P L D 1973 Lahore 739 (PLP)

The plan of land may be inspected in the office of the Land Acquisition Collector (Industries), Poonch House, Lahore. Specification District Tehsil Village Square No. Khasra No. Area K. M. Sheikhu‑ pura Feroze‑ wala Feroze‑ wale 45/1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 46/2/1 1481/1 5/1 47/4/1 5/1 145 145 245 144 144 150 150 1480/1 949/1 1012/ 4/1 3/1 2/1 8/1 7/1 4/1 4/1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 16 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 Grand Total 22 2 Muhammad Siddique Chaudhry, Commissioner, Lahore Division.

5. The petitioners who are owners of the land in question have come up in writ petition against the aforesaid proceedings and Notifications etc., with the following prayer: which is contained in their amended writ petition:‑ "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the acquisition of the land of the petitioners measuring 22 kanals 2 marlas bearing Khasra Nos. 1454/1, 1453/1, 1452/1, 1448/1, 1447/1, 1503/1, 1504/1, 1505/1, 1481/1, 1480/1, 949/1 and 1012/1, in square No. 451/1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 4/1, 5/1, 46/1/1. 2/1, 3/1, 4/1, 5/1, 47/4/1 and 5/1 situated in Ferozewala, Tehsil Ferozewala District Sheikhupura, the notification dated 3‑2‑1970, Annexure `A', by the Collector, Sheikhupura District Sheikhupura, the Notification dated 26‑12‑1970, (Annexure D), issued by the Commissioner Lahore Division, Lahore and the actions taken under and in pursuance of the said notifications by the Collector, the Commissioner and the Officers/ Workers/ Labourers of Messrs Waqar Ceramics, Ltd., may very kindly be declared to be illegal, without jurisdiction, without lawful authority and to be of no legal effect and, it is further prayed that appropriate directions may he issued to the respondents to give up the acquisition of the land of the petitioners."

6. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the agreement contemplated in section 39 of the Act (which has been reproduced above), should have preceded the notification under section 17(4) of the Act. For this proposition, reliance was placed on Ch. Khushi Muhammad v. The Commissioner, Multan Division. Multan and 3 others (P L D 1965 Lah. 250) where at page 256 Muhammad Yaqub Ali, J., (as then his Lordship way) wrote that, "if .the acquisition in the present case was for the benefit of a Company simpliciter, the respondent No. 1 would, undoubtedly, have been incompetent to dispense with the provisions of the agreement under section 39 of the Act". To the same strain is Rajan Singh and others v. State and another (A I R 1959 All. 635). The proposition of law, as being propounded by the learned counsel for the petitioners seems quite in order, but in my view, it has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the agreement executed between the Company and the Government, it is clearly recited that, "the land is needed for the purposes of approach road and the said work is likely to prove useful to the public. At another place, in the agreement it is written, "that the land shall be used only for the purpose of approaching road etc., in accordance with` rules prescribed for the sanction of the plans of the Municipal Committee, Improvement Trust . . . . "Still another recital in the agreement is that, "the Company shall provide employment to the public and it shall also provide technical knowledge and training to suitable members of the public." This recital clearly shows that the land was not being acquired for the Company simpliciter but was also being acquired for a public purpose. In this view of the matter the case does not fall within the objection raised by the learned counsel and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances hereinbefore mentioned, the execution of the agreement need not have preceded the issuance of a notification under section 17(4) of the Act. That the land was needed for public purpose is also evident from the recitals in the notifications under section 6 of the Act reproduced above, wherein it was indicated that the land was needed for public purpose by Messrs Waqar Ceramics Limited for building an approach road to their factory. In subsection (3) of section 6 of the Act, it is laid down that, "the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company as the case may." Apart from the statutory presumption attached to the declaration hereinbefore mentioned, there has been brought no material on the record to show anything to the contrary or in rebuttal. It Is to be pointed out that as laid down in Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian Evacuee Property West Pakistan Lahore and 4 others (P L D 1971 S C 811) fn cases of acquisition of land another principle which Is attracted Is that before an order passed by a public authority is struck down, it is the duty of the Court to explore every possible explanation for Its validity and examine the entire field of powers conferred on the authority in pursuance of which the impugned order has been passed. I have proceeded in accordance with the law declared by the Supreme Court and asked the parties to place all the relevant notifications on the record which have been reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. A perusal of the relevant material thus discloses that there was nothing infirm in the action of the acquiring authorities.

7. The next point argued was that in section 39 of the Act It was laid down that, "the provisions of sections 6 to 37 (both Inclusive) shall not be put up in force In order to acquire land for any Company unless with the previous consent of the Provincial Government nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned". Learned counsel submitted that in the instant case there was no consent of the y Provincial Government previous to the notifications under section 6 of the Act. I have already held that the acquisition in band was not for the Company simpliciter but was also for a public purpose. The contention raised, therefore, has no substance and even otherwise it is just a repetition of the same point in another form which has already been disposed of by me earlier.

8. No other point was argued before me.

9. The result is that this petition has no merit and is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.