1990. (On appeal from the judgment dated 15‑4‑1979 of the Peshawar High Court, in C.R.No.27 of 1975). (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ Art. 185 ‑‑‑ Appeal to Supreme Court‑‑‑Counsel of the ‑ appellant at the very outset of, the argument pointed out that since the grant of leave to appeal in the case, Supreme Court had in a number of cases rejected the plea on which leave to appeal was granted ‑‑‑ Supreme Court dismissed the appeal but on account of the fairness shown by the counsel for appellants, no order as to cost was passed. Mukhtar v. Khakan and others 1983 SCMR 290; Haji Inayat Khan v. Murtaza Khan and others 1988 SCMR 1172 and Gulzada v. Muhammad Usman PLD 1990 SC 465 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑ ‑‑‑‑ Art. 185‑‑‑Appeal to Supreme Court ‑‑‑ Appellants' appeal was dismissed on the ground that since the grant of leave to appeal in the case Supreme Court had in a number of cases rejected the plea on which leave to appeal was granted‑ Respondents prayed that despite the respondents having failed to obtain an order granting leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court, they were entitled to relief through cross objections filed against the present appeal, which should be allowed and the decree passed in favour of appellants, should be set aside? Held, leave to appeal having been refused by a separate earlier order, the prayer made from the respondents' side if allowed would create confusion and might lead to conflicting results ‑‑‑ Plea was dismissed. Mian Muhammad Younas, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ch Akhtar Ali, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellants. Z. Mahfooz Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Nemo for the other Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th November, 1990. JUDGMENT MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.‑‑This appeal through leave of the Court, by plaintiffs in a suit for pre‑emption, is directed against a Revisional judgment by the High Court. The plaintiffs/appellants filed suit for pre‑emption of land measuring 22 kanals. It was decreed for only 4 kanals and 4 marlas comprising of Khasra Nos.16, 18 and 19. The suit in respect of Khasra Nos.48/28 and 46/27 was dismissed. The plaintiffs' first appeal was partly allowed inasmuch as that sale price of the land decreed in their favour was reduced. Their right to pre‑empt the sale regarding the remaining Khasra numbers was not recognized. Two Civil Revisions were filed‑‑one by the appellants/plaintiffs and the other by respondents/defendants. The appellants' Revision was allowed to the extent that they were held entitled to one more Khasra number; namely, 48/28. The respondents' Civil Revision was also allowed on the question of the price only. The appellants, not having been satisfied with regard to the remaining Khasra number; namely, 46/27, which it appears was the biggest piece of the sold land, sought leave to appeal which was granted to examine the following point:‑‑ "That since the land comprised in Khasra No.46/27 is situate in the same block and is borne on the same Khata as Khasra Nos.16, 18 and 19, the petitioners (appellants) are entitled to seek pre‑emption on the ground of vicinage in respect of this Khasra number also." Learned counsel for the appellants in the very outset pointed out that since the grant of leave to appeal in this case, the Supreme Court has in a number of cases rejected the plea on which leave to appeal was granted. He himself cited Mukhtar v. Khakan and others (1983 SCMR 290), Haji Inayat Khan v. Murtaza Khan and others (1988 SCMR 1172) and Gulzada v. Muhammad Usman PLD 1990 Supreme Court 465. That being the latest position this appeal is dismissed but on account of the fairness shown by the learned counsel for the appellants, there shall be no order as to costs. Before closing this order it needs to be mentioned that the learned counsel for the respondents/vendees prayed that despite the respondents having failed to obtain an order granting leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court, they are entitled to relief through cross‑objections filed against the present appeal, which should be allowed and the decree passed in favour of the appellants should be set aside Leave to appeal having been refused to the respondents by a separate earlier order, the prayer made from the respondents' side if allowed will create confusion and might lead to conflicting results. Otherwise too we do not find any merit in the cross‑objections. The same, accordingly, are dismissed M.BA./M‑1155/S????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal allowed.