1982 PLP 338 (PLC)
GRINDLAYS BANK LTD., RAWALPINDI Versus EMPLOYEES' UNION
| Citation | 1982 PLP 338 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | 1st Labour Court Punjab |
| Bench Members | Saeed Ahmad, Presiding Officer |
| Parties | GRINDLAYS BANK LTD., RAWALPINDI Versus EMPLOYEES' UNION |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1982 PLP 338 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1982 PLP 338 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the 1st Labour Court Punjab bench comprising: Saeed Ahmad, Presiding Officer.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1982 PLP 338 (PLC) (GRINDLAYS BANK LTD., RAWALPINDI Versus EMPLOYEES' UNION). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Saad Ullah for Petitioner.
- Mohammad Sadiq for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ ‑‑ Ss:‑34‑& 39-Settlement Raising of industrial dispute during currency of settlement‑Great sanctity attached to settle ment‑Must be given weight so as to maintain industrial peace Settlement containing condition that no demand of financial implication shall be raised during its currency‑Demand can be raised notwithstanding such condition provided it is proved that circumstances have changed Whether circumstances have changed‑Question of fact which can be considered in an industrial, dispute. 1960 P L C 166; 1966 L C 279: 1964 PLC 87 and 1975 PLC 153 ref. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑ ‑‑ Ss.26& 44‑Demand Raising of during pendency of industrial dispute‑Possible if demand raised not same as forming subject‑matter of pending industrial dispute.
Judgment & Decree
3. It was specifically provided in the above contention that no de mands having any financial implications for the Back or any of the demands contained in the Annex: shall be raised during the currency of settlement. The duration of the settlement was 18 months. No demands could be raised up to 31st March, 1977. Even thereafter the settlement was to continue until any party had informed the other party in writing of its intention of no longer to be bound by the settlement.
4. In spite of the above contention a demand notice was given by the Union on 2nd April, 1976. Bilateral negotiations failed and after obtaining a failure certificate from the conciliator the industrial dispute was brought before the Punjab Labour Court No.
2. The petition was dismissed on 23rdAugust, 1976 on the ground that the dispute was not maintainable. The Union preferred an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and presumably it is still pending, In the meantime the Union served fresh Demand Notice thrice. In all the notices of de mands were served on the Bank for four times during the subsistence of the settlement. The date is as under: (1) First Demand Notice served on 2nd April, 1976. (2) Second Demand Notice served on 29th April, 1976. (3) Third Demand Notice served on 13th July, 1976. (4) Fourth Demand Notice served on 10th September, 1976.
5. The reason for serving so many Demand Notices, according to the petitioner, is that Mr. Zafar Iqbal, the General Secretary of the respondent union was held guilty of misconduct and an application under section 47(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 seeking per mission of the Labour Court had been lodged to dismiss him. In order to save him from the proposed punishment, the Union was bent upon crea ting trouble by serving these Demand Notices. Under the above circum stances the petitioner has prayed for a direction to the respondent not to serve any fresh Demand/Strike Notice during the pendency of the Indus trial Dispute before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and during the cur rency of the settlement dated 29th October, 1975. The following two questions need determination in this case . (i) Whether a Union cannot raise any industrial dispute during the currency of the Settlement dated 29th October1975. (ii) Whether the union cannot serve a fresh Demand Notice during the pendency of an industrial dispute ?
6. On the first question reference maybe made to 1960 P L C' 166; 1966 P L C 279, 1964 P L C 87 and 1975 P L C
153. A 'perusal of these decisions would show that great sanctity has been attached to the settlement arrived at between the parties. A settlement arrived at between the parties must be given due weight, so as to maintain industrial peace, The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has fixed period of operation of a settlement for two years. The intention of the Legislature appears to be that when a settlement has been arrived at between the parties, the spirit off the settlement must remain binding on the parties, for sufficiently, long period, so that the Management and the workers are able to work in. amity and peace.
7. However, there are circumstances where a fresh industrial dispute can be raised in spite of any settlement even if there is a condition in the settlement that no demands having any financial implications shall be raised during the currency of the settlement. The Unions can raise any demand provided it can be proved that the circumstances have been changed. Whether the circumstances are changed or not is a question of fact and it can be considered in the industrial dispute raised by the Union. In the present case the first industrial dispute after the settlement of 29th October, 1975 was raised on 2nd April, 1976. The question of new circumstances was to be examined by the Court before whom industrial dispute was pending. This question cannot be taken up in petition under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It may be stated here that the said dispute was dismissed by the Labour Court No. 2 on 23rd August, 1976. The decision of the said Court is not before me. I am not aware as to why the industrial dispute was dismissed. As the Union is at liberty to prove that the circumstances have been changed, therefore, they can bring a fresh. industrial dispute before the Labour Court.
8. Admittedly 4 Demand Notices have been served so far. The first Demand Notice became the basis of the industrial dispute which was dismissed on 23rd August, 1976. An appeal was filed before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appeal is still pending. Obviously the indus trial dispute shall be treated as pending. The question is whether during the pendency of the industrial dispute the Union was competent to serve fresh Demand/Strike notices on the petitioner‑Bank. The relevant provision of law is section 44 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which reproduced below:‑ "No notice of strike or lock‑out shall be served by any party to an industrial dispute while, any conciliation proceedings or proceed ings before an Arbitrator or a Labour Court or an appeal to the Tribunal under subsection (3) of section 38 is pending in respect of any matter constituting such industrial dispute."
9. The words "in respect of any matter constituting such industrial dispute" are significant. It was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the subject‑matter of the Industrial dispute is the same as given in Demand Notice dated 21st April, 1976 and 10th September, 1976.
10. Notices dated 21st April 1976 and 29th April, 1976 are Exhs. P.
3. P.
4. They relate to a grievance in respect of special increments given to certain favourite of the Bank. They do not amount to any strike notice. The last notice dated 10th September, 1976 is Exh. P.
6. It is a Demand Notice under section 26 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and it can be made a basis for a fresh industrial dispute. As the industrial dis pute pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal is not before us there fore I cannot say whether the demands raised in the notice (Exh. P. 6) are the same, which forms the subject‑matter of the previous industrial dispute. It is not proved that the fresh Demand Notice attracts the pro visions of section 44 or not.
11. Both the questions are decided against the petitioners.
12. For the above reasons the petition is hereby dismissed.