P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

6. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the sale was fraudulently kept secret from Jahana plaintiff‑appellant and, therefore, time will run against him from the date when he learnt of the transaction as contemplated by section 18 of the Limitation Act which reads: -- "Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded, or where any document necessary to establish such right has been fraudulently concealed from him, the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application‑- (a) against the person guilty of the fraud or aocessory thereto, or (b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the persons injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production." It was argued that Jahana could have filed the suit within one year from the date on which he learnt of the sale. In support of his contention that the sale had been kept secret from Jahana, the learned counsel relied on .the fact that the sale‑deed was executed and registered at Lahore, although the land in dispute is situated in the district of Shahpur. As already stated, the vendors are now settled in Lahore and this explains why the sale deed was executed and registered at Lahore. Mere concealment does not necessarily imply fraud. There must be some evidence to establish affirmatively that the respondents had designed to prevent the discovery of the cause of action from the plaintiff. In pre‑emption cases wilful omission to notify the fact of sale to the pre‑emptor does not per se connote a fraud. In Kaka Ram v. Muhammad Ali and others (209 P L R 1911), it was held as follows: ‑ "Mere omission on the part of a vendor to give notice of sale to a pre‑emptor does not amount to fraud within the meaning of section

18. It mast be shown not merely that the sale was not proclaimed but that it was fraudulently con cealed." It is noteworthy that the plaintiff did not allege fraud in the plaint. All that is alleged therein is that the vendors and the vendees conspired and kept the factum of the sale secret from him. Order VII, rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: ‑ "Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed." In Kalyan Mal. v. Ahmad‑ud‑din Khan (A I R 1934 P C 208), while considering Order VII, rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, their Lordships observed: ‑ "The learned counsel for the appellant has also urged that the case against Bashir‑ud‑din should be treated as one of fraud to which section 18, Limitation Act (IX of 1901), would be applicable. He has contended that Bashir‑ud‑din repre sented himself to be a joint owner of the mortgaged property, and that the plaintiff was, by reason of that fraud, prevented from instituting the suit within the period of six years pre scribed by law. It is unnecessary for their Lordships to deal with the merits of the question. It is clear that the contention was never put forward in either of the Courts in India and that, while Order VII, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, provides that where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption from such law is claimed, no exemption on the ground of fraud was claimed in the plain. Nor is there any proof of the alleged fraud, or of the date when it became known to the plaintiff." The plaintiff did not allege fraud even in his statement at the trial, the relevant portion of which statement is as follows: ‑ In Ghalam Raza v. Sardar Khan (86 P R 1902) Division Bench of the Punjab Chief Court held: ‑ "The expression `by means of fraud' as such in section 18 of the Limitation Act, means active deceit in defrauding or endea vouring to defraud a person of his rights by some artful device; therefore where the vendor and the vendee had by their act of omission and commission in point of fact kept the pre‑emptor from the knowledge of the sale, but were able to prove that neither of them had any intention to fraudulently conceal the sale from the pre‑emptor, and were able to give a reasonable explanation of their conduct and the acts alleged to constitute fraud, the pre‑emptor was not under the circumstances entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 18 of the Limitation Act:" We have carefully considered the plaintiff's statement. He has not referred to, any act on the part of the vendors or the vendees showing that they had an intention to deceive hint. Merely that the sale‑deed was executed and registered at Lahore does not warrant the inference of fraud.

7. Both the Court below have held that the plaintiff' learnt of the sale when he handed over‑possession of the land in suit to the vendee in March or April 1953. This is a finding of fact and cannot be challenged in second appeal.

8. For the reasons given above, we find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs. K. M. A. Appeal dismissed,